| 1. |
- Akay, Alpaslan, 1975, et al.
(författare)
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'Fair' welfare comparisons with heterogeneous tastes: subjective versus revealed preferences
- 2020
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 55:1, s. 51-84
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Multidimensional welfare analysis has recently been revived by money-metric measures based on explicit fairness principles and the respect of individual preferences. To operationalize this approach, preference heterogeneity can be inferred from the observation of individual choices (revealed preferences) or from self-declared satisfaction following these choices (subjective well-being). We question whether using one or the other method makes a difference for welfare analysis based on income-leisure preferences. We estimate ordinal preferences that are either consistent with actual labor supply decisions or with income-leisure satisfaction. For ethical priors based on the compensation principle, we compare the welfare rankings obtained with both methods. The correlation in welfare ranks is high in general and reranking is insignificant for 77% of the individuals. The remaining discrepancies possibly pertain to a variety of factors including constraints (health issues, labor market rationing), irrational behavior and alternative life choices to the pursuit of well-being. We discuss the implications of using one or the other preference elicitation method for welfare analysis.
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| 2. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Habit formation and the pareto-efficient provision of public goods
- 2022
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer-Verlag New York. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 59, s. 669-681
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper examines the implications of habit formation in private and public goods consumption for the Pareto-efficient provision of public goods, based on a two-period model with nonlinear taxation. Under weak leisure separability, and if the public good is a flow-variable such that the government directly decides on the level of the public good in each period, habit formation leads to a modification of the policy rule for public good provision if, and only if, the degrees of habituation differ for private and public good consumption. By contrast, if the public good supply is time-invariant, the presence of habit formation generally alters the policy rule for public good provision.
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| 3. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy
- 2023
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 61, s. 311-337
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the conditions under which positional preferences for consumption and wealth do not cause inefficiency and derive an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. The concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth partly emanate from social comparisons with people in other countries. We distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a non-welfarist government that does not attach any social value to relative concerns. We also compare the outcome of Nash-competition among local/national governments with the resource allocation implied by a global social optimum both under welfarism and non-welfarism.
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| 4. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Veblen's theory of the leisure class revisited: implications for optimal income taxation
- 2013
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 41:3, s. 551-578
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Several previous studies have demonstrated the importance of relative consumption comparisons for public policy. Yet, almost all of them have ignored the role of leisure for status comparisons. Inspired by Veblen (The theory of the leisure class. Macmillan, New York, 1899), this paper assumes that people care about their relative consumption and that leisure has a displaying role in making relative consumption more visible, based on a two-type model of optimal income taxation. While increased importance of relative consumption typically implies higher marginal income tax rates, in line with previous research, the effect of leisure-induced consumption visibility is to make the income tax more regressive in terms of ability.
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| 5. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Population ethics under risk
- 2023
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Population axiology concerns how to rank populations by the relation “is socially preferred to”. So far, population ethicists have (with important exceptions) focused less on the question of how to rank population prospects, that is, alternatives that contain uncertainty as to which population they will bring about. Most public policy choices, however, are decisions under uncertainty, including policy choices that affect the size of a population (such as climate policy choices). Here, we shall address the question of how to rank population prospects by the relation “is socially preferred to”. We start by illustrating how well-known population axiologies can be extended to population prospect axiologies. And we show that new problems arise when extending population axiologies to prospects. In particular, traditional population axiologies lead to prospect-versions of the problems that they are praised for avoiding in the risk-free settings. Moreover, we show how the axiom of State-Wise Dominance allow us to extend any impossibility theorem in population axiology to impossibility theorems for non-trivial population prospects, that is, prospects that confer probabilities strictly between zero and one on different populations. Finally, we formulate impossibility results that only involve probabilistic axioms.
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| 6. |
- Bastani, Spencer, Docent, 1982-, et al.
(författare)
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Pareto efficient income taxation without single-crossing
- 2020
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 55:3, s. 547-594
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We provide a full characterization of a two-type optimal nonlinear income tax model where the single-crossing condition is violated due to an assumption that agents differ both in terms of market abilities and in terms of their needs for a work-related good. We set up a Pareto-efficient tax problem and analyze the entire second-best Pareto-frontier, highlighting several non-standard results, such as the possibility of income re-ranking relative to the laissez-faire and gaps in the Pareto-frontier.
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| 7. |
- Berg, Sven, et al.
