| 1. |
- Brinck, Ingar, et al.
(författare)
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The Primacy of the "We"?
- 2017
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Ingår i: Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture : Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World - Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World. - 9780262337113 - 9780262035552 ; , s. 131-147
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy history within both philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we consider some arguments that could be adopted for the primacy of the we, and examine their conceptual and empirical implications. We argue that the we needs to be seen as a developing and dynamic identity, not as something that exists fully fledged from the start. The concept of we thus needs more nuanced and differentiated treatment than currently exists, distinguishing it from the idea of a ‘common ground’ and discerning multiple senses of ‘we-ness’. At an empirical level, beginning from the shared history of human evolution and prenatal existence, a simple sense of pre-reflective we-ness, we argue, emerges from second-person I-you engagement in earliest infancy. Developmentally, experientially and conceptually, engagement remains fundamental to the we throughout its many forms, characterized by reciprocal interaction and conditioned by the normative aspects of mutual addressing.
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| 2. |
- León, Felipe, et al.
(författare)
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Buber, Levinas, and the I-Thou Relation
- 2020
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Ingår i: Levinas and Analytic Philosophy. Second-Person Normativity and the Moral Life. - : Routledge. ; , s. 80-100
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 3. |
- León, Felipe, et al.
(författare)
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Consciousness, philosophy, and neuroscience
- 2023
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Ingår i: Acta Neurochirurgica. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0001-6268 .- 0942-0940. ; 165:4, s. 833-839
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The aim of this mini-review paper is to present an overview of work on consciousness from a philosophical perspective, and to argue for the continuing relevance of philosophy in consciousness research. After introducing some major philosophical positions about the relationship between consciousness and matter, we argue that the problem of consciousness that many authors have focused on—the mind–body or mind-brain problem—is only one among several problems of consciousness. We illustrate the idea that the perplexities about consciousness go beyond its relationship with matter by discussing the rela- tionship between consciousness, self-consciousness, and selfhood. This discussion also indicates ways in which philosophy and neuroscience can learn from each other.
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| 4. |
- León, Felipe, et al.
(författare)
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Emotional sharing and the extended mind
- 2019
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Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 196:12, s. 4847-4867
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article investigates the relationship between emotional sharing and the extended mind thesis. We argue that shared emotions are socially extended emo- tions that involve a specific type of constitutive integration between the participating individuals’ emotional experiences. We start by distinguishing two claims, the Envi- ronmentally Extended Emotion Thesis and the Socially Extended Emotion Thesis (Sect. 1). We then critically discuss some recent influential proposals about the nature of shared emotions (Sect. 2). Finally, in Sect. 3, we motivate two conditions that an account of shared emotions ought to accommodate: (i) Reciprocal Other-awareness and (ii) Integration. Consideration of (ii) and discussion of relational accounts of joint attention lead us to the proposal that a construal of socially extended emotions in terms of a constitutive integration of the participating individuals’ experiences is more promising than proposals that simply appeal to various forms of social situatedness, embeddedness, or scaffolding.
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| 5. |
- León, Felipe, et al.
(författare)
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How We Feel: Collective Emotions Without Joint Commitments
- 2018
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Ingår i: ProtoSociology. - : Philosophy Documentation Center. - 1434-4319. ; 35, s. 117-134
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article engages critically with Margaret Gilbert’s proposal that joint commitments are necessary for collective emotions. After introducing Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment (Section 2), and the joint commitment account of collective emotions (Section 3), we argue in Section 4 that research from developmental psychology challenges the necessity of joint commitments for collective emotions. In that section, we also raise a more principled objection to Gilbert’s account, independently of developmental considerations. Section 5 develops a complementary line of argument, focused on the notion of mutual recognition. While we agree with Gilbert that mutual recognition has an important role to play in an account of collective emotions, we take issue with her attempt to analyse face-to-face based mutual recognition in terms of the concept of joint commitment. We conclude by sketching an alternative analysis of collective emotions that highlights the role of interpersonal identification and socially mediated self-consciousness.
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