| 1. |
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Agné, Hans, et al.
(författare)
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Symposium 'The politics of international recognition'
- 2013
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Ingår i: International Theory. - 1752-9719 .- 1752-9727. ; 5:1, s. 94-107
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recognition plays a multifaceted role in international theory. In rarely communicating literatures, the term is invoked to explain creation of new states and international structures; policy choices by state and non-state actors; and normative justifiability, or lack thereof, of foreign and international politics. The purpose of this symposium is to open new possibilities for imagining and studying recognition in international politics by drawing together different strands of research in this area. More specifically, the forum brings new attention to controversies on the creation of states, which has traditionally been a preserve for discussion in International Law, by invoking social theories of recognition that have developed as part of International Relations more recently. It is suggested that broadening imagination across legal and social approaches to recognition provides the resources needed for theories with this object to be of maximal relevance to political practice.
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| 5. |
- Chahboun, Naima, 1980-
(författare)
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Art of the Possible? : Feasibility and Compliance in Ideal and Nonideal Theory
- 2020
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In the past decade, the value of so-called ideal theory has become a major point of dispute among political theorists. While critics of ideal theory accuse this approach of “idle utopianism”, its advocates fault the critics for conceding to “cynical realism”.This dissertation examines two charges against ideal theory. The demandingness charge states that ideal theory fails to acknowledge the constraints on justice set by the empirical conditions that prevail in our world, and that it therefore produces invalid principles. The uselessness charge states that ideal theory, even if it tells us what justice would require under exceptionally favorable circumstances, offers no information valuable for guiding action in the nonideal circumstances characteristic of today’s societies. The two charges target the idealized assumptions made in ideal theory, in particular the assumption of full compliance. By assuming full compliance, the critics argue, ideal theory ignores the way real-world agents’ motivational limitations render the pursuit of its proposed principles infeasible or undesirable.In four free-standing articles, I examine when and why noncompliance due to motivational limitations puts constraints on justice, and how this affects the status and usefulness of ideal theory. I argue that motivational limitations constrain justice in ideal theory if we hold that justice is action-guiding in the sense that it confers actual duties on individual agents, and that the distribution of collective duties to individuals requires reasonable expectations of others’ compliance. In nonideal theory, adopting an actualist standpoint will lead us to conclude that not only the noncompliance of others, but also our own foreseeable noncompliance constrains what justice can demand. I further argue that how this affects the usefulness of ideal theory depends, on the one hand, on how we interpret crucial concepts such as “action-guidance”, and, on the other, on which task we expect political theory to perform. My findings shed new light over the complex conflict lines that underlie the current dispute, and urge debaters to render explicit and argue for the assumptions upon which they rest their judgments about ideal theory.
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| 6. |
- Elm-Schulin, Viktor, 1989-
(författare)
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Do the Ends Justify the Means? : On the Justifiability of Statistical Discrimination
- 2023
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- While statistical discrimination comes with similar objections as other types of discrimination it may also lead to a number of beneficial and important consequences, thereby leaving us with conflicting intuitions regarding the right course of action. This study investigates whether there is any superior account of statistical discrimination that can explain when and why such a practice can be defended; i.e., when it is justified. Employing four desiderata — i.e., requirements — for a successful account of statistical discrimination, this study sorts out a number of popular but inadequate accounts and is left with three main contenders: the demeaning account, the consequentialist accounts, and the ex-ante contractualist account. The study notes several challenges with each of these main contenders and tries its best to answer them given the tools available for each account.This study concludes that the ex-ante contractualist account is superior to the other two main contenders given these four desiderata. In contrast to consequentialist accounts, it can more fully account for the reasons we typically hold against discrimination in a plausible way, and in contrast to the demeaning account, it can avoid the indeterminacy that seems to follow from relying, mainly or solely, upon demeaning treatment. Furthermore, it is argued that ex-ante contractualism’s emphasis on the need to discount uncertain burdens leads to intuitively appealing distinctions and implications. This conclusion gives new fuel to the idea that demeaning treatment is an important wrong of discrimination and offers a refined idea of what it means to take the consequences of statistical discrimination seriously.