(författare)
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Single-peaked compatible preference profiles: some combinatorial results
- 2006
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 27:1, s. 89-102
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper examines combinatorial problems in connection with single-peaked preference orderings on a unidimensional scale. A binary relation, dominance, is defined on the set of connected orderings. Relevant properties of the corresponding poset and cover graph are discussed. A formula for the number of pairs of connected orderings consistent with spatial single-peakedness is derived. The total number of such pairs is shown to be expressible in a simple form involving binomial probabilities. A possible application is a coalition formation process of the kind examined by Brams et al. (J Theor Polit 14:359-383, 2002), where actors have single-peaked preferences on a common scale.
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| 8. |
- Björklund, Anders, 1950-, et al.
(författare)
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Equality of opportunity and the distribution of long-run income in Sweden
- 2012
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 39:2-3, s. 675-696
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Equality of opportunity is an ethical goal with almost universal appeal. The interpretation taken here is that a society has achieved equality of opportunity if it is the case that what individuals accomplish, with respect to some desirable objective, is determined wholly by their choices and personal effort, rather than by circumstances beyond their control. We use data for Swedish men born between 1955 and 1967 for whom we measure the distribution of long-run income, as well as several important background circumstances, such as parental education and income, family structure and own IQ before adulthood. We address the question: in Sweden, given its present constellation of social policies and institutions, to what extent is existing income inequality due to circumstances, as opposed to 'effort'? Our results suggest that several circumstances, importantly both parental income and own IQ, are important for long-run income inequality, but that variations in individual effort account for the most part of that inequality.
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| 9. |
- Dannenberg, Astrid
(författare)
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Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments
- 2015
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 44:1, s. 71-85
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper compares different forms of leadership in their ability to improve cooperation in a public goods experiment. Leaders either contribute before the others (leading by example) or make a non-binding pledge before all players contribute simultaneously (leading by words). The exogenously imposed leadership is then compared to an endogenous setting where players can choose if and how they want to lead. The results show that in both settings leading by example has significant positive effects on cooperation while leading by words only has small effects as compared to situations without leadership. However, only few subjects choose to lead by example when they have the choice. The majority choose to lead by words or do not want to lead at all. The results also show that leading by example is associated with an institutional effect (players increase their contributions when they have to lead by example) and a selection effect (players who choose to lead by example are particularly cooperative).
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| 10. |
- Edvardsson Björnberg, Karin, 1972-, et al.
(författare)
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When Is a Goal Rational?
- 2005
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 24:2, s. 343-361
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In decision theory goals are usually taken as given inputs to the analysis, and the focus is on finding the most efficient means to achieve the goals. But where goals are set with the purpose of achieving them, it is important to know what properties they should possess in order to be successful (or achievement-inducing). Four such properties (or rationality criteria) are discussed, namely that goals should be precise, evaluable, approachable and motivating. Precision and evaluability are epistemic properties that concern what the agent may know. Approachability is an ability-related property that concerns what the agent can do. Motivity is a volitional property that concerns what the agent wants to do. Goals may satisfy the rationality criteria to a greater or lesser extent. Some goals are achievement-inducing mainly because they guide action towards the end-state well, others mainly because they motivate the agent to act towards the realization of the end-state.
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| 11. |
- Enflo, Karin
(författare)
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Quantity, Quality, Equality : Introducing a New Measure of Social Welfare
- 2021
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 57:3, s. 665-701
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this essay I propose a new measure of social welfare. It captures the intuitive idea that quantity, quality, and equality of individual welfare all matter for social welfare. More precisely, it satisfies six conditions: Equivalence, Dominance, Quality, Strict Monotonicity, Equality and Asymmetry. These state that (i) populations equivalent in individual welfare are equal in social welfare; (ii) a population that dominates another in individual welfare is better; (iii) a population that has a higher average welfare than another population is better, other things being equal; (iv) the addition of a well-faring individual makes a population better, whereas the addition of an ill-faring individual makes a population worse; (v) a population that has a higher degree of equality than another population is better, other things being equal; and (vi) individual illfare matters more for social welfare than individual welfare. By satisfying the six conditions, the measure improves on previously proposed measures, such as the utilitarian Total and Average measures, as well as different kinds of Prioritarian measures.
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| 12. |
- Engström, Per
(författare)
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Bling bling taxation and the fiscal virtues of hip hop
- 2011
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 37:1, s. 139-147
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The article extends Ng's (Am Econ Rev 77(1):186-191, 1987) model of optimal taxation of diamond goods-goods that are valued solely for their costliness. We extend his findings by analyzing how other goods should be taxed in the presence of pure diamond goods; modified Ramsey rules are derived in a basic single-type model as well as in a two-type model with redistribution. One key finding, that may be surprising and rather provoking, is that close complements (hip hop music) to diamond goods (bling bling) should be heavily subsidized.
