| 1. |
- Bojner Horwitz, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Writer's Block Revisited Micro-Phenomenological Case Study on the Blocking Influence of an Internalized Voice
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : Imprint Academic. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 25:3-4, s. 9-28
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Writer's block, a common form of procrastination, can have a serious negative impact on an individual's academic performance. In this case study, a student with writer's block was interviewed and asked to perform body movements that represented the process of writing a master's thesis. A micro-phenomenological method was used to investigate the student's experience of writer's block and the role of an inner voice. The analysis unveiled the process by which the inner voice impeded the student, i.e. how the student perceived a set of mental images, movements, and sensations in relation to the 'inner voice'. The findings suggest that non-verbal modes of learning - through movement - may be applied productively to overcome writer's block and other forms of procrastination in broader areas such as research writing. Moreover, the micro-phenomenological method, together with the interpretation of video recordings, can reveal valuable information regarding this learning process in higher education.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Burns, Tom R., et al.
(författare)
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The Social Construction of Consciousness : Individual Selves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity. Part 2
- 1998
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - Thorverton. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 5:2, s. 166-184
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- From a sociological and social psychological perspective, this paper outlines and develops a theoretical framework with which to define and analyse consciousness, emphasizing the role of language, collective representations, conceptions of self, and self-reflectivity in human conscious phenomena. The paper focuses on the social origins of conscious phenomena, on collective as well as individual levels. Part 1 of the paper (Burns and Engdahl, 1998a) dealt with collective consciousness. This second part analyses individual consciousness as arising in the context of a person experiencing herself as an object of collective representation and collective reflection and discourse. Individual consciousness is the outcome of processes of collective naming, classifying, monitoring, judging, reflecting on, and conducting discussions and discourses about, the individual herself. A participant learns in the collective context (in line with George Herbert Mead's earlier formulations) a naming and classification of herself (self-description and identity), of her judgments, actions, and predispositions. In acquiring a language and conceptual framework for this mode of activity -- along with experience and skills in reflective discussion -- she develops a capability of inner reflection and inner dialogue about self, which are characteristic features of individual consciousness. The analysis goes on to distinguish multiple modes of individual awareness and consciousness, distinguishing awareness from consciousness proper, and also identifying pre- and sub-conscious levels. This points up the complexity of the human mind, in part its elaboration through processes of social interaction and construction.
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| 5. |
- Byrne, Eleanor
(författare)
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Grief in Chronic Illness A Case Study of CFS/ME
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : IMPRINT ACADEMIC. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 29:9-10, s. 175-200
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper points to a more expansive conception of grief by arguing that the losses of illness can be genuine objects of grief. I argue for this by illuminating underappreciated structural features of typical grief - that is, grief over a bereavement - which are shared but under-recognized. I offer a common chronic illness, chronic fat-igue syndrome/myalgic encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME), as a striking case study. I then use this analysis to highlight some clinical challenges that arise should this claim receive uptake in clinical practice. Extant literature on CFS/ME tells us that rates of comorbid depression are atypically high. If one accepts that people with CFS/ ME can grieve over losses associated with the condition, and that grief can be easily mistaken for depression in this context, this might suggest that rates of comorbid depression are inflated. I show, how-ever, that the challenge of distinguishing between healthy and pathol-ogical grief arises in its place, and is just as tricky to solve.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Hydén, Lars-Christer
(författare)
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Dementia, Embodied Memories, and the Self
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : Imprint Academic. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 25:7-8, s. 225-241
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Researchers in cognition and linguistics have in the last couple of decades argued that more complex memories of the kind often called episodic memories are embodied and are multimodal. This is something that is interesting in the field of persons living with, for example, neurodegenerative dementia. In this article the interest is on how bodily gestures can be used to make sense of episodic memories that cannot be verbally communicated by persons with dementia. Empirical examples are discussed with a focus on the use of bodily gestures and how the stories are connected to identities and a sense of self. A key conclusion is that embodied resources like bodily gestures can be used to construct and communicate a sense of self. It further indicates that modal aspects of memories are central in the communicative sense-making process. Finally, the examples demonstrate how embodied episodic memories can be used to present and sustain a sense of self
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| 8. |
- Karlsson, Gunnar, 1955-
(författare)
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Psychoanalysis and the question of self : A dialogue with spiritual traditions
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 23:1-2, s. 179-195
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- From a psychoanalytic point of view it is. well established that an early development of a sense of self is crucial to a person's healthy development. At the same time, the psychoanalytic process can to a large extent be described as a deconstruction of narcissistic and illusionary apprehensions of oneself. With this as a background, I want to discuss the notion of self within a psychoanalytic perspective in relationship to the meaning of self and no-self within spiritual traditions. The most striking similarity between psychoanalytical and spiritual practice is identified as the (controlling) ego's surrender or letting go. The article ends with an attempt to characterize the self that is disclosed in the liberating experience of letting go.
