| 1. |
- Allgulin, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
-
Monitoring and pay
- 1999
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
-
2020 års Ekonomipris till Paul Milgrom och Robert Wilson
- 2020
-
Ingår i: Ekonomisk Debatt. - : Nationalekonomiska Föreningen. - 0345-2646. ; 48:8, s. 5-12
-
Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien har beslutat dela ut årets Ekonomipris till Paul Milgrom och Robert Wilson, båda från Stanford University, USA, för ”förbättringar av auktionsteorin och uppfinningar av nya auktionsformat”. Årets pristagare har i sin forskning sammanfört teori och praktik, till nytta för enskilda individer, företag och samhällen världen över.
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| 3. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
-
2022 års ekonomipris till Ben Bernanke, Douglas Diamond och Philip Dybvig
- 2022
-
Ingår i: Ekonomisk Debatt. - : Nationalekonomiska Föreningen. - 0345-2646 .- 2002-4231. ; 50:8/2022
-
Forskningsöversikt (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien har beslutat dela ut årets ekonomipris till Ben Bernanke (verksam vid The Brookings Institution), Douglas Diamond (verksam vid University of Chicago) och Philip Dybvig (verksam vid Washington University, St. Louis) ”för forskning om banker och finanskriser”. Med hjälp av forskningsinsikterna från årets ekonomipristagare har senare finanskriser kunnat hanteras bättre.
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| 4. |
- Burkart, Mike, et al.
(författare)
-
What you sell is what you lend? Explaining trade credit contracts
- 2011
-
Ingår i: Review of Financial Studies. - : Oxford University Press. - 0893-9454 .- 1465-7368. ; 24:4, s. 1261-1298
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We relate trade credit to product characteristics and aspects of bank–firm relationships and document three main empirical regularities. First, the use of trade credit is associated with the nature of the transacted good. In particular, suppliers of differentiated products and services have larger accounts receivable than suppliers of standardized goods and firms buying more services receive cheaper trade credit for longer periods. Second, firms receiving trade credit secure financing from relatively uninformed banks. Third, a majority of the firms in our sample appear to receive trade credit at low cost. Additionally, firms that are more creditworthy and have some buyer market power receive larger early payment discounts.
|
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| 5. |
- Domeij, David, et al.
(författare)
-
Hur kan vi kurera ekonomiska kriser
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Ekonomisk debatt. - : Nationalekonomiska Föreningen. - 0345-2646. ; 45:4, s. 6-12
-
Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
|
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| 6. |
|
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| 7. |
- Domeij, David, et al.
(författare)
-
Rational Bubbles and Economic Crises : A Quantitative Analysis
- 2015
-
Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We extend the Bewley-Aiyagari-Huggett model by incorporating an incomplete stock market and a persistent income process. In this quantitative general equilibrium framework, non-fundamental asset values are both large and desirable for realistic parameter values. However, if expectations shift from one equilibrium to another, some markets may crash as others soar. In the presence of nominal assets and contracts, such movements can be highly detrimental. Our analysis is consistent with the view that some of the world’s large recessions were caused by an avoidable failure of monetary and fiscal policy to prevent deflation in the aftermath of bursting asset price bubbles.
|
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| 8. |
- Domeij, David, et al.
(författare)
-
Rational bubbles and public debt policy: A quantitative analysis
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Journal of Monetary Economics. - : Elsevier: 24 months. - 0304-3932. ; 96, s. 109-123
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Do empirically plausible dynastic general equilibrium models admit bubbles and Ponzi-schemes under rational expectations? Contrary to conventional wisdom, the answer is affirmative. The central assumption is that current securities do not represent claims to all future profits. Calibrating the model to U.S. data, we find that it is consistent with the presence of rational bubbles. The observed level of public debt is entirely a Ponzi-scheme. There are large welfare gains from eliminating bubbles on private assets and lodging all the non-fundamental asset value in public debt. Paying off public debt benefits only a small group of wealthy individuals.
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| 9. |
|
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| 10. |
|
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| 11. |
- Dreber Almenberg, Anna, et al.