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| 13. |
- Erlander, Sven, 1934-
(författare)
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Welfare, freedom of choice and composite utility in the logit model
- 2005
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 24:3, s. 509-525
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Discrete choice models characterize the alternatives in the choice set by utilities/attributes. The decision making is described by a probability distribution over the choice set. In this paper we introduce a welfare measure based on expected payoff and expected freedom of choice for the simple one parameter logit model. In this case the welfare measure turns out to be the so called composite utility. This means that the composite utility can be interpreted as the combined benefit of expected payoff and expected freedom of choice. The proposed welfare measure can be extended to the linear-in-parameters logit model and nested logit models and others. The proposed welfare measure is formulated in terms of the choice probability distribution. It depends on the form of the probabilities, but not on any particular derivation of the distribution.
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| 14. |
- Grüne-Yanoff, Till
(författare)
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Old Wine In New Casks : Libertarian Paternalism Still Violates Liberal Principles
- 2012
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 38:4, s. 635-645
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Libertarian Paternalism (LP) purports to be a kind of paternalism that is "liberty-preserving" and hence compatible with liberal principles. In this paper, I argue against this compatibility claim. I show that LP violates core liberal principles, first because it limits freedom, and secondly because it fails to justify these limitations in ways acceptable to liberal positions. In particular, Libertarian Paternalists argue that sometimes it is legitimate to limit people's liberties if it improves their welfare. A closer look at the welfare notions used, however, reveals that they respect neither the subjectivity nor the plurality of people's values. Thus its justification of the liberty-welfare trade-off is not compatible with liberal principles. I conclude that to justify LP policies, one must appeal to traditional paternalistic principles-and thus, there is no categorical difference between "libertarian" and other forms of paternalism.
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| 15. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-
(författare)
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Freedom of choice and expected compromise
- 2010
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 35:1, s. 65-79
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed, which is able to take into account the values of the possible options.
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| 16. |
- Hansson, Sven Ove
(författare)
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Social decisions about risk and risk-taking
- 2007
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 29:4, s. 649-663
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- There has been very little contact between risk studies and more general studies of social decision processes. It is argued that as a consequence of this, an oversimplified picture of social decision processes prevails in studies of risk. Tools from decision theory, welfare economics, and moral theory can be used to analyze the intricate inter-individual relationships that need to be treated in an adequate account of social decision-making about risk. However, this is not a matter of simple or straightforward application of existing theory. It is a challenging area for new theoretical developments.
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| 17. |
- Hansson, Sven Ove
(författare)
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What are opportunities and why should they be equal?
- 2004
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 22:2, s. 305-316
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In order to clarify the concept of equal opportunities we need an accurate definition of opportunity. Opportunities can be defined in terms of qualifying actions through which an agent can achieve an advantageous position. It is concluded that equal opportunities is often used as a catchword in cases when opportunities are not really equal, and no one tries seriously to make them so. In many of these cases it would have been more accurate to speak of open opportunities and procedural justice. These are important enough aspects of social justice, that should be appreciated for what they are, rather than being falsely represented as equal opportunities.
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| 18. |
- Hederos, Karin, et al.
(författare)
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Gender and inequality of opportunity in Sweden
- 2017
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 49:3-4, s. 605-635
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper considers the role of gender in generating inequality of opportunity. Using data on long-run income for Swedish men and women, we explore to what extent income inequality is due to circumstances beyond individuals' control, such as gender and parental income, rather than to differences in individuals' choices. The key idea is that a society has achieved equality of opportunity if there is no income inequality that is due to circumstances. Analyzing men and women separately, we find that circumstances account for up to 31% of income inequality among men and up to 25% among women. We conclude that there is greater equality of opportunity among women than among men. When we analyze men and women together, treating gender as a circumstance, at most 38% of income inequality can be attributed to circumstances. Gender accounts for up to 13% of income inequality, making gender the single most important circumstance in accounting for inequality in long-run income in Sweden.
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| 19. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining
- 2017
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 48:3, s. 659-678
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We experimentally test preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether only union members determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, but it increases if the game becomes an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect.
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| 20. |
- Leedham-Green, Charles, et al.
(författare)
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The largest Condorcet domain on 8 alternatives
- 2024
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science+Business Media B.V.. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 62:1, s. 109-116
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this note, we report on a Condorcet domain of record-breaking size for n = 8 alternatives. We show that there exists a Condorcet domain of size 224 and that this is the largest possible size for 8 alternatives. Our search also shows that this domain is unique up to isomorphism. In this note we investigate properties of the new domain and relate them to various open problems and conjectures.