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| 9. |
- Khrennikov, Andrei
(författare)
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The quantum-like brain on the cognitive and subcognitive time scales
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 15:7, s. 39-77
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article takes as its point of departure the view that the discovery of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics (QM) was not merely a discovery of a new mathematical way of dealing with physical, and specifically quantum, processes in nature. It was also a discovery of a general mathematical formalism (in part discovered in mathematics itself earlier), which, supplemented by certain additional rules, consistently described the processing of incomplete information about certain events and contexts in which these events occur. This article proposes a quantum-like (QL) model of the functioning of the brain based on the (Hilbert-space) formalism of quantum mechanics, but now used as part of a QL mathematical model of neural processes in the brain, rather than for describing quantum physical processes. This model is, thus, fundamentally different from the (reductionist) quantum model of the brain and consciousness, according to which cognition arises by virtue of physical quantum processes in the brain. In the present view, the brain is an advanced biological system that developed the ability to create a QL representation of contexts, which, thus, allows one to describe a significant part of its functioning by the QM mathematical formalism. The possibility of such a description has nothing to do with the constitution and workings of the brain as a quantum system (composed of photons, electrons, protons, and so forth). The QL model offered here is based instead on conventional neurophysiological model of the functioning of the brain, even though the brain, the article suggests, does use the QL rule (given by von Neumann trace formula, used in QM) for the calculation of approximate averages for mental functions. The QL model developed in this article has a temporal basis, based on a (hypothetical) argument that cognitive processes are based on at least two time scales: a (very fine) subcognitive one and a (much coarser) cognitive one.
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| 10. |
- Käll, Lisa, 1971-, et al.
(författare)
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Bodily Relational Autonomy
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : IMPRINT ACADEMIC. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 21:9-10, s. 100-120
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Conceptions of autonomy in western philosophy and ethics have often centred on self-governance and self-determination. However, a growing bulk of literature also questions such conceptions, including the understanding of the autonomous self as a self-governing independent individual that chooses, acts, and lives in accordance with her or his own values, norms, or sense of sell This article contributes to the critical interrogation of selfhood, autonomy, and autonomous decision making by combining a feminist focus on relational dimensions of selfhood and autonomy with phenomenological philosophy of the embodied self as being-in-the-world. It offers a philosophical investigation of different dimensions of bodily relational autonomy by turning to phenomenological accounts of the lived body as self-reflexive. When so doing, we hope to contribute to bridging the gap that sometimes exists between discussions of autonomy in analytic moral philosophy and of freedom and facticity in phenomenological philosophy. We see this gap as unfortunate, and hold that a nuanced understanding of autonomy and autonomous decision making can be reached if these strands of philosophy are brought into dialogue.
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| 11. |
- Lindahl, B. Ingemar B., et al.
(författare)
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Consciousness and Neural Force Fields
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 23:7-8, s. 228-253
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article compares Wolfgang Kohler's pioneering field theory of the consciousness brain relation with Benjamin Libet's conscious mental field theory and Karl Popper's mental force field hypothesis. In the discussion of Kohler's theory we devote special attention to his analysis of problems of sense perception and to his explanation of figural after-effects. Both Libet and Popper take consciousness to causally interact with the brain, and we argue that even Kohler presupposes an interactionist interpretation of the consciousness brain relation. We argue that nothing necessarily rules out that consciousness as something subjective may causally interact with the brain as something objective. We discuss an evolutionary argument for the theory that consciousness causally interacts with the brain, and we consider some arguments for consciousness having had a survival value.
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| 12. |
- Rappert, B., et al.
