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| 2. |
- Wollbrant, Conny, 1981, et al.
(författare)
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Commentary: Fairness is intuitive
- 2016
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Ingår i: Frontiers in Psychology. - : Frontiers Media SA. - 1664-1078. ; 7:654
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 3. |
- Bouwmeester, Sjoerd, et al.
(författare)
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Registered Replication Report : Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)
- 2017
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Ingår i: Perspectives on Psychological Science. - : SAGE Publications. - 1745-6916 .- 1745-6924. ; 12:3, s. 527-542
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
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| 4. |
- Furtner, Nadja C., et al.
(författare)
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Gender and cooperative preferences on five continents
- 2016
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative preferences), and beliefs about the level of others’ contributions in variants of the public goods game. We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood and completely explained when controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks based on data from around 450 additional independent observations around the world confirm our main empirical results: Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, and they seem to be more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues for women than for men.
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| 5. |
- Guzmán, Andrea, et al.
(författare)
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Social Information and Charitable Giving: An artefactual field experiment with young children and adolescents
- 2013
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A growing literature in economics examines the development of preferences among children and adolescents. This paper combines a repeated dictator game with treatments that either provides participants with information about the average behavior of others or not. Collecting data on 384 children aged 5-17, we find that sensitivity to social information is present already in early life and that information about others’ donations can reduce, but primarily increases donations.
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| 6. |
- Hennlock, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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Prices versus Standards and Firm Behavior: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment
- 2017
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We conduct an artefactual field experiment in which 164 managers and senior advisors recruited from Swedish industry were presented with a task of maximizing net revenue from abatement investments under three different but equally stringent environmental policy regimes. We find that investment decisions are strongly influenced by type of policy instrument. Economic instruments and performance standards cause different attentional and judgment biases that are inconsistent with standard economic theory. Inconsistencies are larger with economic policy instruments (tax and subsidy) than with performance standards even though subjects’ attention to cost minimization was greater with economic instruments than under performance standards.
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| 7. |
- Knutsson, Mikael, et al.
(författare)
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Do people avoid opportunities to donate? A natural field experiment on recycling and charitable giving
- 2012
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We use a natural field experiment to investigate the hypothesis that generosity is partly involuntary, by examining whether individuals tend to avoid opportunities to act generously. In Sweden, new recycling machines for bottles and cans with an option of donating the returned deposit to charity were gradually introduced in one of the largest store chains. We find a substantial decline in recycling the month these new machines were introduced and a further decline in the following months. These results indicate that individuals avoid opportunities to act generously and corroborate findings from both lab and field studies supporting the claim that generous behavior is partly involuntary.
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| 8. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
- 2012
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We develop a model relating self-control, risk preferences and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. We subject our model to data from an experimental public goods game and a risk experiment, and we measure conflict identification and self-control. As predicted, we find a robust association between self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is weaker for more risk-averse individuals. Free riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place. Our model accounts for the data at least as well as do other models.
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| 9. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas
- 2017
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 20:1, s. 44-69
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2016, Economic Science Association.We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.
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| 10. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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The role of beliefs, trust, and risk in contributions to a public good
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper experimentally investigates the role of beliefs, trust, and risk in shaping cooperative behavior. By applying incentivized elicitation methods to measure these concepts, we find that beliefs about others’ behavior and trust are positively associated with cooperation in a public goods game. However, even though contributing unconditionally to a public good resembles a situation of making decisions under risk, elicited risk preferences do not seem to explain cooperation in a systematic way.
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