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| 7. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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A Function-Sensitive Approach to the Political Legitimacy of Global Governance
- 2020
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Ingår i: British Journal of Political Science. - 0007-1234 .- 1469-2112. ; 50:3, s. 1001-1024
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article draws attention to an aspect that thus far has escaped systematic scrutiny in the theoretical literature on the political legitimacy of global governance – functions. It does so by exploring the idea that the content and justification of a principle of political legitimacy for global governance may depend on the function of the entity it is supposed to regulate (for example, law making, policy making, implementation, monitoring). Two arguments are made: one meta-theoretical and one substantive. The metatheoretical argument demonstrates the fruitfulness of adopting a ‘function-sensitive approach’ to political legitimacy to address this aspect. The substantive argument develops the contours of an account of political legitimacy by applying this approach. This account consists of five regulative principles, which are sensitive to, and vary in accordance with, different functions in global politics.
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| 8. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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A World of Possibilities : The Place of Feasibility in Political Theory
- 2020
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Ingår i: Res Publica. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1356-4765 .- 1572-8692. ; 26, s. 1-23
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Although the discussion about feasibility in political theory is still in its infancy, some important progress has been made in the last years to advance our understanding. In this paper, we intend to make a contribution to this growing literature by investigating the proper place of feasibility considerations in political theory. A motivating force behind this study is a suspicion that many presumptions made about feasibility in several current debates—such as that between practice-independence and practice-dependence, ideal and non-ideal theory, and political moralism and political realism—are too rigid and underestimate the numerous different ways in which feasibility concerns may enter into our theorizing. To chisel out this feasibility space, our aim is to suggest two metatheoretical constraints on normative political principles as intuitively plausible, the so-called ‘fitness constraint’ and the ‘functional constraint’, through which we elucidate five central aspects for determining proper feasibility constraints of an account in political theory.
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| 9. |
- Erman, Eva, 1971-
(författare)
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Action and Institution : Contributions to a discourse theory of human rights
- 2003
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In the theoretical rights discourse rights are commonly analyzed in terms of two themes,negative and positive rights, on the one hand, and individual and collective rights, on theother. We witness similar themes in the empirical rights discussion held by the UnitedNations’ Commission on Human Rights (the CHR). There is a tendency in both the theoreticaland empirical rights discourse of not including one kind of rights, namely, political rights.Political rights are either not mentioned at all or only in terms of negative rights, that is, asrights we are assigned through a ballot-paper.The purpose of this thesis is to problematize the absence of political rights in the humanrights discourse from a deliberative perspective. The thesis takes part in the debate of how tounderstand and legitimize human rights, one presumption being that if we cannot define orjustify any natural rights another possible way to go is to start out from a substantive actionrelatednotion of political rights and a problematization of the relationship between politicalrights and other rights. More specifically, the aim of the thesis is to make a contribution to adiscourse theory of human rights and apply it to a global rights institution, the CHR, bystarting out from and at the same time criticizing Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of lawand democracy.A discourse theory of human rights links democratic processes with rights and opens thedoor for new ways of defining traditional democratic concepts such as representation andparticipation. Facing one of the most urgent problems on the international political arena, i.e.,how to democratize the United Nations, this thesis is a contribution, albeit a small one, to howthis could be done, viz. by finding ways to make the international human rights discoursemore legitimate than it would otherwise have been.
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| 10. |
- Erman, Eva, 1971-, et al.
(författare)
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Artificial Intelligence and the Political Legitimacy of Global Governance
- 2022
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Ingår i: Political Studies. - : SAGE Publications. - 0032-3217 .- 1467-9248.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Although the concept of “AI governance” is frequently used in the debate, it is still rather undertheorized. Often it seems to refer to the mechanisms and structures needed to avoid “bad” outcomes and achieve “good” outcomes with regard to the ethical problems artificial intelligence is thought to actualize. In this article we argue that, although this outcome-focused view captures one important aspect of “good governance,” its emphasis on effects runs the risk of overlooking important procedural aspects of good AI governance. One of the most important properties of good AI governance is political legitimacy. Starting out from the assumptions that AI governance should be seen as global in scope and that political legitimacy requires at least a democratic minimum, this article has a twofold aim: to develop a theoretical framework for theorizing the political legitimacy of global AI governance, and to demonstrate how it can be used as a compass for critially assessing the legitimacy of actual instances of global AI governance. Elaborating on a distinction between “governance by AI” and “governance of AI” in relation to different kinds of authority and different kinds of decision-making leads us to the conclusions that much of the existing global AI governance lacks important properties necessary for political legitimacy, and that political legitimacy would be negatively impacted if we handed over certain forms of decision-making to artificial intelligence systems.