(författare)
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What is absent from contemplative neuroscience? : Rethinking limits within the study of consciousness, experience, and meditation
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : Imprint Academic. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 24:5-6, s. 199-225
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In conveying experiences of meditation, the question of what exceeds or should resist description has been a recurrent topic of commentary in a wide array of literature -- including religious doctrine, meditation guides (secular and religious), and contextual accounts written by historians and social scientists. Yet, to date, this question has not significantly informed neuroscientific studies on the effects of meditation on brain and behaviour, in large part -- but not wholly -- because of the disregard for first-person accounts of experience that still characterizes neuroscience in general. By juxtaposing perspectives from non-neuroscientific accounts on the tensions and questions raised by what is and is not expressed or expressible in words, this article paves the way for a new set of possibilities in experimental contemplative neuroscience.
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| 13. |
- Revonsuo, Antti
(författare)
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Hard to See the Problem?
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : Imprint Academic. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 22:3-4, s. 52-67
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 14. |
- Schellekens, Elisabeth, 1974-
(författare)
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Explanatory Dualism in Empirical Aesthetics: A New Reading
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 19:9-10
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The last decade has seen a significant increase in empirical research into the nature of art and aesthetic experience in the Anglo- American scientific community. Much of the impetus for this came from the publication of three special issues of the present journal on the theme of 'Art and the Brain' (Vol. 6, no. 6-7, 1999; Vol. 7, no. 8-9, 2000; Vol.11, no. 3-4, 2004). A decade or so later, it seems timely to consider the extent to which these new approaches have filtered through into wider philosophical understanding. Many philosophers express scepticism towards empirical aesthetics. This paper seeks to re-examine the grounds for any such scepticism and proposes a new reading of the explanatory power of scientific approaches. It begins by separating the data provided by such theories into three categories. Having identified a particular conceptual problem, it argues that many empirical accounts fail to distinguish sufficiently between the aesthetic and the artistic, and that this is a source of considerable philosophical concern. It then suggests that empirical aesthetics should be divided into two branches, namely empirical aesthetics and empirical art theory. Although such a division may seem to restrict the explanatory reach of scientific accounts somewhat in philosophy, it highlights the numerous ways in which empirical investigations can nonetheless strengthen and benefit philosophical analyses.
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| 15. |
- Svenaeus, Fredrik
(författare)
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Depression and the Self : Bodily Resonance and Attuned Being-in-the-World
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 20:7-8, s. 15-32
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper will explore the relationship between selfhood and depression, by focusing upon the lived body’s capacity to “resonate” with the world and thus open up an “attuned” space of meaning. Persons will become differently tuned in different situations because they embody different patterns of resonance—what is most often referred to as different temperaments—but the self may also suffer from idiosyncrasies in mood profile that develop into deficiencies of resonance, making the person in question ill. In many cases of depression one might describe this as a being out of tune in the sense of being oversensitive to the sad, anxious and boring tune qualities of the world. This phenomenological model allows us to describe a spectrum of various normal sensitivities which might favor certain moods over others, but also to identify pathologies, like depression, in which the body is out of tune and makes the being-in-the-world overwhelmingly unhomelike.
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| 16. |
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| 17. |
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| 18. |
- Ziemke, Tom
(författare)
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The Embodied Self : Theories, Hunches and Robot Models
- 2007
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : Imprint Academic. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 14:7, s. 167-179
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many theories and models of machine consciousness emphasize the role of embodiment. However, there are different interpretations of exactly what kind of embodiment would be required for an artifact to be at least potentially conscious. This paper contrasts the sensorimotor approach, which holds that consciousness emerges from the mastery of sensorimotor knowledge resulting from the interaction between agent and environment, with the view that the living body's homeostatic regulation is crucial to self and consciousness.
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| 19. |
- Brinck, Ingar, et al.
(författare)
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Change blindness in higher-order thought : Misrepresentation or good enough?
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 24:5-6, s. 50-73
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- To evaluate the explanation of change blindness in terms of misrepresentation and determine its role for David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory of consciousness, we present an alternative account of change blindness that affords an independent outlook and provides a viable alternative. First we describe Rosenthal’s actualism and the notion of misrepresentation, then introduce change blindness and the explanation of it by misrepresentation. Rosenthal asserts that in change blindness, the first-order state tracks the post-change stimulus, but the higher-order state misrepresents it. We propose the alternative that both post-change and pre-change content can be tracked by the first order state, and that in change blindness the higher-order thought represents the pre-change state, resulting in a good-enough representation: true but not veridical. We compare the two explanations with respect to available data and analyse the principal theoretical claims. Discussing the rationale of the alternative account, we conclude that there is good reason to conceive of the mind as satisficing, geared towards reliability instead of truth-tracking, and guided by representations that are good enough as opposed to complete or corresponding to the facts. We end by some methodological remarks concerning the risk of cognitive biases in interdisciplinary research that brings together empirical and philosophical claims.
