| 1. |
- Batrancea, Larissa, et al.
(författare)
-
Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations
- 2019
-
Ingår i: Journal of Economic Psychology. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-4870 .- 1872-7719. ; 74
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2019 The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
|
|
| 2. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
-
Regulatory dealing: Technology adoption versus enforcement stringency of emission taxes
- 2014
-
Ingår i: Contemporary economic policy. - : Wiley. - 1074-3529. ; 32:2, s. 451-473
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze the role of targeted enforcement of emissions taxes when the regulator wants to minimize aggregate emissions via the adoption of new more environmentally friendly technology. The regulator wants to speed up the path of technology adoption generated by a policy of uniform enforcement (that monitors adopters and nonadopters with the same probability) by engaging in a regulatory deal where a reduced monitoring probability is granted in "exchange" for adoption of the new technology. We set up a theoretical model, characterize the circumstances in which such dealing minimizes aggregate emissions, and test our hypothesis using economic laboratory experiments. Our analytical and experimental results suggest that even though such a deal might imply an increased level of violation by adopters, such tolerance is rather an integral part of an overall enforcement strategy that minimizes aggregate emissions when the rate of adoption is endogenous. (JEL L51, Q53, Q55, Q58) © 2013 Western Economic Association International.
|
|
| 3. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
-
Should we tax or let firms trade emissions? An experimental analysis with policy implications for developing countries
- 2011
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper we use laboratory experiments to test the theoretical predictions derived by Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010) about the effects of the interaction between technology adoption and incomplete enforcement. They show that under Tradable Emissions Permits (TEPs), and in contrast to taxes, the fall in permit price produced by adoption of environmentally friendly technologies reduces the benefits of violating the environmental regulation at the margin and leads firms to improve their compliance behavior. Moreover, when TEPs are used, the regulator can speed up the diffusion of new technologies since the benefits from adopting the new technology increase with the enforcement stringency. Our experimental results confirm these theoretical predictions. While the aggregate emissions do not statistically differ between the two policy instruments, the fraction of firms violating the regulation and the aggregate extent of violation are lower under TEPs than under emission taxes regardless of the monitoring probability. Hence, in contrast to previous studies, our results indicate that TEPs would appear to be a feasible policy alternative in weak regulatory contexts.
|
|
| 4. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
-
Why Do Environmental Taxes Work Better in Developed Countries?
- 2011
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We compare of the performance of emission taxes between Colombia and Sweden in an experimental setting where subjects are regulated through environmental taxes and had to decide on emission levels, compliance behavior, and adoption of an environmentally friendly technology. Our design allows us to analyze the role of variations in the stringency of the policy enforcement by regulatory agencies in two different cultural contexts. In line with previous literature that emphasizes the role of social norms and intrinsic motivations explaining compliance behavior, we find that actual emissions and tax underreporting are lower than predicted by traditional models that are solely based on self-interested preferences. However, we find that for an equivalent monitoring stringency, there are no statistically significant differences in emission levels and compliance behavior between Colombian and Swedish subjects. This is to say that despite the positive effect of social norms enhancing compliance, a more stringent enforcement remains as an important mechanism to induce firms to comply with the regulation.
|
|
| 5. |
- Guzmán, Andrea, et al.
(författare)
-
Social Information and Charitable Giving: An artefactual field experiment with young children and adolescents
- 2013
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A growing literature in economics examines the development of preferences among children and adolescents. This paper combines a repeated dictator game with treatments that either provides participants with information about the average behavior of others or not. Collecting data on 384 children aged 5-17, we find that sensitivity to social information is present already in early life and that information about others’ donations can reduce, but primarily increases donations.
|
|
| 6. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
-
Conditional Cooperation and Disclosure in Developing Countries
- 2012
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Understanding the motivations behind people’s voluntary contributions to public goods is crucial for the broader issues of economic and social development. By using the experimental design of Fischbacher et al. (2001), we investigate the distribution of contribution types in two developing countries with very high collectivism rating – Colombia and Vietnam – and compare our findings with those previously found in developed countries. We also investigate the effect of introducing disclosure of contribution on the distribution of contribution types and on the contribution itself. Overall, our experiments show that the distribution of contribution types remains unaffected by the disclosure of contributions and, on average, is similar both in the two countries and when compared with previous findings with the exception of proportion of free-riders.
|
|
| 7. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
-
Conditional cooperation and disclosure in developing countries
- 2013
-
Ingår i: Journal of Economic Psychology. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-4870. ; 34, s. 148-155
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Understanding the motivations behind people's voluntary contributions to public goods is crucial for the broader issues of economic and social development. By using the experimental design of Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr (2001), we investigate the distribution of contribution types in two developing countries with very high collectivism rating - Colombia and Vietnam - and compare our findings with those previously found in developed countries. We also investigate the effect of introducing disclosure of contribution on the distribution of contribution types and on the contribution itself. Overall, our experiments show that the distribution of contribution types remains unaffected by the disclosure of contributions and, on average, is similar both in the two countries and when compared with previous findings with the exception of proportion of free-riders. (c) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
|
|
| 8. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
-
Conditional Cooperation and Social Group - Experimental results from Colombia
- 2009
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In contrast to previous studies on cross-group comparisons of conditional cooperation, this study keeps cross- and within-country dimensions constant. The results reveal significantly different cooperation behavior between social groups in the same location.
|
|
| 9. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
-
Cooperation and social classes: evidence from Colombia
- 2015
-
Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 45:4, s. 829-848
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We investigate the relationship between social class belonging and contributions to local public goods. By utilizing the social class classifications in Colombia and an experimental design based on the strategy method, we can both study contributions to public goods and classify subjects into contribution types. We find similar contribution levels between high and medium-low social classes and also similar distributions of contributor types. However, low social class members conditionally contribute a significantly higher level than high social class members. This has implications for policymakers, who may need to consider differential policy schemes for locally provided public goods. © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
|
|
| 10. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
-
Does disclosure crowd out cooperation?
- 2010
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper investigates whether disclosure crowds out pro-social behavior using a public goods experiment. In a between-subject design, we investigate different degrees of disclosure. We find a small positive but insignificant effect of disclosure treatments on contributions to the public good. Thus, our empirical findings are consistent with crowding theory.
|
|