(författare)
-
Weighing Reward and Punishment - Response
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Science. - : American Association for the Advancement of Science. - 0036-8075 .- 1095-9203. ; 326:5960, s. 1632-1633
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
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| 12. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
A Model of Social Duties
- 2022
-
Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We develop a formal model of social duties. Duties to respect entitlements (duties of justice) differ from duties to promote well-being (duties of charity). A situation- specific version of our model takes entitlements as primitives. A fully portable ver- sion derives entitlements from situational characteristics. Utility functions obtain kinks where duties of justice and charity are exactly satisfied. Actions at these kinks are candidates for descriptive social norms. Empirically, duties are identified using Krupka-Weber appropriateness ratings, with negative ratings indicating entitlement violations. The model’s predictions are confronted with established regularities and new survey evidence in seven pre-registered applications.
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| 13. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
A randomized trial of the effect of testosterone and estrogen on verbal fluency, verbal memory, and spatial ability in healthy postmenopausal women
- 2011
-
Ingår i: Fertility and Sterility. - : Elsevier. - 0015-0282 .- 1556-5653. ; 95:1, s. 152-157
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Objective: To test the causal relationship between sex hormones and cognitive skills in postmenopausal women. We hypothesized that testosterone would decrease verbal memory and verbal fluency and increase spatial ability compared with a placebo. For estrogen, we conversely hypothesized that the treatment would increase verbal fluency and verbal memory and decrease spatial ability. Design: Randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel-group trial. Setting: Women's health clinical research unit at a university hospital. Patient(s): Two-hundred healthy, naturally postmenopausal women aged 50-65 years. Intervention(s): Randomization to 4 weeks' treatment with testosterone (testosterone undecanoate, 40 mg/day), estrogen (oral E2 2 mg/day) or placebo. Main outcome measure(s): Comparisons in verbal fluency, verbal memory, and spatial ability between the three treatment groups. Result(s): We found no significant effects of testosterone or estrogen on verbal fluency, verbal memory, or spatial ability. Conclusion(s): Our results give no support for short-term testosterone or estrogen treatment having any substantial effect on verbal fluency, verbal memory, or spatial ability in healthy postmenopausal women. Copyright © 2011 American Society for Reproductive Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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| 14. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Anchoring and Cognitive Ability
- 2010
-
Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier. - 0165-1765. ; 107:1, s. 66-68
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
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| 15. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior
- 2008
-
Ingår i: Evolution and Human Behavior. - : Elsevier. - 1090-5138. ; 29:2, s. 100-105
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A distinctive feature of humans compared to other species is the high rate of cooperation with nonkin. One explanation is that humans are motivated by concerns for praise and blame. In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact of anticipated verbal feedback on altruistic behavior. We study pairwise interactions in which one subject, the “divider,” decides how to split a sum of money between herself and a recipient. Thereafter, the recipient can send an unrestricted anonymous message to the divider. The subjects' relationship is anonymous and one-shot to rule out any repeated interaction effects. Compared to a control treatment without feedback messages, donations increase substantially when recipients can communicate. With verbal feedback, the fraction of zero donations decreases from about 40% to about 20%, and there is a corresponding increase in the fraction of equal splits from about 30% to about 50%. Recipients who receive no money almost always express disapproval of the divider, sometimes strongly and in foul language. Following an equal split, almost all recipients praise the divider. The results suggest that anticipated verbal rewards and punishments play a role in promoting altruistic behavior among humans.
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| 16. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining
- 2008
-
Ingår i: American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282. ; 98:4, s. 1629-1635
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Building on previous work by Schelling and Crawford, we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c. Most of our results concern outcomes that survive iterated strict dominance. If commitment attempts never fail, there are three such outcomes. In two of them, all the surplus goes to one player. In the third, there is a high probability of conflict. If commitment attempts succeed with probability q < 1, the unique outcome that survives iterated strict dominance entails conflict with probability q2. When c = 0, analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance.
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| 17. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Confining the Coase theorem: Contracting, ownership, and free-riding
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Review of Economic Studies. - : Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy E - Oxford Open Option D / Wiley: No OnlineOpen. - 1467-937X .- 0034-6527. ; 83:2, s. 547-586
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- If individuals own the right to take any action that they please, and are free to contract about behaviour, will outcomes be efficient in all situations? That is, does the Coase theorem hold? We study this classic question through the lens of a non-cooperative model of contract negotiations, considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations. In either case, we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players. But if participation is voluntary, and there are more than two players, there are situations in which all consistent equilibria are inefficient. Specifically, the provision of public goods tends to be inefficiently low due to strategic abstention from contracting. Free-riding on others' agreements can be avoided if individuals do not own all their actions. When actions involve the use of assets, efficient action ownership may correspond to collective rather than individual asset ownership.