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| 20. |
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| 21. |
- Hesslow, Germund, et al.
(författare)
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The inner world of a simple robot
- 2007
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 14:7, s. 85-96
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The purpose of the paper is to discuss whether a particular robot can be said to have an 'inner world', something that can be taken to be a critical feature of consciousness. It has previously been argued that the mechanism underlying the appearance of an inner world in humans is an ability of our brains to simulate behaviour and perception. A robot has previously been designed in which perception can be simulated. A prima facie case can be made that this robot has an inner world in the same sense as humans. Various objections to this claim are discussed in the paper and it is concluded that the robot, although extremely simple, can easily be improved without adding any new principles, so that ascribing an inner world to it becomes intuitively reasonable.
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| 22. |
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| 23. |
- Kirkeby-Hinrup, Asger
(författare)
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Two caveats to the meta-problem challenge
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 27:5-6, s. 74-81
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- I present two caveats to the meta-problem challenge to theories of consciousness. Chalmers suggests that a theory of consciousness that solves the hard problem should also inform us about the meta-problem, and vice versa. The first caveat is the view that mechanism M, the mechanism through which content becomes conscious, may be neutral with respect to the content it renders conscious. This means that there can be no systematic connection between M and conscious content. The second caveat concerns how we should treat the problem intuitions fueling the meta-problem. I argue that we should award them no special status with respect to their explanatory power in relation to the hard problem.
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| 24. |
- Liljenström, Hans
(författare)
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Editorial Introduction
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 25, s. 8-12
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Annan publikation (refereegranskat)
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| 25. |
- Liljenström, Hans
(författare)
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Freeman Neurodynamics The Past 25 Years
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 25, s. 13-32
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Walter Freeman established a unique approach for interpreting brain processes, perception, cognition, and intentionality. Freeman's neurodynamics approach evokes the concepts of mass action and synchrony in neural populations, and even today is far ahead of the field of dynamical systems in hierarchical brain models. He summarized the essence of his views on the physiology of perception in a landmark paper on the pages of Scientific American in 1991. He spelled out the main components of his neurodynamics theory in that essay, which became a classic in brain theory and cognition. His approach has been hailed by many and attracted a large number of scientists all over the world. At the same time there were fellow scientists who objected to Freeman's approach and dismissed its basic tenets. This love or hate relationship followed Freeman until his death in his home in Berkeley, on 24 April 2016. In the present contribution we review the progress of Freeman's theory of neurodynamics over the past 25 years. We describe his work in light of new developments in experimental and theoretical approaches to brain dynamics, establishing new directions in computational neuroscience, cognitive monitoring, computational and mathematical modelling, field theories of cognition and intelligence, and his quest towards inventing novel engineering applications.
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| 26. |
- Liljenström, Hans
(författare)
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Intentionality as a Driving Force
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 25, s. 206-229
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Intentionality - in the sense of purposiveness - is essential for the action perception cycle, which is central in Walter Freeman's work. In this paper, I will reflect upon Walter Freeman's view on intentionality and its relation to mesoscopic neurodynamics, also quoting him from a couple of unique dialogues. Further, I will elaborate on the role of intentionality for decision making and free will, in particular focusing on intentionality as a driving force in evolution and in life in general. I will also describe briefly a computational model of decision making and put that model in the broader context of the action perception cycle. Finally, in some philosophical comments on consciousness, I will discuss its dual aspects of intention and attention, which appears to be causally effective in the material world.
