| 1. |
- Buhl-Mortensen, Lene, et al.
(författare)
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Carbon sequestration, the precautionary approach and the responsibility of scientists
- 2005
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Ingår i: Water Science and Technology. - 0273-1223 .- 1996-9732. ; 52:6, s. 205-212
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper reviews problems connected to the use of the deep-sea and sub-sea geological formations for carbon sequestration. We will focus on the risks and dangers involved in using this kind of large-scale engineering approach, which is not yet fully tested, to combat global warming. We will not provide a complete discussion on the technologies involved, but concentrate on a few principal questions, such as the responsibility of environmental scientists involved in this research. We will also discuss carbon sequestration in relation to the precautionary approach. We argue that there may be a place for large-scale engineering attempts, but this should be the last rather than the first option. © IWA Publishing 2005.
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| 2. |
- Grankvist, Hannah, 1976-, et al.
(författare)
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Germ line gene therapy - why not!
- 2004
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Ingår i: XVIIIth European Conference on Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care,2004. ; , s. 48-49
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 3. |
- Jaarsma, Pier, 1960-, et al.
(författare)
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Autism, Accommodation and Treatment: A Rejoinder to Chong-Ming Lims Critique
- 2015
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Ingår i: Bioethics. - : WILEY-BLACKWELL. - 0269-9702 .- 1467-8519. ; 29:9, s. 684-685
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We are very grateful to Chong-Ming Lim for his thoughtful reply published in this journal on one of our articles, which motivated us to think more carefully about accommodating autistic individuals and treating autism. However we believe there are some confusions in Lims argument. Lim uses the accommodation thesis, according to which we should accommodate autistic individuals rather than treat autism, as the starting point for his reasoning. He claims that if the accommodation thesis is right, then we should not treat autistic individuals for their autism, not even low-functioning (i.e. intellectually disabled) ones, because this would be disrespectful to all autistic individuals. We should instead limit ourselves to accommodate all autistic individuals. However, the opposition between accommodation and treatment is not valid in the case of autism, because of ambiguity in the concepts of accommodation and treatment. Moreover there is confusion in Lims reasoning caused by omitting important facts about the practice of treating autism.
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| 4. |
- Jaarsma, Pier, 1960-, et al.
(författare)
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Autism as a Natural Human Variation : Reflections on the Claims of the Neurodiversity Movement
- 2012
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Ingår i: Health Care Analysis. - Dordrecht : Springer. - 1065-3058 .- 1573-3394. ; 20:1, s. 20-30
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Neurodiversity has remained a controversial concept over the last decade. In its broadest sense the concept of neurodiversity regards atypical neurological development as a normal human difference. The neurodiversity claim contains at least two different aspects. The first aspect is that autism, among other neurological conditions, is first and foremost a natural variation. The other aspect is about conferring rights and in particular value to the neurodiversity condition, demanding recognition and acceptance. Autism can be seen as a natural variation on par with for example homosexuality. The broad version of the neurodiversity claim, covering low-functioning as well as high-functioning autism, is problematic. Only a narrow conception of neurodiversity, referring exclusively to high-functioning autists, is reasonable. We will discuss the effects of DSM categorization and the medical model for high functioning autists. After a discussion of autism as a culture we will analyze various possible strategies for the neurodiversity movement to claim extra resources for autists as members of an underprivileged culture without being labelled disabled or as having a disorder. We will discuss their vulnerable status as a group and what obligation that confers on the majority of neurotypicals.
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| 5. |
- Jaarsma, Pier, 1960-, et al.
(författare)
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Human capabilities, mild autism, deafness and the morality of embryo selection
- 2013
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Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy. - : Springer Netherlands. - 1386-7423 .- 1572-8633. ; 16:4, s. 817-824
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A preimplantation genetic test to discriminate between severe and mild autism spectrum disorder might be developed in the foreseeable future. Recently, the philosophers Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane claimed that there are strong reasons for prospective parents to make use of such a test to prevent the birth of children who are disposed to autism or Asperger’s disorder. In this paper we will criticize this claim. We will discuss the morality of selection for mild autism in embryo selection in a hypothetical in vitro fertilization (IVF) situation where preimplantation genetic diagnosis is performed and compare this with a similar selection for congenital deafness. To do this we first discuss relevant human differences. We then introduce the principle of human capabilities (PC) and compare this principle with the principle of procreative beneficence (PB) introduced by Savulescu and Kahane. We apply the two principles to selection for mild autism and selection for congenital deafness. We argue that PC allows for the selection for mild autism but rules out selection for congenital deafness. PB will not give clear answers; the ruling of PB depends to a large extent on expected social, cultural and political developments. We will argue that PC is preferable to PB. We will discuss arguments for the value of mild autism for individuals who have this condition and argue that they are able to lead a life with human dignity provided autism-friendly social circumstances are present. Neither PC nor PB yields strong reasons for prospective parents to seek to prevent the birth of children who are disposed to mild autism spectrum disorder.
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| 6. |
- Jaarsma, Pier, 1960-, et al.
