| 1. |
- Hansson, Lisa
(författare)
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The private whistleblower : defining a new type of role in the public system
- 2012
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Ingår i: Business and Politics. - : Walter de Gruyter. - 1369-5258 .- 1469-3569. - 9789173931755 ; 14:2
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Public procurement has become a common element in Swedish administration. One purpose of procuring is to lower the costs of the procured service and another is for the political level to gain better control over what it is purchasing. However, monitoring problems exist when conducting public procurements; recent studies indicate that actions related to corruption among public servants are most common in public procurement processes. This article takes its departure in public actors monitoring problems. I argue that, in the case of public procurement, private actors have taken on a type of monitoring role towards the public sector, and that the public system in fact, depends on private actors to detect bypasses committed by civil servants. This article provides an understanding of this monitoring role and discusses its theoretical and practical implications for the public system. It is concluded that upholding the public system is not the primary objective for the private whistleblower but a positive effect. The monitoring role is analysed in the framework of principal-agent theory and should be seen as complementary to existing monitoring functions that public principals have at their disposal.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Baccini, Leonardo, et al.
(författare)
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Regional competition, business politicians, and subnational fiscal policy
- 2018
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Ingår i: Business and Politics. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1369-5258 .- 1469-3569. ; 20:3, s. 410-437
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Forskningsöversikt (refereegranskat)abstract
- What explains subnational policy choices over tax cut after decentralization? We test two different explanations in the context of the 2002 tax reform in Russia. A popular strand of literature suggests that decentralization induces more regional competition over investment, motivating subnational tax cuts. A second body of literature suggests that personal business interests of regional governors can account for their different policy choices. Governors with personal business ties refrain from tax cuts because they increase market competition. We find no support for the regional competition hypothesis, but strong statistical evidence for the business connection hypothesis. Our findings have important implications for research on fiscal decentralization and on the connections between business interests of leaders and their policy choices.
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| 4. |
- Bauhr, Monika, 1973, et al.
(författare)
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Does Corruption Lead to Lower Subnational Credit Ratings? Fiscal Dependence, Market Reputation, and the Cost of Debt
- 2021
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Ingår i: Business and Politics. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1369-5258 .- 1469-3569. ; 23:3, s. 364-382
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- While studies show a consistent negative relationship between the level of corruption and range indicators of national-level economic performance, including sovereign credit ratings, we know less about the relationship between corruption and subnational credit ratings. This study suggests that federal transfers allow states with higher levels of corruption to retain good credit ratings, despite the negative economic implications of corruption more broadly, which also allows them to continue to borrow at low costs. Using data on corruption conviction in US states and credit ratings between 2001 and 2015, we show that corruption does not directly reduce credit ratings on average. We find, however, heterogeneous effects, in that there is a negative effect of corruption on credit ratings only in states that have a comparatively low level of fiscal dependence on federal transfers. This suggest that while less dependent states are punished by international assessors when seen as more corrupt, corruption does not affect the ratings of states with higher levels of fiscal dependence on federal revenue.
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| 6. |
- Lim, Sijeong
(författare)
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Financial structures, firms, and the welfare states in South Korea and Singapore
- 2015
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Ingår i: Business and Politics. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1369-5258 .- 1469-3569. ; 17:2, s. 327-354
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- South Korea and Singapore display distinctive patterns of social provision. The Singaporean welfare state has served as the primary provider of social infrastructure and services, whereas the South Korean welfare state has developed its primary role in supporting income maintenance. These differences are not well accounted for in the existing literature, which focuses on similarities between the two regimes. This paper shows that deep institutional legacies in the two countries' respective financial structures powerfully shaped their unique social policy instruments. In South Korea, where financial openness was low and firms relied on relationship-based financing, the corresponding long-term perspectives on production and employment encouraged the private provision of welfare-related infrastructure and services. In Singapore, where firms have relied heavily on arm's length financing, the corresponding flexible investment and employment perspectives encouraged the utilization of private income maintenance arrangements. Each country's government prioritized the mode of social provision that the firms were less willing to engage in. These findings suggest that financial liberalization may be an important determinant of welfare regimes in developing countries.
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| 7. |
- Näsman, Mattias, 1989-, et al.
(författare)
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The power and limits of expertise: Swiss–Swedish linking of vehicle emission standards in the 1970s and 1980s
- 2022
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Ingår i: Business and Politics. - : Cambridge University Press. - 1369-5258 .- 1469-3569. ; 24:3, s. 241-260
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recent decades have witnessed increased public concern about vehicle emissions and growing frustrationwith political inaction and business preferences for the status quo. This article provides historical perspectiveon such regulatory dynamics by analyzing the Swiss and the Swedish cases of vehicle emission governance inthe1970s-1980s. Relying on archival documents detailing the policy process in both countries as well as oninternational regulatory arenas, the analysis focuses on political solutions for reducing the toxicity of vehicleemissions. It uncovers the influence of national as well as international business groups and the existence ofthe tension between various national ministries, arising from conflicting environmental and trade-relatedgoals. Is also highlights the importance of different institutional settings in creating the expertise to explainthe political outcomes. While the Swiss corporatist system gave a great deal of power to a variety of interestgroups at each stage of the political process, the Swedish government invested significant resources in thecreation of independent expertise and enjoyed a relative autonomy, despite the importance of the Swedishcar industry. The analysis also assesses the importance of the Swiss–Swedish collaboration in overcomingcertain obstacles and their contribution to the implementation of stricter regulations in Europe thatultimately occurred at the margins of the European Economic Community.
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| 8. |
- Tallberg, Jonas, 1971-, et al.
(författare)
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AI regulation in the European Union: examining non-state actor preferences
- 2024
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Ingår i: Business and Politics. - 1369-5258 .- 1469-3569.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- As the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) continues to grow, policymakers are increasingly grappling with the question of how to regulate this technology. The most far-reaching international initiative is the European Union (EU) AI Act, which aims to establish the first comprehensive, binding framework for regulating AI. In this article, we offer the first systematic analysis of non-state actor preferences toward international regulation of AI, focusing on the case of the EU AI Act. Theoretically, we develop an argument about the regulatory preferences of business actors and other non-state actors under varying conditions of AI sector competitiveness. Empirically, we test these expectations using data from public consultations on European AI regulation. Our findings are threefold. First, all types of non-state actors express concerns about AI and support regulation in some form. Second, there are nonetheless significant differences across actor types, with business actors being less concerned about the downsides of AI and more in favor of lax regulation than other non-state actors. Third, these differences are more pronounced in countries with stronger commercial AI sectors. Our findings shed new light on non-state actor preferences toward AI regulation and point to challenges for policymakers balancing competing interests in society.
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