| 1. |
- Alem, Yonas, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Distributional preferences in adolescent peer networks
- 2023
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 26, s. 223-248
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study distributional preferences in adolescent peer networks. Using incentivized choices between allocations for themselves and a passive agent, children are classified into efficiency-loving, inequality-loving, inequality-averse, and spiteful types. We find that pairs of students who report a friendship link are more likely to exhibit the same preference type than other students who attend the same school. The relation between types is almost completely driven by inequality-loving and spiteful types. The role of peer networks in explaining distributional preferences goes beyond network composition effects. A low rank in academic performance and a central position within the network relate positively to a higher likelihood of being classified as spiteful. Hence, social hierarchies seem to be correlated with distributional preference types.
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Subliminal influence on generosity
- 2017
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 20:3, s. 531-555
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We experimentally subliminally prime subjects prior to charity donation decisions by showing words that have connotations of pro-social values for a very brief time (17 ms). Our main finding is that, compared to a baseline condition, the pro-social prime increases donations by approximately 10–17 % among subjects with strong pro-social preferences (universalism values). We find a similar effect when interacting the prime with the Big 5 personality characteristic of agreeableness. We furthermore introduce a novel method for testing for priming, “subliminity”. This method reveals that some subjects are capable of recognizing prime words, and the overall results are weaker when we control for this capacity.
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| 3. |
- Buser, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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The impact of stress on tournament entry
- 2016
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer (part of Springer Nature): Springer Open Choice Hybrid Journals. - 1573-6938 .- 1386-4157. ; , s. 1-25
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Individual willingness to enter competitive environments predicts career choices and labor market outcomes. Meanwhile, many people experience competitive contexts as stressful. We use two laboratory experiments to investigate whether factors related to stress can help explain individual differences in tournament entry. Experiment 1 studies whether stress responses (measured as salivary cortisol) to taking part in a mandatory tournament predict individual willingness to participate in a voluntary tournament. We find that competing increases stress levels. This cortisol response does not predict tournament entry for men but is positively and significantly correlated with choosing to enter the tournament for women. In Experiment 2, we exogenously induce physiological stress using the cold-pressor task. We find a positive causal effect of stress on tournament entry for women but no effect for men. Finally, we show that although the effect of stress on tournament entry differs between the genders, stress reactions cannot explain the well-documented gender difference in willingness to compete.
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| 4. |
- Cappelen, Alexander W., et al.
(författare)
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Fairness is intuitive
- 2016
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1573-6938 .- 1386-4157. ; 19:4, s. 727-740
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper we provide new evidence showing that fair behavior is intuitive to most people. We find a strong association between a short response time and fair behavior in the dictator game. This association is robust to controls that take account of the fact that response time might be affected by the decision-maker’s cognitive ability and swiftness. The experiment was conducted with a large and heterogeneous sample recruited from the general population in Denmark. We find a striking similarity in the association between response time and fair behavior across groups in the society, which suggests that the predisposition to act fairly is a general human trait.
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| 5. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Easy come, easy go: The role of windfall money in lab and field experiments
- 2013
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 16:2, s. 190-207
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A growing number of experimental studies focus on the differences between the lab and the field. One important difference between many lab and field experiments is how the endowment is obtained. By conducting a dictator game experiment, we investigate the influences of windfall and earned endowment on behavior in the laboratory and in the field. We find subjects donate more in both environments if the endowment is a windfall gain. However, although the experimental design was intended to control for all effects other than environment, there are significant differences in behavior between the lab and the field for both windfall and earned endowment. This points to the importance of discussing the context when interpreting both laboratory and field experiment results as well as when conducting replication studies.
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| 6. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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The influence of spouses on household decision making under risk: An experiment in rural China
- 2013
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - 1386-4157. ; 16, s. 383-401
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study household decision making in a high-stakes experiment with a random sample of households in rural China. Spouses have to choose between risky lotteries, first separately and then jointly. We find that spouses' individual risk preferences are more similar the richer the household and the higher the wife's relative income contribution. A couple's joint decision is typically very similar to the husband's preferences, but women who contribute relatively more to the household income, women in high-income households, and women with communist party membership have a stronger influence on the joint decision.
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| 7. |
- Dannenberg, Astrid, et al.
