| 1. |
- Axelsson, Karl, 1976-
(författare)
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Shaftesbury on natural beauty, science, and animals
- 2023
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Taylor & Francis Group. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- At the heart of Michael B. Gill's impressive study of the third Earl of Shaftesbury's theory of beauty is the notion of nature and its moral, aesthetic, and religious ramifications. In this article, I elaborate on one of Gill's primary claims up to a point where I think a weak spot occurs. The claim concerns nature, and the weak spot is the interpretation of Shaftesbury's references to science (natural philosophy). On the whole, Gill holds that Shaftesbury is “no enemy of a rational understanding of nature, no enemy of science” (44). While I agree with the first clause, I find the second problematic. I argue that, for Shaftesbury, a central problem with science is that it disrupts the moral and aesthetic unity of nature, a flaw shared by society's general exploitation of nature and animals.
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| 2. |
- Ekenberg, Tomas, 1972-
(författare)
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Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury
- 2016
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 24:2, s. 215-230
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic.
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| 3. |
- Flodin, Camilla, 1977-
(författare)
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Adorno and Schelling on the art–nature relation
- 2018
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Taylor & Francis. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 26:1, s. 176-196
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When it comes to the relationship between art and nature, research on Adorno’s aesthetics usually centres on his discussion of Kant and Hegel. While this reflects Adorno’s own position – his comprehension of this relationship is to a large extent developed through a critical re-reading of both the Kantian and the Hegelian position – I argue that we are able to gain important insights into Adorno’s aesthetics and the central art–nature relation by reading his ideas in the light of Schelling’s conception of this relationship. The article focuses on the similarities between Schelling’s notion of nature’s productivity and Adorno’s understanding of natural beauty. It concludes with a discussion on Adorno’s re-evaluation of the reconciliatory power of the exemplary unity of the artwork in conjunction with Schelling’s comparison between artwork and organism, as well as his concept of the construction of nature.
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| 4. |
- Halldenius, Lena
(författare)
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Alison Stone: Luce Irigaray and the Philosophy of Sexual Difference
- 2008
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Routledge. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 16:1, s. 260-263
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Book review of Alison Stone's Luce Irigaray and the Philosophy of Sexual Difference, published by Cambridge UP, 2006. ISBN 978-0-521-86270-7
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| 5. |
- Halldenius, Lena
(författare)
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Review of Historical Dictionary of Feminist Philosophy
- 2009
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Routledge. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 17:2, s. 453-456
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Review of Catherine Villanueva Gardner Historical Dictionary of Feminist Philosophy. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2006.
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| 6. |
- Halldenius, Lena
(författare)
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The Primacy of Right : On the Triad of Liberty, Equality and Virtue in Wollstonecraft's Political Thought
- 2007
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Routledge. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 15:1, s. 75-99
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- I argue along the following lines: For Wollstonecraft, liberty is independence in two different spheres, one presupposing the other. On the one hand, liberty is independence in relation to others, in the sense of not being vulnerable to their whim or arbitrary will. Call this social, or political, liberty. For liberty understood in this way, infringements do not require individual instances of interfering. Liberty is lost in unequal relationships, through dependence on the goodwill of a master. In addition, liberty is independence of mind, a state I am in when I trust my own reasoned judgement above any other authority. Call this moral liberty. Moral liberty needs social liberty. In other words, to the extent I am subject to the whim of others, I am not in a position to be guided by my own judgement. Moral liberty is one of two aspects of virtue: a disposition to independent deliberation according to reason. As such, virtue is a habit of mind. The second aspect of virtue is universal benevolence as its action guiding principle. This is how liberty, equality, and virtue fit together. Social liberty, understood as independence in relation to others, necessarily coexist with equality, and is necessary for moral liberty, the habit of mind that makes up one aspect of virtue, as well as for universal benevolence as virtue’s action guiding principle. This triad explains her views on property, on sex equality, and also on legitimate government. My second line of argument is that according to Wollstonecraft, we have a duty to be virtuous. Virtue is the main object of human life. But since virtue, in both its aspects, needs social liberty and since liberty is the birthright of man, the duty is conditioned on the right. The foundation for the triad of liberty, equality, and virtue is a theory of rights. The basis for the discussion of virtue is the right to the conditions necessary for its realization. The duty is conditioned on the right to liberty.
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| 7. |
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| 8. |
- Svensson, Frans
(författare)
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Non-Eudaimonism, The Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness, and Two Senses of the Highest Good in Descartes’s Ethics
- 2015
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 23:2, s. 277-296
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes's view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in 'a firm and constant resolution' (e.g. CSMK: 325/AT 5: 83) to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good in some detail. In Section 2, I discuss the question of how the motivation to virtue should be accounted for within Descartes's ethical framework. In Section 3, I turn to Descartes's defence of the view that virtue, while fundamentally distinct from happiness, is nevertheless sufficient for obtaining it. In the final section of the paper (Section 4), my concern is instead with a second and sometimes neglected distinction that Descartes makes between two different senses of the highest good. I show that this distinction does not remove the non-eudaimonistic character of Descartes's ethics suggested in Section 1, and present two reasons for why the distinction is important for Descartes's purposes.
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| 9. |
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