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| 11. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Bör vi ha global demokrati?
- 2013
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Ingår i: Statsvetenskapens frågor. - Lund : Studentlitteratur. - 9789144091112 ; , s. 66-74
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 12. |
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| 13. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Conclusion: Transnational Actors and Global Democracy
- 2010
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Ingår i: Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors. - Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan. - 9781349316137 - 9780230283251 ; , s. 194-213
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This concluding chapter elaborates on the findings of the volume and raises a number of issues pertaining to normative theorizing on democracy beyond the state. Drawing on the individual chapters, it offers a comprehensive analysis of the different democratic requirements applicable to different types of transnational actors (TNAs). We discuss the question of whether different kinds of TNAs necessarily have to be democratic in the same way and to the same extent. We also pay attention to potential trade-offs between different democratic values. Moreover, we analyze the potential roles of TNAs in global democracy, considering formal and informal tracks for linking constituencies to political authority. One principle underlying much scholarship on global democracy — including this volume — is the all-affected principle. A problem in the contemporary debate, however, is that this principle is vaguely defined and presupposed rather than problematized and carefully elaborated. In light of the empirical and theoretical contributions of this volume, we revisit this debate with the aim of sorting out some of the issues that are in need of further attention. We also discuss how the market economy may relate to global democracy, an issue highlighted by the prominence of market actors — not only civil society actors — among the TNAs influencing global governance. It is argued that more normative theoretical work needs to be done in addressing the role of market actors in global democracy. Finally, after having devoted the whole book to issues of democratic legitimacy, we conclude with a brief discussion of other sources of legitimacy linked to TNAs and global governance, which are in need of further elaboration.
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| 14. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Conflict and Universal Moral Theory : From Reasonableness to Reason-Giving
- 2007
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Ingår i: Political theory. - : Sage Publications. - 0090-5917 .- 1552-7476. ; 35:5, s. 598-623
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The solutions to moral problems offered by contemporary moral theories largely depend on how they understand pluralism. This article compares two different kinds of universal moral theories, liberal impartiality theory and discourse ethics. It defends the twofold thesis that (1) a dialogical theory such as discourse ethics is better equipped to give an account of pluralism than impartiality theory due to a more correct understanding of the nature of conflict, but that (2) discourse ethics cannot, contrary to what Jürgen Habermas claims, embrace the notion of impartiality connected to agent-neutrality. The article argues that pluralism reflects conflicts among values not only between but also within people and that discourse ethics can include both these dimensions since it recognizes the constitutive connection between deliberation and (moral) conflict. Thus, unlike impartiality theory, it can elucidate the transformative aspects of pluralism.
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| 15. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Debate : Brandom and Political Philosophy
- 2014
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Ingår i: The Journal of Political Philosophy. - Chichester : Wiley. - 0963-8016 .- 1467-9760. ; 22:4, s. 486-498
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 16. |
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| 17. |
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| 18. |
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| 19. |
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| 20. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Distinctively Political Normativity in Political Realism : Unattractive or Redundant
- 2022
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Ingår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 25:3, s. 433-447
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Political realists’ rejection of the so-called ‘ethics first’ approach of political moralists (mainstream liberals), has raised concerns about their own source of normativity. Some realists have responded to such concerns by theorizing a distinctively political normativity. According to this view, politics is seen as an autonomous, independent domain with its own evaluative standards. Therefore, it is in this source, rather than in some moral values ‘outside’ of this domain, that normative justification should be sought when theorizing justice, democracy, political legitimacy, and the like. For realists the question about a distinctively political normativity is important, because they take the fact that politics is a distinct affair to have severe consequences for both how to approach the subject matter as such and for which principles and values can be justified. Still, realists have had a hard time clarifying what this distinctively political normativity consists of and why, more precisely, it matters. The aim of this paper is to take some further steps in answering these questions. We argue that realists have the choice of committing themselves to one of two coherent notions of distinctively political normativity: one that is independent of moral values, where political normativity is taken to be a kind of instrumental normativity; another where the distinctness still retains a justificatory dependence on moral values. We argue that the former notion is unattractive since the costs of commitment will be too high (first claim), and that the latter notion is sound but redundant since no moralist would ever reject it (second claim). Furthermore, we end the paper by discussing what we see as the most fruitful way of approaching political and moral normativity in political theory.