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| 18. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Conspicuous generosity
- 2011
-
Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier: 24 months. - 0047-2727. ; 95:9-10, s. 1131-1143
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
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| 19. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Decency
- 2019
-
Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We develop a formal theory of decency. Shared values and understandings give rise to social norms. Norms may mandate collectively optimal behavior, but they need not do so. Furthermore, behavior can be affected by social values even if it stops short of norm compliance. Seeking stronger predictions, we propose a structural model of social values; society endorses efficiency and equality, but condemns ill-gotten gains. The model implies that decent people will tend to avoid situations that encourage prosocial behavior. It also rationalizes the existence of willful ignorance, intention-based negative reciprocity, and betrayal aversion.
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| 20. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?
- 2002
-
Ingår i: Games and economic behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 39:1, s. 28-53
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold-up problem. At the first stage, one agent decides on the level of a relationship-specific investment. There is no contract, so at the second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has generated. We show that the conventional underinvestment result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargaining game and on the choice of equilibrium concept. In particular, we prove the following two results: (i) If bargaining proceeds according to the Nash demand game, any investment level is subgame perfect, but only a particular efficient outcome is stochastically stable. (ii) If bargaining proceeds according to the ultimatum game (with the trading partner as proposer), only the minimal investment level is subgame perfect, but any investment level is stochastically stable. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L14, C78.
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| 21. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Does Gender Diversity Promote Nonconformity?
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Management Science. - : INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences). - 0025-1909 .- 1526-5501. ; 63:4, s. 1085-1096
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Failure to express minority views may distort the behavior of company boards, committees, juries, and other decision-making bodies. Devising a new experimental procedure to measure such conformity in a judgment task, we compare the degree of conformity in groups with varying gender composition. Overall, our experiments offer little evidence that gender composition affects expression of minority views. A robust finding is that a subject’s lack of ability predicts both a true propensity to accept others’ judgment (informational social influence) and a propensity to agree despite private doubt (normative social influence). Thus, as an antidote to conformity in our experiments, high individual ability seems more effective than group diversity.
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| 22. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Does impartial deliberation breed fair behavior? : An experimental test
- 2005
-
Ingår i: Rationality and society. - : Sage. - 1461-7358 .- 1043-4631. ; 17:1, s. 116-136
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We experimentally test whether impartial deliberation leads to stronger concern for fairness in bargaining. In the experiment a seller can invest some of his/her time in order to generate potential gains from trade with a buyer. Conditional on investment the seller proposes how to split the gain. The buyer either accepts or rejects the seller's offer. To vary the degree of impartiality, subjects are assigned to their roles as sellers or buyers either before (the 'subjective group') or after (the 'objective group') they read the instructions. We find that the relationship between the perceived investment cost and the bargaining proposal is significantly stronger in the objective group. This suggests that sellers in the objective group are more preoccupied with setting a fair price.
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| 23. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Fair and Square: A Retention Model of Managerial Compensation
- 2022
-
Ingår i: Management Science. - : INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences). - 1526-5501 .- 0025-1909. ; 68:5, s. 3604-3624
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We propose a model of how the retention motive shapes managerial compensation contracts. Once employed, a risk-averse manager acquires imperfectly portable skills whose value is stochastic because of industry-wide demand shocks. The manager's actions are uncontractible, and the perceived fairness of the compensation contract affects the manager's motivation. If the volatility of profits is sufficiently large and outside offers are suffi-ciently likely, the equilibrium contract combines a salary with an own -firm stock option. The model's predictions are consistent with empirical regularities concerning contractual shape, the magnitude of variable pay, the lack of indexation, and the prevalence of discretionary severance pay.
|
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| 24. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Financial contracting under imperfect enforcement
- 2011
-
Ingår i: Quarterly Journal of Economics. - : Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy E - Oxford Open Option D - RCUK. - 1531-4650 .- 0033-5533. ; 126:1, s. 323-371
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
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| 25. |
|
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| 26. |
|
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| 27. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 107, s. 153-181
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.
|
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| 28. |
- Ellingsen, Tore
(författare)
-
Institutional and Organizational Economics : A Behavioral Game Theory Introduction
- 2024. - 1st
-
Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Why do some countries succeed while others struggle? Why are some firms profitable while rivals fail? Why do some marriages thrive and others end in divorce? These questions seem unrelated, but societies, companies, and marriages have one important thing in common: they involve more than one individual. They thus face the same fundamental challenges. How can people be made to help rather than hurt each other? How can they use sacrifice, cooperation, and coercion to promote the common good? In this introductory text, Tore Ellingsen equips readers to answer essential questions around the success and failure of humans in groups, drawing on behavioral game theory, psychology, and sociology. He emphasizes how other-regarding preferences such as altruism and dutifulness matter for societies’ prosperity, and analyzes the role of culture in the form of shared values and understandings. One lesson is that cooperation is facilitated when people anticipate that they will hold common memories of past behavior, especially if agreements take precedence over leaders’ authority. A groundbreaking text, Institutional and Organizational Economics is essential reading for students and scholars of economics, political science, sociology, and public administration.