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| 27. |
- Liljenström, Hans
(författare)
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Peak experiences in a consciousness landscape - report on the science of consciousness conference in Interlaken, Switzerland, 2019
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 26, s. 238-263
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Introduction The Science of Consciousness (TSC) 2019 was the 26th international interdisciplinary conference in the series that started in Tucson in 1994. This one was held in late June in the beautiful Swiss town of Interlaken, between two lakes and surrounded by high alps. The local organizer was Harald Atmanspacher from Collegium Helveticum in Zurich, assisted by the “eternal” main organizer, Stuart Hameroff from the Center for Consciousness Studies in Tucson. There was no special theme for this conference, but I agree with the introductory comment in the abstract book: “Despite remarkable empirical and theoretical progress, consciousness is not understood yet, and therefore the field will benefit from a healthy scientific attitude that includes openness to multiple perspectives”. This was certainly applicable here. The beautiful alpine landscape provided a perfect setting for the conference, but the unexpectedly hot weather made it hard to concentrate and contemplate on the deep questions discussed. Yet, the organizers had done what they could to make the conference welcoming and inspiring for the 620 participants from about 30 countries. There were in total 24 invited talks in 9 plenary sessions, 105 oral presentations in concurrent sessions, and 220 posters - on topics, such as connectomics, placebo research, first-person experience, anesthetics, psychedelics, plant cognition, quantum biology, dual-aspect monism, bistable perception, insight, religious studies, evolution, and language. More details on the conference, including video recordings of the plenary talks are available on the website, www.tsc2019-interlaken.ch. This will be a very subjective report, where I have cherry-picked among the talks I attended, primarily focusing on the plenaries, but with some visits to concurrent sessions. In addition, I will not give equal amount of space to all the presentations I refer to, and apologize if anyone feels mistreated that way. It also goes without saying that the report is biased with respect to my own research interests, as a biophysicist working with neurocomputational models of decision making, based on mesoscopic neurodynamics. Inspired by the surrounding alpine landscape, I think it could serve as a metaphor for the mental landscape and intellectual challenges we have to climb when trying to understand the ancient conundrum of consciousness. The perspectives provided by various research areas, can then be likened with different alps, with rather deep valleys between. Somewhat arbitrary, I will structure my report around three major peak perspectives, Physics, Biology, and Metaphysics, where I have roughly and not chronologically grouped the various presentations.
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| 28. |
- Lindahl, BIB, et al.
(författare)
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Consciousness and Neural Force Fields
- 2016
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Ingår i: JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES. - 1355-8250. ; 23:7-8, s. 228-253
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 29. |
- Lindström, Lena, et al.
(författare)
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Dissolution of What? The Self Lost in Self-Transcendent Experiences
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - : Imprint Academic Ltd. - 1355-8250. ; 29:5-6, s. 75-101
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this study, we investigate the phenomenology of self-transcendent experiences, in which the usual sense of self is lost. Based on a taxonomy of nine aspects of self and three types of content of consciousness, we compare ten accounts of such experiences acquired through in-depth interviews. Sense of separateness and identification with body and narrative self were reported as lost in all of these. However, bodily awareness, spatial self-location, sense of agency, perspectival ownership of experience, thoughts, emotions, sensory impressions, metacognition, and personal identity were variously reported as lost or retained. Individual participants emphasized the absence of either of these ‘optional’ aspects as crucial for their judgment that the experience was without self. We conclude that there is a large variety in what is felt as being lost in self-transcendent experiences, and we recommend that research and theory avoid general terms such as ‘ego-dissolution’ and instead probe more precisely the different aspects of self.
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| 30. |
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| 31. |
- Wirling, Ylwa
(författare)
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Imagining Oneself Being Someone Else The Role of the Self in the Shoes of Another
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 21:9-10, s. 205-225
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Proceeding from a distinction between imagining oneself in another person's situation and imagining oneself being someone else, this article attempts to elucidate what the latter type of imagining consists in. Previous attempts at spelling out the phenomenon fail to properly account for the role of the self or rather every individual's unique point of view. An alternative view is presented, where the concept of imagining oneself being someone else is explained in terms of a distinction between and a co-running of the imaginer's own perspective and that of the target individual. It is further argued that while we can imagine about an individual without imagining her having any of her actual properties, to meaningfully imagine oneself being someone else the imaginer needs to ascribe at least some qualitative property to the target individual for the imaginative project to get off the ground. Finally, the concept of empathy is used to illustrate the analysis provided, and the imagining oneself being someone else is in turn used to cast light on what is to be understood as genuine empathy.
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| 32. |
- Zlatev, Jordan
(författare)
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The dependence of language on consciousness
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 15:6, s. 34-62
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- For we have the experience of ourselves, of that consciousness which we are, and it is on the basis of this experience that all linguistic connotations are assessed, and precisely through it that language comes to have any meaning at all for us.
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| 33. |
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