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| 21. |
- Erman, Eva, 1971-, et al.
(författare)
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Distinctively political normativity in political theory
- 2022
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Ingår i: Philosophy Compass. - : Wiley. - 1747-9991. ; 17:6
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recent years' literature on distinctively political normativity raises methodological and meta-theoretical concerns of importance for political theory. The aim of this article is to identify and critically examine the main positions in this debate as well as to analyze problems and promising ways forward. In brief, we argue that the predominant non-moral view of distinctively political normativity (i.e., the view that political normativity is independent of moral normativity), is problematic in all its three versions. Further, we suggest that a reasonable approach to political normativity should adopt a moral view (i.e., the view that political normativity is not independent of moral normativity) and investigate two such approaches: the so-called filter approach and the role approach!' Although still much in need of further development in political theory, both of them bear promise as accounts which preserve the distinctness of the political domain while acknowledging its status as a moral kind.
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| 22. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Does Global Democracy Require a World State?
- 2019
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Ingår i: Philosophical Papers. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0556-8641 .- 1996-8523. ; 48:1, s. 123-153
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The question of whether global democracy requires a world state has with few exceptions been answered with an unequivocal No'. A world state, it is typically argued, is neither feasible nor desirable. Instead, different forms of global governance arrangements have been suggested, involving non-hierarchical and multilayered models with dispersed authority. The overall aim of this paper is to addresses the question of whether global democracy requires a world state, adopting a so-called function-sensitive' approach. It is shown that such an approach is equipped to resist the predominant binary view of a world state (either accepting it or rejecting it) and offer a more differentiated and nuanced answer to this question. In brief, a basic presumption of a function-sensitive approach is that the content, justification and status of principles of democracy are dependent on the aim they are set out to achieve, what functions they are intended to regulate (e.g., decision-making, implementation, enforcement and evaluation), and the relationship between those functions. More specifically, within a function-sensitive framework, the paper sketches the contours of an account of global democracy consisting of five regulative principles and argues-utilizing the notion of sufficient stateness'-that it would require supranational legislative entities and perhaps supranational judicial entities but not necessarily supranational executive entities.
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| 23. |
- Erman, Eva, 1971-, et al.
(författare)
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Does Normative Behaviourism Offer an Alternative Methodology in Political Theory?
- 2023
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Ingår i: Political Studies Review. - : SAGE Publications. - 1478-9299 .- 1478-9302. ; 21:3, s. 454-461
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A central distinction for Jonathan Floyd is that between the traditional method of pursuing political theory conducted by mainstream theorists, which he calls ‘mentalism’, and his suggested method, so-called ‘normative behaviourism’. While the former relies on patterns of thought (e.g. intuitions, value commitments, principles or considered judgements) to justify normative theories, the latter instead relies on patterns of behaviour. Floyd argues that normative behaviourism offers an alternative methodology to mainstream mentalism, a new – and better – way of doing political philosophy. Our aim in this article is to reject this claim: normative behaviourism does not offer an alternative methodology in political theory. First, we show that normative behaviourism, contrary to Floyd’s claim, is as dependent on value premises as mainstream, ‘mentalist’ political theory. Second, we illustrate the structural similarities between normative behaviourism and mainstream political theory from a methodological standpoint by comparing the former with an influential normative theory, namely, utilitarianism.
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| 24. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Ethics & Global Politics
- 2014
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Ingår i: Peace Review. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1040-2659 .- 1469-9982. ; 26:4, s. 479-481
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 25. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Freedom as Non-Domination
- 2011
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Ingår i: Differenz und Dialog. - Berlin : Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag. - 9783830519676
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 26. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Freedom as non-domination or how to throw the agent out of the space of reasons
- 2010
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Ingår i: Journal of Power. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1754-0291 .- 1754-0305. ; 3, s. 33-51
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper analyzes agency in Pettit’s republican conception of freedom. By understanding freedom intersubjectively in terms of agency, Pettit makes an important contribution to the contemporary debate on negative liberty. At the same time, some of the presumptions about agency are problematic. The paper defends the thesis that Pettit is not able to provide the sufficient conditions for freedom as non‐domination that he sets out to do. In order to show why this is the case and how we can address this shortcoming, a distinction is introduced between a thick and a thin intersubjective account of agency. It is argued that while Pettit’s freedom presupposes a thin account, he would need a thick account in order to elaborate not only the necessary but also the sufficient conditions of freedom as non‐domination.