(författare)
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research
- 2020
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 23:3, s. 716-749
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they play the game. In this paper, we review the experimental literature of the last 20 years on the choice of institutions and describe what has been learned about the quality and the determinants of institutional choice. Cooperative subjects and subjects with optimistic beliefs about others often vote in favor of the institution. Almost all institutions improve cooperation if they are implemented, but they are not always implemented by the players. Institutional costs, remaining free-riding incentives, and a lack of learning opportunities are identified as the most important barriers. Unresolved cooperation problems, like global climate change, are often characterized by these barriers. The experimental results also show that cooperation tends to be higher under endogenously chosen institutions than exogenously imposed institutions. However, a significant share of players fails to implement the institution and they often perform poorly, which is why we cannot conclude that letting people choose is better than enforcing institutions from outside.
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Dreber Almenberg, Anna, et al.
(författare)
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Gender and competition in adolescence : task matters
- 2014
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 17:1, s. 154-172
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We look at gender differences among adolescents in Sweden in preferences for competition, altruism and risk. For competitiveness, we explore two different tasks that differ in associated stereotypes. We find no gender difference in competitiveness when comparing performance under competition to that without competition. We further find that boys and girls are equally likely to self-select into competition in a verbal task, but that boys are significantly more likely to choose to compete in a mathematical task. This gender gap diminishes and becomes non-significant when we control for actual performance, beliefs about relative performance, and risk preferences, or for beliefs only. Girls are also more altruistic and less risk taking than boys.
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| 10. |
- Dreber Almenberg, Anna, et al.
(författare)
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Outrunning the Gender Gap - Boys and Girls Compete Equally
- 2011
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 14:4, s. 567-582
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recent studies find that women are less competitive than men. This gender difference in competitiveness has been suggested as one possible explanation for why men occupy the majority of top positions in many sectors. In this study we explore competitiveness in children, with the premise that both context and gendered stereotypes regarding the task at hand may influence competitive behavior. A related field experiment on Israeli children shows that only boys react to competition by running faster when competing in a race. We here test if there is a gender gap in running among 7-10 year old Swedish children. We also introduce two female sports, skipping rope and dancing, to see if competitiveness is task dependent. We find no gender difference in reaction to competition in any task; boys and girls compete equally. Studies in different environments with different types of tasks are thus important in order to make generalizable claims about gender differences in competitiveness.
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| 11. |
- Ekström, Mathias
(författare)
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Do watching eyes affect charitable giving? : Evidence from a field experiment
- 2012
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 15:3, s. 530-546
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The presence of implicit observation cues, such as picture of eyes, has been shown to increase generosity in dictator games, and cooperative behavior in field settings. I combine these approaches, by testing if a picture of watching eyes affects unconditional giving in a natural environment, where the recipient is a charity organization. Taken together, this study reduces the influence of three potential confounding factors in previous experiments: (i) experimenter demand effects, (ii) that the facial cue reminds subjects of a human counterpart, and (iii) a social multiplier effect. Specifically, the paper reports results from an experiment, conducted in a Swedish supermarket chain, where customers face a naturally occurring decision problem. People who recycle cans and bottles have to choose whether to keep the recycled amount or donate it to a charity organization. By posting a picture of human eyes on recycling machines, I am able to test whether this causes an increase in donations to the charity. Based on a sample covering a 12-day period, 38 stores and 16775 individual choices, I find no general effect. However, when controlling for store and day fixed effects, and using a proxy for store attendance, the picture of eyes increased donated amount by 30 percent during days when relatively few other people visited the store. This result gives further support to the conclusion that subtle social cues can invoke reputation concerns in humans, although the relatively small effect suggests that previous estimates could be biased upward, or at least that the influence of observational cues is context dependent.
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| 12. |
- Embrey, Matthew, et al.
(författare)
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Strategy revision opportunities and collusion
- 2019
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 22:4, s. 834-856
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.
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| 13. |
- Giebe, Thomas, Dr, et al.
(författare)
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Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions
- 2023
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 27, s. 80-108
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, 'cross-game learning' may rather be understood as 'cross-game transfer', as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.
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| 14. |
- Grimm, S., et al.
