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| 3. |
- Jebari, Karim, et al.
(författare)
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Saved by the Dark Forest : How a Multitude of Extraterrestrial Civilizations Can Prevent a Hobbesian Trap
- 2024
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Ingår i: The Monist. - 0026-9662 .- 2153-3601. ; 107:2, s. 176-189
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The possibility of extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) exists despite no observed evidence, and the risks and benefits of actively searching for ETI (Active SETI) have been debated. Active SETI has been criticized for potentially exposing humanity to existential risk, and a recent game-theoretical model highlights the Hobbesian trap that could occur following contact if mutual distrust leads to mutual destruction. We argue that observing a nearby ETI would suggest the existence of many unobserved ETI. This would expand the game and implies that there may be a mechanism that prevents ETI from attacking us. As a result, the Hobbesian trap would be avoided if both parties assumed the other is not likely to attack.
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| 4. |
- Andina, T., et al.
(författare)
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Transgenerational Social Structures and Fictional Actors: Community-Based Responsibility for Future Generations
- 2023
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Ingår i: The Monist. - 0026-9662. ; 106:2, s. 150-164
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The notion of transgenerational community is usually based on two diachronic interactions. The first interaction consists of present generations taking up the legacy (not only economic, but also institutional, artistic, cultural, and so forth) of past generations and giving it continuity, exercising a form of active agency. The second interaction occurs when present generations pass on their legacy to future generations. This is supposed to expand the boundaries of the community in a transgenerational sense (both backward- and forward-looking). In this article we argue that the transgenerational community can be grounded on a different ontological insight: future generations play the role of fictional actors for present generations, i.e., present generations entertain a present-time interaction with future generations, insofar as future generations are functional for the realization of transgenerational actions. This lays the foundations for more solid community-based bonds of intergenerational justice.
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| 5. |
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Transgenerationality, Community, and Justice
- 2023
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Ingår i: The Monist. - 0026-9662. ; 106:2, s. 1-223
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- What are the ontological foundations of the transgenerational community? Can transgenerational collective actions provide justification to normative obligations? This special issue analyses advantages and limitations of community-based approaches to justice between generations, as opposed to the perhaps better known and more debated individualistic approaches. To this end, it brings together a series of reflections, ranging from ontology to political philosophy and ethics, and focusing on the concept of social bonds that bind people distant in time.
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| 6. |
- Milam, Per-Erik, 1982
(författare)
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Get Smart: Outcomes, Influence, and Responsibility
- 2021
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Ingår i: Monist. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0026-9662. ; 104:4, s. 443-457
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Once relegated to the margins of the responsibility debate, moral influence theories have recently been rehabilitated. This paper offers a moral influence theory with two parts: a theory of responsibility as influenceability and an act-consequentialist justification of blame. I defend this account against six concerns commonly raised both by opponents and by advocates of similar views. Some concerns target act consequentialism, claiming that it 1) permits blaming innocents; 2) permits coercion, manipulation, and other objectionable forms of influence; and 3) fails to capture intuitions about desert. Other concerns target responsibility as influenceability, claiming that influenceability accounts are 4) unsophisticated, 5) make ascriptions of responsibility dependent on assessments of permissible blame, and 6) have various counterintuitive implications.
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| 7. |
- Beebee, Helen, et al.
(författare)
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Nihil Obstat : Lewis’s Compatibilist Account of Abilities
- 2020
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Ingår i: The Monist. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0026-9662 .- 2153-3601. ; 103:3, s. 245-261
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In an outline of a paper found amongst his philosophical papers and correspondence after his untimely death in 2001—“Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability,” reproduced in this volume—David Lewis sketched a new compatibilist account of abilities, according to which someone is able to A if and only if there is no obstacle to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a ‘robust preventer’ of their A-ing. In this paper, we provide some background context for Lewis’s outline, a section-by-section commentary, and a general discussion of the account’s main features.
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| 8. |
- Page, Jeremy
(författare)
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Nietzsche on Honesty
- 2019
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Ingår i: The Monist. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 0026-9662 .- 2153-3601. ; 102:3, s. 349-368
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Some commentators have argued that curiosity, not honesty, is Nietzsche’s central intellectual virtue. These commentators give minimalistic interpretations of the nature of Nietzsche’s concept of honesty, casting it as a disposition to ensure that relevant epistemic standards are applied during belief formation. I argue against such interpretations by highlighting three strands of Nietzsche’s concept of honesty which they fail to accommodate (cf. GS 2, GS 335, BGE 230). I interpret Nietzsche’s concept of honesty against the background of his drive psychology and show that it applies not only to reflective cognitive processes but also to unconscious cognitive processes. In concluding, I explain the key role which honesty plays in Nietzsche’s project of translating ‘man back into nature’ (BGE 230).
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| 9. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism : Brentano's and Reid's
- 2017
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Ingår i: The Monist. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0026-9662 .- 2153-3601. ; 100:1, s. 106-119
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explores Franz Brentano’s metaethics by comparing it to Thomas Reid’s. Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they are both aptly classified as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and the nature of moral judgement. However, their respective versions of inuitionism are importantly different, in ways that reflect more general differences between their respective epistemological views. Sections III and IV of the paper focus more exclusively on Brentano’s metaethics and some of its unorthodox features. These features tie in with notorious difficulties for moral realism concerning the nature of moral truth and the relation between moral judgement and motivation to act.
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| 10. |
- Johansson, Ingvar
(författare)
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Constitution as a relation within mathematics
- 2013
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Ingår i: The Monist. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0026-9662 .- 2153-3601. ; 96:1, s. 87-100
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The author proposes a theory of constitution as applied to mathematics. For constitutional relations to exist, the concept of colocation (CR) in mathematics, in areas such as geometry or topography, should be accepted. The relations of mathematical constitution to material, perceptual and property constitution are also expounded.
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