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| 27. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Global Democracy and Feasibility
- 2020
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Ingår i: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1369-8230 .- 1743-8772. ; 23:3, s. 311-331
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- While methodological and metatheoretical questions pertaining to feasibility have been intensively discussed in the philosophical literature on justice in recent years, these discussions have not permeated the debate on global democracy. The overall aim of this article is to demonstrate the fruitfulness of importing some of the advancements made in this literature into the debate on global democracy, as well as to develop aspects that are relevant for explaining the role of feasibility in normative political theory. This is done by pursuing two arguments. First, to advance the work on the role of feasibility, we suggest as intuitively plausible two metatheoretical constraints on normative political theorizing – the ‘fitness constraint’ and the ‘functional constraint’ – which elucidate a number of aspects relevant in determining proper feasibility constraints for an account in political theory. Secondly, to illustrate the usefulness of this feasibility framework, we sketch an account of global democracy consisting of normative principles which respond differently to these aspects and thus are tied to different feasibility constraints as well as exemplify how it may be applied in practice.
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| 28. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Global democracy and feasibility
- 2021
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Ingår i: Legitimacy Beyond the State. - : Routledge. - 9780367694975 - 9781003142027
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 29. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Global political legitimacy beyond justice and democracy?
- 2016
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Ingår i: International Theory. - 1752-9719 .- 1752-9727. ; 8:1, s. 29-62
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Despite the broad consensus on the value of political legitimacy in global politics, there is still little agreement on what the specific regulative content of the principles of legitimacy ought to be. Two main paths have thus far been taken in the theoretical literature to respond to the legitimacy deficit in the global domain: one via the ideal of democracy, another via the ideal of justice. However, both have run into problems. The overall purpose of this paper is to examine these two paths in the endeavour to explore the possibilities of a third path, which investigates global political legitimacy (GPL) as a value that is at a basic level distinct from democracy and justice. The paper aims to fulfil two tasks. The conceptual task consists in identifying some characteristics of the concept of GPL that makes it distinct from political legitimacy generally, as well as showing its usefulness for normative theorizing. The normative task is twofold: first, to demonstrate that the value of GPL is reducible neither to democracy nor to justice; and second, to develop the contours of a dual account of GPL, in which both justice and democracy play essential roles.
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| 30. |
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| 31. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Globala orättvisor
- 2009
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Ingår i: Politisk teori. - Malmö : Liber. - 9789147088812 ; , s. 228-245
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 32. |
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| 33. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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How practices do not matter
- 2019
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Ingår i: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. - : Routledge. - 1369-8230 .- 1743-8772. ; 22:1, s. 103-118
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In his most recent work, Sangiovanni has retreated from his stronger claims about practice-dependence. Instead of claiming that principles of justice must be practice-dependent, he now expresses his claim in a modal form, arguing that there are several ways in which practices may matter. While merely mapping out the logical space of possibilities seems to look like a modest ambition, the conditions for when practices do matter according to Sangiovanni's analysis are easily met in actuality. Consequently, if he is right, the practice-dependent approach covers a significant number of political theories. Sangiovanni's main claim is that higher-level principles with an open texture, which include most higher-level principles in political philosophy, justify a practice-dependent method in the form of a mode of application called 'mediated deduction,' according to which a thoroughgoing investigation is made of the nature of the target practice. Our task in this paper is to reject this claim. This is done in two steps. First, we question Sangiovanni's distinction between instrumental application and mediated deduction, arguing that it remains unclear whether it marks out two sufficiently distinct 'modes' to do any theoretical work. Second, we argue that the practice-dependent method is not required even if two such modes are established.