(författare)
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Sharing or gambling? On risk attitudes in social contexts
- 2021
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 24, s. 1075-1104
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Decisions under risk are often embedded in a social context that we usually abstract from when studying decision-making in the laboratory. In contrast to that practice, our experiment investigates whether risk-taking is affected by social comparisons. In particular, we focus on situations where some amount of money has to be allocated to two parties: either the amount can be shared, or a random device allocates the entire amount to one of the parties. We find that the social context of the decision matters strongly: When participants are in a disadvantageous initial position compared to the other party, they select the risky option much more often than in a purely individual decision, identical in all other respects. Overall, we find that individuals are relatively more risk-seeking in the socially unfavorable domain than in isolation, in contrast to the favorable one, where we find no or little change in elicited risk attitudes in comparison to an isolated decision.
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| 15. |
- Hauge, K. E., et al.
(författare)
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Keeping others in our mind or in our heart? Distribution games under cognitive load
- 2016
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 19:3, s. 562-576
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has recently been argued that giving is spontaneous while greed is calculated (Rand et al., in Nature 489:427-430, 2012). If greed is calculated we would expect that cognitive load, which is assumed to reduce the influence of cognitive processes, should affect greed. In this paper we study both charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load to test if greed is affected by the load. This is tested in three different dictator game experiments. In the dictator games we use both a give frame, where the dictators are given an amount that they may share with a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may take from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results from all three experiments show that the behavioral effect in terms of allocated money of the induced load is small if at all existent. At the same time, follow-up questions indicate that the subjects' decisions are more impulsive and less driven by their thoughts under cognitive load.
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| 16. |
- Holm, Hakan, et al.
(författare)
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Choosing bargaining partners - An experimental study on the impact of information about income, status and gender
- 2005
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1573-6938 .- 1386-4157. ; 8:3, s. 183-216
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Ultimatum proposals and dictator donations are studied when proposers can choose,the income and sex of the responder. Responder attributes generated strong effects in the selection decisions; subjects preferred to send proposals to low-income responders and female responders were much more popular than males. Hence, signals of income and sex appear to be important in deciding with whom to bargain. We also report from an experiment where both responders and proposers could select co-player based on socioeconomic status and gender. Both female responders and proposers were strongly preferred. A weaker tendency was that high status subjects were favored.
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| 17. |
- Holm, Håkan J., et al.
(författare)
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Strategic decisions : behavioral differences between CEOs and others
- 2020
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 23:1, s. 154-180
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study whether CEOs of private firms differ from other people with regard to their strategic decisions and beliefs about others’ strategy choices. Such differences are interesting since CEOs make decisions that are economically more relevant, because they affect not only their own utility or the well-being of household members, but the utility of many stakeholders inside and outside of the organization. They also play a central role in shaping values and norms in society. We expect differences between both groups, because CEOs are more experienced with strategic decision making than comparable people in other professional roles. Yet, due to the difficulties in recruiting this high-profile group for academic research, few studies have explored how CEOs make incentivized decisions in strategic games under strict controls and how their choices in such games differ from those made by others. Our study combines a stratified random sample of 200 CEOs of medium-sized firms with a carefully selected control group of 200 comparable people. All subjects participated in three incentivized games—Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Battle-of-the-Sexes. Beliefs were elicited for each game. We report substantial and robust differences in both behavior and beliefs between the CEOs and the control group. The most striking results are that CEOs do not best respond to beliefs; they cooperate more, play less hawkish and thereby earn much more than the control group.
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| 18. |
- Huber, Jürgen, et al.
(författare)
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Experimental asset markets with endogenous choice of costly asymmetric information
- 2011
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - 1386-4157. ; 14:2, s. 223-240
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Asymmetric distribution of information, while omnipresent in real markets, is rarely considered in experimental financial markets. We present results from experiments where subjects endogenously choose between five information levels (four of them costly). We find that (i) uninformed traders earn the highest net returns, while average informed traders always perform worst even when information costs are not considered; (ii) over time traders learn to pick the most advantageous information levels (full information or no information); and (iii) market efficiency decreases with higher information costs. These results are mostly in line with the theoretical predictions of Grossman and Stiglitz (Am. Econ. Rev. 70:393–408, 1980) and provide additional insights that studies with only two information levels cannot deliver.
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| 19. |
- Huber, Jürgen, et al.