(författare)
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Living the Categorical Imperative : autistic perspectives on lying and truth telling-between Kant and care ethics
- 2012
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Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy. - Dordrecht : Springer. - 1386-7423 .- 1572-8633. ; 15:3, s. 271-277
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Lying is a common phenomenon amongst human beings. It seems to play a role in making social interactions run more smoothly. Too much honesty can be regarded as impolite or downright rude. Remarkably, lying is not a common phenomenon amongst normally intelligent human beings who are on the autism spectrum. They appear to be 'attractively morally innocent' and seem to have an above average moral conscientious objection against deception. In this paper, the behavior of persons with autism with regard to deception and truthfulness will be discussed in the light of two different ethical theories, illustrated by fragments from autobiographies of persons with autism. A systemizing 'Kantian' and an empathizing 'ethics of care' perspective reveal insights on high-functioning autism, truthfulness and moral behavior. Both perspectives are problematic from the point of view of a moral agent with autism. High-functioning persons with autism are, generally speaking, strong systemizes and weak empathizers. Particularly, they lack 'cognitive empathy' which would allow them to understand the position of the other person. Instead, some tend to invent a set of rules that makes their behavior compatible with the expectations of others. From a Kantian point of view, the autistic tendency to always tell the truth appears praiseworthy and should not be changed, though it creates problems in the social life of persons with autism. From a care ethics perspective, on the other hand, a way should be found to allow the high-functioning persons with autism to respect the feelings and needs of other persons as sometimes overruling the duty of truthfulness. We suggest this may even entail 'morally educating' children and adolescents with autism to become socially skilled empathic 'liars'.
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| 7. |
- Jaarsma, Pier
(författare)
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Reflections on Autism : Ethical Perspectives on Autism Spectrum Disorder in Health Care and Education
- 2014
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In the four papers presented in this dissertation I analyze and discuss various value statements and moral stances, which I regard as unjustifiably harmful for persons with Autism and obstacles for the creation of an Autism-friendly society. In the papers I try to show that the positions underpinning the Autism-phobic moral stances are not warranted and cannot be defended in a good way. In doing so, I hope to transform the harmful moral intuitions underlying these positions into autism-friendly ones. The first paper investigates the Neurodiversity claim that ‘Autism is a natural variation’. The claim is interpreted and investigated and an argument is given that, contrary to Low-Functioning Autism, High-Functioning Autism can indeed be seen as a natural variation, without necessarily being seen as a disability. The second paper focuses on the problem for persons with Autism to adapt to prosocial lying, which is saying something not true but socially acceptable in a situation. By comparing a Kantian approach and a care ethics approach, the paper ends up recommending teaching persons with Autism to lie in a rule based and empathic way. The third paper deals with the morality of embryo selection in IVF. Based on a widely shared intuition of natural capabilities, arguments are given that it is morally legitimate to choose an Autistic embryo instead of a ‘normal’ one, contrary to arguments given by proponents of ‘every child should have the best chance of the best life’. The fourth paper deals with moral education. An argument is given that due to problems with cognitive empathy children with Autism should be taught pro-social behavior in a rule based way.
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| 8. |
- Johansson, Anders, 1972-
(författare)
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Biopolitics and Reflexivity : A Study of GMO Policymaking in the European Union
- 2009
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The political discourse that has emerged as a consequence of establishing a European regulatory framework for GMOs has not been without problems. This dissertation addresses the political and regulatory challenges created by the development and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the EU. The underlying hypothesis in the dissertation is that the emergence of a European policy in the field of GMOs has appeared through new reflexive forms of governance. The aim of this research is to understand how these reflexive forms of regulation have emerged and operate within the EU, with a particular focus on the two GMO directives 90/220/EEC and 2001/18/EC. However, the study scrutinises the regulatory regimes from the 1970s onwards by investigating how the regulatory framework regarding GMOs has been developed and implemented in the EU. This is done through an analysis of the notion of ‘risk’ and the ‘precautionary principle’ since these concepts have been at the forefront of the GMO regulation debate. The empirical approach focuses on how the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council as well as other actors and institutions articulate ambivalence, interpretations and uncertainties in the decision-making processes regarding regulative measures for GMOs, with an accent on risk and the precautionary principle. The main empirical material has been documents concerning the inter-institutional process involved in the regulatory process of making the two directives. The analysis indicates that during the process of implementing GMO regulations, new steering strategies have appeared within the EU’s decision-making institutions when the objective of the regulation has taken centre stage in political and scientific controversies.
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Malmqvist, Erik, 1980-
(författare)
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Good Parents, Better Babies : An Argument about Reproductive Technologies, Enhancement and Ethics
- 2008
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This study is a contribution to the bioethical debate about new and possibly emerging reproductive technologies. Its point of departure is the intuition, which many people seem to share, that using such technologies to select non-disease traits – like sex and emotional stability - in yet unborn children is morally problematic, at least more so than using the technologies to avoid giving birth to children with severe genetic diseases, or attempting to shape the non-disease traits of already existing children by environmental means, like education. The study employs philosophical analysis for the purpose of making this intuition intelligible and judging whether it is justified.Different ways in which the moral problems posed by reproductive technologies are often framed in bioethical debates are criticised as inadequate for this task. In particular, it is argued that the intuition cannot fully be made sense of in terms of harm to the children that such technologies help create.The study attempts to elaborate an alternative to that broadly consequentialist approach, by drawing on Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, Hans Jonas’s ethics, and Aristotle’s practical philosophy, as it has been received and developed in the hermeneutical tradition. It is suggested that reproductive choices, unlike decisions for already born children, are characterised by a peculiar one-sidedness: the future child appears to the parents as something wholly theirs to decide about, not as a concrete other with whom they must interact in a responsive and attuned way. This is problematic because it means that such choices cannot call upon the particularised moral understanding only gained in interpersonal encounters. In particular, it makes them easily shaped by various tendencies, to which parents are always susceptible, to relate to children in instrumentalising ways, and at risk of reinforcing such tendencies. However, this does not mean that all uses of reproductive technologies are equally troubling. When selecting against severe disease the parents can rely on a widely shared illness experience to escape the dangers that one-sidedness involves. It is concluded that the intuition under discussion, thus explicated and in some ways qualified, makes sense morally.
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