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| 34. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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How practices do not matter
- 2020
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Ingår i: Facts & Norms. - London : Routledge. - 9781000192766
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 35. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Human Rights and Democracy : Discourse Theory and Global Rights Institutions
- 2005
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Bok (refereegranskat)abstract
- This volume explores the relationship between human rights and democracy within both the theoretical and empirical field. It is a book within the tradition of deliberative democracy, although it focuses on global institutions and human rights rather than nation-state or federalist democracy. Eva Erman problematizes the absence of political rights in the global human rights discourse from a deliberative standpoint. Starting out from and at the same time criticizing Habermas' discourse theory of law and democracy, she makes a significant contribution to a discourse theory of human rights and applies it to a global rights institution, the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights. This is an innovative study that offers tools for democratizing existing global political institutions, and is therefore suitable for philosophers, political theorists, scholars of human rights and those interested in democracy.
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| 36. |
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| 37. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Human rights do not make global democracy
- 2011
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Ingår i: Contemporary Political Theory. - Basingstoke : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1470-8914 .- 1476-9336. ; 10:4, s. 463-481
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- On most accounts of global democracy, human rights are ascribed a central function. Still, their conceptual role in global democracy is often unclear. Two recent attempts to remedy this deficiency have been made by James Bohman and Michael Goodhart. What is interesting about their proposals is that they make the case that under the present circumstances of politics, global democracy is best conceptualized in terms of human rights. Although the article is sympathetic to this 'human rights approach', it defends the thesis that human rights are not enough for global democracy. It argues that insofar as we hold on to the general idea of democracy as a normative ideal of self-determination (self-rule) that is, of people determining their own lives and ruling over themselves, the concept of democracy accommodates two necessary conditions, namely, political bindingness and political equality. Further, it argues that neither Bohman's nor Goodhart's accounts fulfills these conditions and that one explanation for this could be traced to a lack of clarity concerning the distinction between democracy as normative ideal and democracy as decision method or rules (for example, institutions, laws and norms) for regulating social interactions. This ambiguity has implications for both Goodhart and Bohman. In Goodhart's work it manifests itself as a vagueness concerning the difference between political agency and democratic agency; in Bohman's work it becomes unclear whether he contributes a normative democratic theory or a theory of democratization. Although this article develops both a conceptual and a normative argument against their proposals, the aim is not to find fault with them but to point to questions that are in need of further elaboration to make them more convincing. Contemporary Political Theory (2011) 10, 463-481. doi:10.1057/cpt.2010.36; published online 12 July 2011
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| 38. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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In Search for Democratic Agency in Deliberative Governance
- 2013
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Ingår i: European Journal of International Relations. - : SAGE Publications. - 1354-0661 .- 1460-3713. ; 19:4, s. 847-868
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In recent years, we have witnessed deliberative democracy take a ‘civil society turn’ to address the democratic deficit of global governance. In light of the present circumstances of world politics, it is argued that civil society offers a rich soil for reformulating democracy globally. This article engages in this debate with particular focus on democratic agency. It investigates the notion of democratic agency built into this deliberative civil society view with regard to its democratic qualities. This is done by problematizing a common feature underlying this view, here called the ‘separability premise’, which presumes that it is possible to define democracy as two or more separate core democratic qualities or mechanisms — most importantly, inclusive participation, accountability, authorization and deliberation — and that democracy increases the more one or more of these are strengthened. The article defends the thesis that the proposed political subject is not equipped to be a democratic agent insofar as the deliberative civil society view does not fulfil two basic requirements for an arrangement to qualify as minimally democratic, namely, political equality and political bindingness. The article concludes that insofar as we wish to hold on to a deliberative conception of democracy, something along the lines of Habermas’s two-track view is still our best bet for accommodating these two conditions, even in a transnational context, since it is able to avoid the problems connected with the separability premise.
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| 39. |
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| 40. |
- Erman, Eva
(författare)
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Introduktion
- 2009. - 2
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Ingår i: Texter i samtida politisk teori. - Malmö : Liber. ; , s. 291-298
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 41. |
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| 42. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Is Ideal Theory Useless for Non-Ideal Theory?
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Politics. - : University of Chicago Press. - 0022-3816 .- 1468-2508. ; 84:1, s. 525-540
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Ever since the debate between ideal and nonideal theory emerged in political theory, a “strong position” has been defended, which holds that ideal theory is useless for theorizing what ought to be done to make our actual societies more just. Varieties of this position have been put forward, but the criticism has been underdeveloped. In the last couple of years, however, the strong position has been defended in a more systematic way and on other grounds than previous proposals. It is argued that ideal theory is entirely uninformative for theorizing nonideal principles. It is this version of the strong position that is scrutinized in the present paper. We make two claims. First, we argue that the arguments put forward fail to demonstrate that ideal theory is uninformative in the intended sense. Second, we sketch plausible ways in which ideal theory may be informative in construing principles for our current conditions.