(författare)
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The impact of instructions and procedure on reducing confusion and bubbles in experimental asset markets
- 2012
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 15:1, s. 89-105
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In 1988 Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (henceforth SSW) introduced a very influential model to test the efficiency of experimental asset markets. They and many subsequent studies observe that bubbles are robust to many treatment changes. Instead, bubbles are avoided only when subjects are experienced in the same setting, when the dividend-process is experienced by subjects beforehand, or when the fundamental value-process (FV) is presented in a well understandable context to reduce subjects’ confusion. We extend this line of research and show that even marginal changes in the experimental instructions/procedure can eliminate bubbles in the SSW-model. In particular, we show that mispricing is significantly reduced and overvaluation is eliminated completely (i) when the fundamental value process is displayed in a graph instead of a table or (ii) when subjects are asked about the current fundamental value at the beginning of each period. From a questionnaire conducted at the end of the experiment we infer that these treatment changes help to improve subjects’ understanding of the FV-process. We conclude that all bubble reducing factors have one common feature: they allow subjects to understand the non-intuitive declining FV-process of the SSW-model better and thus reduce subjects’ confusion about the FV-process.
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| 20. |
- Huber, Jürgen, et al.
(författare)
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The influence of investment experience on market prices: laboratory evidence
- 2016
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 19:2, s. 394-411
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We run laboratory experiments to analyze the impact of prior investment experience on price efficiency in asset markets. Before subjects enter the asset market they gain either no, positive, or negative investment experience in an investment game. To get a comprehensive picture about the role of experience we implement two asset market designs. One is prone to inefficient pricing, exhibiting bubble and crash patterns, while the other exhibits efficient pricing. We find that (i) both, positive and negative, experience gained in the investment game lead to efficient pricing in both market settings. Further, we show that (ii) the experience effect dominates potential effects triggered by positive and negative sentiment generated by the investment game. We conjecture that experiencing changing price paths in the investment game can create a higher sensibility on changing fundamentals (through higher salience) among subjects in the subsequently run asset market.
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| 21. |
- Karagozoglu, E., et al.
(författare)
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Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines
- 2019
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 22:2, s. 419-440
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargaining game with an induced reference point at the 2/3-1/3 distribution. Our results show that first proposals, concessions, and settlements are very similar for different time-pressure levels. Nevertheless, time pressure systematically influences the type of agreements reached: the likelihood of bargainers reaching agreements on the equal split is lower under time pressure. Furthermore, disagreements and last-moment-agreements (conditional on reaching an agreement) are more frequently observed under time pressure, though the effect on last-moment agreements disappears when disagreements are included in the analysis. Finally, the effect of time-pressure on the frequency of disagreements is stronger for those pairs with higher tension in first proposals.
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| 22. |
- Karmeliuk, M., et al.
(författare)
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Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions
- 2022
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 25, s. 1327-1348
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However, we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we provide evidence that the observed difference could be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions seem to play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.
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| 23. |
- Kirchler, Michael, 1977, et al.
(författare)
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Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions: evidence from the field
- 2018
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 21:1, s. 205-230
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Reciprocation of monetary gifts is well-understood in economics. In contrast, there is little research on reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts like compliments. We narrow this gap and investigate how employees reciprocate after receiving immaterial gifts and material gifts over time. We purchase (1) ice cream from fast food restaurants, and (2) durum doner, a common lunch snack, from independent vendors. Prior to the food's preparation, we either compliment or tip the salesperson. We find that salespersons reciprocate compliments with higher product weight than in a control treatment. Importantly, this reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts grows over repeated transactions. Tips, in contrast, have a stronger level effect which does not change over time.
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| 24. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas
- 2017
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 20:1, s. 44-69
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2016, Economic Science Association.We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.
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| 25. |
- Koppel, Lina, et al.
(författare)
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The effect of acute pain on risky and intertemporal choice
- 2017
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 20:4, s. 878-893
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Pain is a highly salient and attention-demanding experience that motivates people to act. We investigated the effect of pain on decision making by delivering acute thermal pain to participants’ forearm while they made risky and intertemporal choices involving money. Participants (n = 107) were more risk seeking under pain than in a no-pain control condition when decisions involved gains but not when they involved equivalent losses. Pain also resulted in greater preference for immediate (smaller) over future (larger) monetary rewards. We interpret these results as a motivation to offset the aversive, pain-induced state, where monetary rewards become more appealing under pain than under no pain and when delivered sooner rather than later. Our findings add to the long-standing debate regarding the role of intuition and reflection in decision making.
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