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| 21. |
- Mannberg, Andrea, et al.
(författare)
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Social identity and risky leisure activities : implications for welfare and policy
- 2022
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 59:2, s. 251-285
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we build on theories in psychology and economics and link positional preferences to private agents' identification with a social group, and the social norms present in that group. The purpose of our paper is to analyze behavioral, welfare, and policy implications of a link between private agents' social identity and a risky leisure activity. Our results suggest that, when the outcome of the positional activity is uncertain, the over-consumption result that is associated with positional preferences in a deterministic framework need not apply to all agents in a social equilibrium. The reason is that agents have incentives to act with caution in order to avoid failure when the outcome of the socially valued activity is uncertain. We also show how policy can be used to improve the welfare within a social group where the risky leisure activity is positional.
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| 22. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(författare)
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Cooperation and social classes: evidence from Colombia
- 2015
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 45:4, s. 829-848
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We investigate the relationship between social class belonging and contributions to local public goods. By utilizing the social class classifications in Colombia and an experimental design based on the strategy method, we can both study contributions to public goods and classify subjects into contribution types. We find similar contribution levels between high and medium-low social classes and also similar distributions of contributor types. However, low social class members conditionally contribute a significantly higher level than high social class members. This has implications for policymakers, who may need to consider differential policy schemes for locally provided public goods. © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
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| 23. |
- Reffgen, Alexander
(författare)
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Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- 2011
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 37, s. 39-59
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The Gibbard–Satterthwaite (GS) theorem is generalized in three ways: First, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; second, it is shown that every non-dictatorial surjective social choice function (SCF) is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; third, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the SCF are subsets of the set of alternatives of an a priori fixed size. In addition, all results are proved not only for finite, but also for countably infinite sets of alternatives.
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| 24. |
- Simula, Laurent
(författare)
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Optimal nonlinear income tax and nonlinear pricing: optimality conditions and comparative static properties
- 2010
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 35:2, s. 199-220
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using the Mirrlees optimal income tax model, with no income effects on labour supply, this article shows that the discrete population approach provides new insights into the characterization of the optimal tax system, which complements the previous findings. The analysis is based on the "Spence-Mirrlees wedge" which corresponds, at each observed gross income level, to a ratio between the marginal tax rate of the individual for whom the bundle is designed and that of his nearest more productive neighbour if he chooses to mimic. Using this wedge, a necessary and sufficient condition for bunching to be optimal is obtained in terms of the primitives of the model, separating optima are characterized geometrically, and comparative statics properties derived, notably with respect to skill levels and individual social weights. It is then shown that the analysis extends to adverse-selection problems where participation constraints replace the tax revenue constraint.
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| 25. |
- Simula, Laurent, et al.
(författare)
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Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? : The optimal income tax perspective
- 2012
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 39:4, s. 751-782
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes abroad changes the optimal non-linear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs, utilities and costs both depending on productivity. Three average social criteria are distinguished-national, citizen and resident-according to the agents whose welfare matters. A curse of the middle-skilled occurs in the first-best, and it may be optimal to let some highly skilled leave the country under the resident criterion. In the second-best, under the Citizen and Resident criteria, preventing emigration of the highly skilled is not necessarily optimal because the interaction between the incentive-compatibility and participations constraints may cause countervailing incentives. In important cases, a Rawlsian policymaker should decrease top marginal tax rates to keep everyone at home.
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| 26. |
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, et al.
(författare)
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Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- 2008
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 30:2, s. 181-196
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1} imes cdots imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1} imes cdots imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B l . If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained.
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| 27. |
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| 28. |
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| 29. |
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| 30. |
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| 31. |
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| 32. |
- Yu, J., et al.
(författare)
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Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity
- 2023
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - 0176-1714. ; 61, s. 685-712
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Social dilemmas such as greenhouse gas emission reduction are often characterized by heterogeneity in benefits from solving the dilemma. How should leadership of group members be organized in such a setting? We implement a laboratory public goods experiment with heterogeneous marginal per capita returns from the public good and leading by example that is either implemented exogenously or by self-selection. Our results suggest that both ways of implementing leadership only have small effects on contributions to the public good. Self-selected leaders-in particular self-selected low-benefit leaders-tend to set better examples than imposed leaders, but they are also exploited more strongly by followers. Leaders seem to need additional instruments to be more effective when benefits are heterogeneous.
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