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| 29. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Is There a Hold-up Problem?
- 2004
-
Ingår i: The Scandinavian journal of economics. - : Blackwell Publishing Ltd/Inc. - 1467-9442 .- 0347-0520. ; 106:3, s. 475-494
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We report on a hold-up experiment in which unilateral investment is followed by bilateral gaining according to Nash's demand game. Without communication, investment is low and coordination is poor. Unilateral communication facilitates coordination, but not perfectly. Successful coordination predominantly entails "fair" outcomes. Perhaps suprisingly, sellers (investors) do at least as well under buyer communication as under seller communication.
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| 30. |
|
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| 31. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Monetary Policy and Market Interest Rates
- 2001
-
Ingår i: The American economic review. - : American Economic Association. - 1944-7981 .- 0002-8282. ; 91:5, s. 1594-1607
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
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| 32. |
|
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| 33. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Paying respect
- 2007
-
Ingår i: Journal of Economic Perspectives. - : American Economic Association. - 0895-3309. ; 21:4, s. 135-150
-
Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Why do people work? Economic theory generally, and the principal-agent model specifically, emphasize the role of material incentives. But many academics, for example, work diligently year after year for a nearly fixed real salary, continuing to work hard as they approach retirement, although financial incentives are usually absent. We will argue that while economists have been right to focus on incentives, they have been wrong to focus so exclusively on material incentives. While workers appreciate monetary rewards, they also get utility from what (they believe that) others think about them. We lay out a body of evidence that, taken as a whole, makes a strong case that respect matters in the workplace, above and beyond material rewards. We discuss evidence that workers respond to attention, symbolic rewards, and trust -- and even that material incentives in some cases lead to less effort. Finally, we argue that many of these observations can be captured in a standard principal-agent model, once the principals and the agents are assumed to care about respect or esteem as well as money.
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| 34. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive theory
- 2008
-
Ingår i: American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282. ; 98:3, s. 990-1008
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors' utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a principal agent setting, we show that the model can account for motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode morale by signaling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. The model also offers an explanation for why agents are motivated by unconditionally high pay and by mission-oriented principals.
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| 35. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Puritanical moralism may signal patience rather than cause self-control
- 2023
-
Ingår i: Behavioral and Brain Sciences. - : Cambridge University Press. - 0140-525X .- 1469-1825. ; 46
-
Forskningsöversikt (refereegranskat)abstract
- We argue that people may resist temptations not only with the aim of acquiring more self-control, but also because they want to convince others that they are patient and already possess self-control.
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| 36. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Rational Bubbles in UK Housing Markets: Comment on "No-Bubble Condition: Model-Free Tests in Housing Markets"
- 2020
-
Ingår i: Econometrica. - : Econometric Society: Econometrica. - 1468-0262 .- 0012-9682. ; 88:4, s. 1755-1766
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Giglio, Maggiori, and Stroebel (2016) show that there is no significant price difference between freeholds and ultra-long leaseholds in the UK housing market. They claim that this finding precludes the presence of large rational bubbles, as these can only attach to the price of freeholds. But the conclusion presumes that leaseholders cannot acquire bubbles through enfranchisement at favorable prices. We find that the presumption is violated. Enfranchisement rights are comprehensive and cheap to exercise. We also dispute the counter-argument that cheap enfranchisement proves that market participants, if they have rational expectations, must have explicitly concluded that freehold prices are bubbleless.
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| 37. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games
- 2011
-
Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765 .- 1873-7374. ; 110:2, s. 90-92
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Within a class of games that we call Blame Games, we discuss how strategic risk may discourage play of a unique and efficient (strictly) dominance solvable equilibrium.
