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Jesus och politiken
- 2024
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Editorial collection (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Syftet med projektet är att granska och att reflektera kring Jesu politiska aktörsskap i relation till nutida samtidsdiskussioner. Som en teoretisk utgångspunkt för att möta den frågan kommer Jesus liv och lära att diskuteras genom att relatera hans politiska verksamhet till begreppen aktivism, revolution, populism, och anarki. Syftet är inte att erbjuda en anakronistisk läsning av Jesus liv och lära, i tron att någondera av dessa politiska praktiker enkelt låter sig tillämpas på den politiska kontext som Jesus fungerade i. Inte heller är det i tron att de erbjuder någon definitiv tolkning av Jesu politiska verksamhet. Syftet är snarare att bruka nutida politiska teoretiska begrepp för att tolka Jesu politiska verksamhet, med förhoppningen att denna association ska underlätta arbetet med att nyttja Jesu liv och lära som en resurs för att föreställa det allmänna goda och tackla nutida utmaningar. Orsaken till varför just aktivism, revolution, populism och anarkism valts som en teoretisk-begreppslig grund, är för att vardera av dessa politiska praktiker försöker få till stånd en förändring av något slag, dock utifrån olika logiska förutsättningar och på olika sätt. Trots att man kan tolka Jesu politiska aktörsskap på olika sätt, är det däremot mer eller mindre uppenbart att han försökte få till stånd en förändring i den rådande samhällsordningen. Utifrån denna insikt har framför allt kristna genom tiderna inspirerats av Jesus för att förverkliga den vision om det goda som hans liv och lära innehåller, samt utvecklat en kritik av de aktörer som motarbetar denna vision.
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- Almén, Edgar, 1943-, et al.
(author)
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Livstolkning och värdegrund : att undervisa om religion, livsfrågor och etik
- 2000
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Book (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Skolans värdegrund har på senare år lyfts fram i många olika sammanhang. Uppgiften att undervisa om religion, etik, och livsfrågor har också debatterats. Detta undervisningsområde hör till skolans svåraste uppgifter - men kanske också till de viktigaste. Denna antologi ger ett bidrag till utvecklingen av ett professionellt lärarkunnande i frågor som gäller skolans värdegrund och undervisning på livsåskådningsområdet.Författarna ger utifrån sina respektive kompetensområden en belysning av några av ämnesområdets centrala aspekter.De texter som ingår har skrivits särskilt för lärarutbildningen men kan också användas i andra sammanhang. Avsikten har varit att via texterna föra de studerande i kontakt med såväl aktuell forskning som professionell lärarkunskap av annat slag.
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- Mindus, Patricia
(author)
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Austin and Scandinavian Realism
- 2013
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In: The Legacy of John Austin's Jurisprudence. - : Springer-Verlag New York. ; , s. 73-106
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The imperative theory of law exemplified in the work of John Austin is the object of much criticism in the movement of Scandinavian legal realism (SLR). The very core notions of command, sovereignty and will are targeted. This paper explores the Scandinavian readings of Austin’s theory, chiefly by reconstructing the main arguments of Axel Hägerström’s criticism of the will-theory and Karl Olivecrona’s reading of the imperative character of law. Special attention is paid to the affinities between the various outlooks and to their core differences. On one hand, strong resemblances can be discovered in the common methodological afflatus and respect for Hume’s principle. On the other hand – apart from contrasting opinions on minor aspects (such as tacit consent grounding custom) – among the unbridgeable divergences mention should be made of the view on morals: Austin embraced a form of cognitivism, while the Scandinavians supported a strict form of non-cognitivism. In order to assess the originality of the Scandinavian attack on the imperative theory of law, the aim of the paper is to test to what extent it stimulated the seminal work on the question of law’s authoritative dimension in SLR.
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- Skånberg Dahlstedt, Ami, 1967
(author)
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Walking in Suriashi as a Radical and Critical Art of Inquiry
- 2023
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In: Walking as Critical Inquiry. - Cham : Springer. - 9783031299902 ; , s. 151-173
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This chapter contributes to the discussion on moving in and through site-specific and urban space; at the cusp between higher dance education and everyday life, creating a post-Certauian tear through space and time as a call for agency. It draws from my Ph.D. research Suriashi as Experimental Pilgrimage in Urban and Other Spaces, where I propose an experience of society from within a Japanese practice called suriashi, which translates as sliding foot. Suriashi is a specific gender codified walking technique in classical Japanese dance and theatre, and an important method for acting on stage. Gender is constructed physically through the positioning and moulding of the body. The original practice is performed in the dance studio or on stage. My research asks whether suriashi also could be a method for agency to act, as being active, or to activate, and temporally alter spaces outside the theatre; i.e. the practical application of this artistic practice outside the theatrical context. This relocation brings a traditional form into new configurations, connecting to everyday practices and sites of resistance and performance. It also contributes to the burgeoning field of walking arts practice, bringing a Japanese dance-based practice into a dialogue with debates and practices of Western dancing and walking. Suriashi performed in urban spaces was able to unfold and identify new relations between aesthetic practice and politics, between movements and monuments in the city as a way to critique the unequal distribution of power, and by looking for new ways to protest/resist peacefully. I assess this from three of my many experiments with slow suriashi walkings. The first one is Suriashi Intervention, performed at Gothenburg Culture Festival in August 2016. This experiment did two things: it engendered the city’s unacknowledged dance archive, while performing critique of the unequal distribution of funding of the arts. The second experiment is an ‘invisible’ suriashi performed by the then Hong Kong-based scholar Ching-yuen Cheung during the violent protests at Yuen Long Station in Hong Kong in July 2019. It showed how artistic methods are necessary when democracy collapses. The third experiment regards introducing suriashi as methodology to master students of Contemporary Performative Arts at University of Gothenburg. Here, suriashi unveiled important issues regarding art in urban spaces, necessary for the art student. To further contextualize, I interlace my arguments through positionings by sociologist Doreen Massey.
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- Svensson, Frans
(author)
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Non-Eudaimonism, The Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness, and Two Senses of the Highest Good in Descartes’s Ethics
- 2015
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In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 23:2, s. 277-296
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes's view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in 'a firm and constant resolution' (e.g. CSMK: 325/AT 5: 83) to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good in some detail. In Section 2, I discuss the question of how the motivation to virtue should be accounted for within Descartes's ethical framework. In Section 3, I turn to Descartes's defence of the view that virtue, while fundamentally distinct from happiness, is nevertheless sufficient for obtaining it. In the final section of the paper (Section 4), my concern is instead with a second and sometimes neglected distinction that Descartes makes between two different senses of the highest good. I show that this distinction does not remove the non-eudaimonistic character of Descartes's ethics suggested in Section 1, and present two reasons for why the distinction is important for Descartes's purposes.
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