| 1. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies
- 2007
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765 .- 1873-7374. ; 95:3, s. 398-401
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Anticipation of COVID-19 Vaccines Reduces Social Distancing
- 2020
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We show that the anticipation of COVID-19 vaccines reduces voluntary social distancing. In a large-scale preregistered survey experiment with a representative sample, we study whether providing information about the safety, effectiveness, and availability of COVID-19 vaccines affects compliance with public health guidelines. We find that vaccine information reduces peoples' voluntary social distancing, adherence to hygiene guidelines, and their willingness to stay at home. Vaccine information induces people to believe in a swifter return to normal life and puts their vigilance at ease. The results indicate an important behavioral drawback of the successful vaccine development: An increased focus on vaccines can lead to bad health behaviors and accelerate the spread of the virus. The results imply that, as vaccinations start and the end of the pandemic feels closer, existing policies aimed at increasing social distancing will be less effective and stricter policies might be required.
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| 3. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
-
Anticipation of COVID-19 vaccines reduces social distancing
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Health Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-6296. ; 80
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We investigate how the anticipation of COVID-19 vaccines affects voluntary social distancing. In a large-scale preregistered survey experiment with a representative sample, we study whether providing information about the safety, effectiveness, and availability of COVID-19 vaccines affects the willingness to comply with public health guidelines. We find that vaccine information reduces peoples’ voluntary social distancing, adherence to hygiene guidelines, and their willingness to stay at home. Getting positive information on COVID-19 vaccines induces people to believe in a swifter return to normal life. The results indicate an important behavioral drawback of successful vaccine development: An increased focus on vaccines can lower compliance with public health guidelines and accelerate the spread of infectious disease. The results imply that, as vaccinations roll out and the end of a pandemic feels closer, policies aimed at increasing social distancing will be less effective, and stricter policies might be required.
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| 4. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
-
Anticipation of COVID-19 vaccines reduces willingness to socially distance
- 2021
-
Ingår i: Journal of Health Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-6296 .- 1879-1646. ; 80
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We investigate how the anticipation of COVID-19 vaccines affects voluntary social distancing. In a large-scale preregistered survey experiment with a representative sample, we study whether providing information about the safety, effectiveness, and availability of COVID-19 vaccines affects the willingness to comply with public health guidelines. We find that vaccine information reduces peoples’ voluntary social distancing, adherence to hygiene guidelines, and their willingness to stay at home. Getting positive information on COVID-19 vaccines induces people to believe in a swifter return to normal life. The results indicate an important behavioral drawback of successful vaccine development: An increased focus on vaccines can lower compliance with public health guidelines and accelerate the spread of infectious disease. The results imply that, as vaccinations roll out and the end of a pandemic feels closer, policies aimed at increasing social distancing will be less effective, and stricter policies might be required.
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| 5. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Attityder och beteenden under covid-19-pandemin
- 2021
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk Debatt. - 0345-2646. ; 49:6, s. 5-18
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Sverige valde en annan väg under pandemin. Men vad tyckte egentligen svenskarna om strategin och hur utvecklades synen på strategin över tiden? Vad kännetecknar de som fann de svenska åtgärderna tillräckliga och de som ansåg dem otillräckliga? Vi presentar en kartläggning av attityder, oro och beteenden och hur de relaterar till sociodemografiska variabler, preferenser och politiska attityder. Den svenska pandemihanteringen har starkare stöd bland de med hög tillit, de som står till vänster politiskt, samt de med hög tolerans för hälsorisker. Följsamheten till restriktioner varierar med risktolerans och tillit, men också med individens grad av tålmodighet och altruism.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games
- 2010
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Economics. - : Walter de Gruyter GmbH. - 1935-1704. ; 10:1, Article 51
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is shown that for every level of renegotiation cost, there exists a discount factor such that any collusive profit can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, any arbitrary small renegotiation cost will suffice to facilitate collusive outcomes for sufficiently patient firms. This result stands in stark contrast to the unique pure strategy WRP equilibrium without renegotiation costs, which implies marginal-cost pricing in every period. Moreover, in comparison to the findings of Mc-Cutcheon (1997), who states that renegotiation costs have to be substantial to facilitate collusion, this result points to a quite different conclusion.
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| 8. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 81:1, s. 207-219
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.
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| 9. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Deciding for Others Reduces Loss Aversion
- 2016
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Ingår i: Management Science. - : Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). - 0025-1909 .- 1526-5501. ; 62:1, s. 29-36
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study risk taking on behalf of others, both when choices involve losses and when they do not. A large-scale incentivized experiment with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population is conducted. We find that deciding for others reduces loss aversion. When choosing between risky prospects for which losses are ruled out by design, subjects make the same choices for themselves as for others. In contrast, when losses are possible, we find that the two types of choices differ. In particular, we find that subjects who make choices for themselves take less risk than those who decide for others when losses loom. This finding is consistent with an interpretation of loss aversion as a bias in decision making driven by emotions and that these emotions are reduced when making decisions for others.
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| 10. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Differences Attract: An Experimental Study of Focusing in Economic Choice
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Several recent models of choice build on the idea that decision makers are more likely to choose an option if its attributes stand out compared to the attributes of the available alternatives. One example is the model of focusing by Köszegi and Szeidl (2013) where decision makers focus disproportionally on the attributes in which the available options differ more, implying that some attributes will be overweighted. We test this prediction in a controlled experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to make inconsistent choices when we manipulate the choice set by adding new options that are unchosen, but affect the maximal difference in attributes among the options. Hence, our results suggest that there exists a focusing effect.
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