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| 38. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining
- 2005
-
Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 50:2, s. 155-177
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study a bilateral trading relationship in which one agent, the seller, can make a nonrecoverable investment in order to generate potential gains from trade. Afterwards, the seller makes a price offer that the buyer can either accept or reject. If agents are fairminded, sellers who are known by the buyer to have high investment costs are predicted to charge higher prices. If the investment cost is private information, low-cost sellers should price more aggressively and high-cost sellers less aggressively than under complete information, giving rise to disagreement and/or underinvestment. Our experiment support these predictions.
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| 39. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Sweden and the virus: What was the Swedish government's approach to the pandemic, and how was it received in Sweden?
- 2020
-
Ingår i: Sweden through the crisis. - Stockholm : Stockholm School of Economics Institute for Research. - 9789186797386 ; , s. 35-51
-
Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this article, Tore Ellingsen and Jesper Roine discuss Sweden’s strategy of mitigation rather than suppression of the COVID-19 virus. They explore why this strategy was chosen and why the Swedish government has trusted experts at the Swedish Health Agency to formulate the overall strategy.
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| 40. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Testing guilt aversion
- 2010
-
Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 68:1, s. 95-107
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
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| 41. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
The aversion to lying
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681. ; 70:1-2, s. 81-92
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
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| 42. |
|
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| 43. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument.
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Biology. - : Elsevier. - 0022-5193. ; 299, s. 113-119
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In most animals with internal fertilization, the early costs of parenting by necessity falls on the female, whereas male and female investments are closer substitutes later on. After Dawkins and Carlisle's (1976) critique of Trivers' (1972) anisogamy argument, the conventional wisdom has been that early investment costs as such are irrelevant for the allocation of subsequent parental investment. However, in a stylized evolutionary model with recurrent mutations, we show that if only one parent bears early costs, then the other parent should bear a substantial fraction of later costs. The result implies that the conventional wisdom has shaky logical foundations and that we have yet to understand the interaction between anisogamy and non-gamete parental investment.
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| 44. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Time is not money
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681. ; 72:1, s. 96-102
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
|
| 45. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
Trust and truth
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Economic Journal. - : Wiley: 24 months. - 1468-0297 .- 0013-0133. ; 119:534, s. 252-276
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
|
| 46. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
-
When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
- 2010
-
Ingår i: The American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282 .- 1944-7981. ; 100:4, s. 1695-1724
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2 x 2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 x 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination.
|
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| 47. |
- Jacobson, Tor, et al.
(författare)
-
Trade credit: Contract-level evidence contradicts current theories
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We study 52 million trade credit contracts, issued by 51 suppliers over 9 years to about 199,000 unique customers. The data contain information on contract size, due dates, actual time to payment, and firm characteristics. Our empirical analysis contradicts the conventional view that trade credit is an inferior source of funding. Specifically, while we replicate the usual finding that payables are negatively related to customers’ financial strength, our disaggregated data reveal that improvements in customers’ financial conditions are primarily associated with a reduced value of input purchases rather than smaller trade credit usage. In fact, customers’ financial conditions are unrelated to agreed contract duration and only modestly affect overdue payments. Moreover, the customer’s size and share of the supplier’s sales both have a positive impact on the due date. Overall, the evidence indicates that customers prefer trade credit over other available sources of funding and thus calls for a new theory of short-term finance.
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| 48. |
- Johannesson, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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Is generosity involuntary?
- 2007
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier B.V. - 1873-7374 .- 0165-1765. ; 94:1, s. 32-37
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We estimate the distribution of exit reservation prices in a dictator game. The mean exit reservation price equals 82% of the dictator game endowment and only 36% of subjects have exit reservation prices consistent with selfish or social preferences.
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| 49. |
- Johannesson, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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Promises, Threats and Fairness
- 2004
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Ingår i: The Economic Journal. - : Royal Economic Society. - 1468-0297 .- 0013-0133. ; 114:495, s. 397-420
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate the hold-up problem. While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner's promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioural economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness and consistency. The model can account for several of our experimental findings. Its most striking implication is that fairmindedness strengthens the credibility of promises to behave fairly, but weakens the credibility of threats to punish unfair behaviour.
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| 50. |
- Lilja, Jannie, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
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Trust and Truth
- 2009
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Ingår i: Economic Journal. - 0013-0133 .- 1468-0297. ; 119:534, s. 252-276
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values bargaining game with or without communication. Communication substantially increases bargaining efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma but has no significant effect on bargaining outcomes when one subject defected. Subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma bid more aggressively if their opponent defected. Cooperators also lie more about their valuations when their opponent defected. The results constitute novel evidence that many people are strong reciprocators.
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