| 1. |
- Afsar, Atahan, et al.
(författare)
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Political Power in the Swedish Riksdag
- 2021
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Ingår i: SSRN Electronic Journal. - : SSRN. - 1556-5068 .- 1556-5068.
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In recent years many parliaments have become fragmented and polarized, with difficulties to form government. Traditional party alliances have changed, new parties have been established, and some of these are shunned by the traditional parties. Fragile minority governments are formed and break up. We propose a game-theoretic framework for analysis of political power in parliaments for situations when party affilations change and new coalitions are formed. More speciffically, we use and modify tools from cooperative game theory, in particular Myerson (1977) and Alonso-Meijide and Carreras (2011). The analytical framework is applied to the current Swedish parliament
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| 2. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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A generalization of Hamilton's rule-Love others how much?
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Biology. - : Elsevier BV. - 0022-5193 .- 1095-8541. ; 299, s. 42-54
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to Hamilton's (1964a, b) rule, a costly action will be undertaken if its fitness cost to the actor falls short of the discounted benefit to the recipient, where the discount factor is Wright's index of relatedness between the two. We propose a generalization of this rule, and show that if evolution operates at the level of behavior rules, rather than directly at the level of actions, evolution will select behavior rules that induce a degree of cooperation that may differ from that predicted by Hamilton's rule as applied to actions. In social dilemmas there will be less (more) cooperation than under Hamilton's rule if the actions are strategic substitutes (complements). Our approach is based on natural selection, defined in terms of personal (direct) fitness, and applies to a wide range of pairwise interactions.
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| 3. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Does evolution lead to maximizing behavior?
- 2015
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Ingår i: Evolution. - : Wiley: 12 months. - 0014-3820. ; 69:7, s. 1858-1873
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A long-standing question in biology and economics is whether individual organisms evolve to behave as if they were striving to maximize some goal function. We here formalize this “as if” question in a patch-structured population in which individuals obtain material payoffs from (perhaps very complex multimove) social interactions. These material payoffs determine personal fitness and, ultimately, invasion fitness. We ask whether individuals in uninvadable population states will appear to be maximizing conventional goal functions (with population-structure coefficients exogenous to the individual's behavior), when what is really being maximized is invasion fitness at the genetic level. We reach two broad conclusions. First, no simple and general individual-centered goal function emerges from the analysis. This stems from the fact that invasion fitness is a gene-centered multigenerational measure of evolutionary success. Second, when selection is weak, all multigenerational effects of selection can be summarized in a neutral type-distribution quantifying identity-by-descent between individuals within patches. Individuals then behave as if they were striving to maximize a weighted sum of material payoffs (own and others). At an uninvadable state it is as if individuals would freely choose their actions and play a Nash equilibrium of a game with a goal function that combines self-interest (own material payoff), group interest (group material payoff if everyone does the same), and local rivalry (material payoff differences).
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| 4. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution and Kantian morality
- 2016
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Academic Press. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 98, s. 56-67
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative. Individuals' preferences are their private information. The set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions. We show that a certain class of such preferences, that combine self-interest with morality of a Kantian flavor, are evolutionarily stable, and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable. We also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of Maynard Smith's and Price's (1973) notion of evolutionary stability of strategies.
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| 5. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution and Kantian morality: a correction and addendum
- 2022
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (Games and Economic Behavior, 2016) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moralis with the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a stronger hypothesis that guarantees existence, and we also establish a new and closely related result. As a by-product, we also obtain an extension of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (Econometrica, 2013).
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| 6. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum
- 2024
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 140, s. 585-587
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2016, Games and Economic Behavior) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moralis with the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a stronger hypothesis that guarantees existence, and we also establish a new and closely related result. As a by-product, we also obtain an extension of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2013, Econometrica).
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| 7. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Theory. - : Elsevier. - 1095-7235 .- 0022-0531. ; 185
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- During human evolution, individuals interacted mostly within small groups that were connected by limited migration and sometimes by conflicts. Which preferences, if any, will prevail in such scenarios? Building on population biology models of spatially structured populations, and assuming individuals' preferences to be their private information, we characterize those preferences that, once established, cannot be displaced by alternative preferences. We represent such uninvadable preferences in terms of fitness and in terms of material payoffs. At the fitness level, individuals can be regarded to act as if driven by a mix of self-interest and a Kantian motive that evaluates own behavior in the light of the consequences for own fitness if others adopted this behavior. This Kantian motive is borne out from (genetic or cultural) kin selection. At the material-payoff level, individuals act as if driven in part by self-interest and a Kantian motive (in terms of material payoffs), but also in part by other-regarding preferences towards other group members. This latter motive is borne out of group resource constraints and the risk of conflict with other groups. We show how group size, the migration rate, the risk of group conflicts, and cultural loyalty shape the relative strengths of these motives.
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| 8. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation
- 2018
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that material outcomes drive evolutionary success, under what circumstances does evolution promote Homo oeconomicus, defined as material self-interest, and when does it instead lead to other preferences? The literature suggests that Homo oeconomicus is favored by evolution only when individuals' preferences are their private information and the population is large and well-mixed so that individuals with rare mutant preferences almost never get to interact with each other. If rare mutants instead interact more often (say, due to local dispersion), evolution instead favors a certain generalization of Homo oeconomicus including a Kantian concern. If individuals interact under complete information about preferences, evolution destabilizes Homo oeconomicus in virtually all games.
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| 10. |
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