| 1. |
- Asheim, G. B., et al.
(författare)
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Epistemically robust strategy subsets
- 2016
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Ingår i: Games. - : MDPI AG. - 2073-4336. ; 7:4
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian product Y of player type subsets with X as the associated set of best reply profiles such that the set Yi contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of types in Y-i and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability.
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| 2. |
- Fiestras-Janeiroc, MG, et al.
(författare)
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Characterizing cautious choice
- 2008
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Ingår i: Mathematical Social Sciences. - : Elsevier. - 1879-3118 .- 0165-4896. ; 55:2, s. 143-155
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The set of maximin actions in general decision problems is characterized.
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| 3. |
- Grahn, Sofia, et al.
(författare)
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A minimal test for convex games and the Shapley value
- 2001
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.
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| 4. |
- Grahn, Sofia, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
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Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes in Bankruptcy Games
- 2001
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Ingår i: Annals of Operations Research. - : Kluwer Academic Publishers. - 0254-5330 .- 1572-9338. ; 109:1-4, s. 315-327
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The USA Bankruptcy Code legislates the bankruptcy of firms. Any allocation mechanism that is legal according to the Bankruptcy Code is necessarily population monotonic. Bankruptcy rules yielding a population monotonic allocation scheme in the associated bankruptcy game are characterized by efficiency, reasonability (each claimant receives a nonnegative amount not exceeding his claim), and the thieve property. The thieve property for bankruptcy problems entails that if a claimant manages to escape with his claim, the amount allocated to each remaining claimant is not larger than his share in the original problem. Many bankruptcy rules studied in the literature are efficient, reasonable, self-consistent, and monotonic. Rules satisfying these axioms are shown to yield population monotonic allocation schemes.
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| 5. |
- Ilinov, Pavel, et al.
(författare)
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Sequential Search with Flexible Information
- 2023
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Ingår i: SSRN Electronic Journal. - : SSRN. - 1556-5068 .- 1556-5068.
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper extends the classical search framework and allows the decision-maker to choose information endogenously and flexibly. We consider a problem in which the manager chooses the best among two ex ante identical candidates. The manager learns the qualities of candidates sequentially and can choose the information structure by herself. We show that the manager may learn different information about candidates, but this does not lead to discrimination against a candidate: she chooses them uniformly on average. We connect our findings with the serial-position effect from the psychological literature. Also, we show that our results extend to a more general framework with two candidates. Including an additional candidate in our model creates discrimination against the last candidate.
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| 6. |
- Jonsson, Adam, et al.
(författare)
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The limit of discounted utilitarianism
- 2018
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Ingår i: Theoretical Economics. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 1933-6837 .- 1555-7561. ; 13:1, s. 19-37
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper presents an infinite-horizon version of intergenerational utilitarianism. By studying discounted utilitarianism as the discount factor tends to one, we obtain a new welfare criterion: limit-discounted utilitarianism (LDU). We show that LDU meets the standard assumptions of efficiency, equity, and interpersonal comparability, but allows us to compare more pairs of utility streams than commonly-used utilitarian criteria, including the overtaking criterion and the catching-up criterion. We also introduce a principle of compensation for postponements of utility streams and use it to characterize the LDU criterion on a restricted domain.
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| 7. |
- Jonsson, Adam, et al.
(författare)
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The limit of discounted utilitarianism
- 2017
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper presents an infinite-horizon version of intergenerational utilitarianism. By studying discounted utilitarianism as the discount factor tends to one, we obtain a new welfare criterion: limit-discounted utilitarianism (LDU). We show that LDU meets standard assumptions on efficiency, equity, and interpersonal comparability, but allows us to compare more pairs of utility streams than commonly used utilitarian criteria do, including the overtaking criterion and the catching-up criterion. We also introduce a principle of compensation for postponements of utility streams and use it to characterize the LDU criterion on a restricted domain.
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| 8. |
- Jonsson, Adam, et al.
(författare)
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Utilitarianism on infinite utility streams : summable differences and finite averages
- 2015
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Ingår i: Economic Theory Bulletin. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 2196-1085 .- 2196-1093. ; 3:1, s. 19-31
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper provides axiomatic descriptions of social welfare relations, defined on infinite streams of utility, that are consistent with the utilitarian criterion on subsets where maximizing aggregate utility has a clear interpretation: the streams, or their differences, are summable. Besides standard assumptions on efficiency, equity and interpersonal comparability, two axioms are introduced and shown to be necessary and sufficient. A more general version of one axiom suffices to distinguish streams with different long-run averages.
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| 9. |
- Kasyanov, P.O., et al.
(författare)
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Berge's maximum theorem for noncompact image sets
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications. - : Elsevier. - 0022-247X. ; 413:2, s. 1040-1046
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This note generalizes Berge's maximum theorem to noncompact image sets. It also clarifies the results from Feinberg, Kasyanov and Zadoianchuk (2013) [7] on the extension to noncompact image sets of another Berge's theorem, that states semi-continuity of value functions. Here we explain that the notion of a K-inf-compact function introduced there is applicable to metrizable topological spaces and to more general compactly generated topological spaces. For Hausdorff topological spaces we introduce the notion of a KN-inf-compact function (N stands for "nets" in K-inf-compactness), which coincides with K-inf-compactness for compactly generated and, in particular, for metrizable topological spaces. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
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| 10. |
- Kosfeld, Michael, et al.
(författare)
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A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching
- 2002
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Ingår i: Games and economic behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 40:2, s. 270-298
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze a myopic strategy adjustment process in strategic-form games. It is shown that the steady states of the continuous time limit, which is constructed assuming frequent play and slow adjustment of strategies, are exactly the best-reply matching equilibria, as discussed by Droste, Kosfeld, and Voorneveld (2000. Mimeo, Tilburg University). In a best-reply matching equilibrium every player ‘matches’ the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this pure strategy is a best reply to the pure-strategy profile played by his opponents. We derive stability results for the steady states of the continuous time limit in 2×2 bimatrix games and coordination games. Analyzing the asymptotic behavior of the stochastic adjustment process in discrete time shows convergence to minimal curb sets of the game. Moreover, absorbing states of the process correspond to best-reply matching equilibria of the game.
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