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| 43. |
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| 44. |
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| 45. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Multiple Citizenship : Normative Ideals and Institutional Challenges
- 2012
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Ingår i: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. - : Routledge. - 1369-8230 .- 1743-8772. ; 15:3, s. 279-302
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Institutional suggestions for how to rethink democracy in response to changing state responsibilities and capabilities have been numerous and often mutually incompatible. This suggests that conceptual unclarity still reigns concerning how the normative ideal of democracy as collective self-determination, i.e. ‘rule by the people’, might best be brought to bear in a transnational and global context. The aim in this paper is twofold. First, it analyses some consequences of the tendency to smudge the distinction between democratic theory and moral theories of legitimacy and justice. Second, it develops a conceptual framework that distinguishes between necessary conditions, aspects and aims of democracy. On this basis it specifies three objectives of democracy, some of which may also hold for multilevel governance. It is argued that there are in principle at least three reasons to value democratic institutions: they are intrinsically justified to the extent that they distribute fair shares of political influence over decision-making; they are instrumentally justified to the extent that they secure several of our other best interests, one of which is our interest in non-domination; and finally, they are also instrumentally justified insofar as they secure the just distribution of other goods. The aim of this framework is not to develop a specific theory of multilevel governance but to point at important distinctions to be made and normative criteria to be specified. The intention is to take the debate forward by noting some of the issues that any satisfactory account must address. The framework lays out the grounds for analysing the institutional challenges facing legitimate multilevel governance through what is speculatively called ‘multiple citizenship’, understood in explorative terms, opening the door for the manifold roles that citizens could and ought to play in multilevel governance, not only as democratic agents, but also as agents of democracy and agents of justice.
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| 46. |
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| 48. |
- Erman, Eva, 1971-
(författare)
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On the Relationship between Global Justice and Global Democracy : A Three-Layered View
- 2022
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Ingår i: Ethics and International Affairs. - 0892-6794 .- 1747-7093. ; 36:3, s. 321-331
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- How should we understand the relationship between global justice and global democracy? One popular view is captured by the aphorism “No global justice without global democracy.” According to Dryzek and Tanasoca's reading of this aphorism, a particular form of deliberative global democracy is seen as the way to specify and justify what global justice is and requires in various contexts. Taking its point of departure in a criticism of this proposal, this essay analyzes how to best understand the relationship between global justice and global democracy. The aim is not to offer a first-order substantial account of this relationship, but to theorize the normative boundary conditions for such an account; that is, the conditions that any plausible theory should respect. These conditions take the form of what is here called a “three-layered view,” which is specified through three claims. It is argued, first, that global democracy is best seen as a partial normative ideal; second, that global democracy must be grounded in fundamental principles of justice; and third, that global democracy is an ideal through which applied principles of distributive justice are formulated and justified in light of reasonable disagreement about what justice requires.
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| 49. |
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| 50. |
- Erman, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Political legitimacy and the unreliability of language
- 2016
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Ingår i: Public Reason. - : University of Bucharest. - 2065-7285 .- 2065-8958. ; 8:1-2, s. 81-89
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many political theorists in current debates have argued that pragmatist theories of mind and language place certain constraints on our normative political theories. In a couple of papers, we have accused these pragmatically influenced political theorists of misapplication of otherwise perfectly valid ideas. In a recent paper, one of the targets of our critique, Thomas Fossen, has retorted that we have misrepresented the role that a pragmatist theory of language plays in these accounts. In this paper, we claim that Fossen’s attempt to chisel out a role for his account in normative political theory rehearses the same problematic view of the utility of theories of language as his previous iterations. We argue that Fossen’s account is still guilty of the fallacious claim that a pragmatist theory of language (in his case Robert Brandom’s account) has implications for the form and justification of theories of political legitimacy. We specifically focus on three flaws with his current reply: the idea that criteria and conditions are problematic on a pragmatist outlook, the idea that a pragmatist linguistic account applied to a particular political context will have a distinct political-theoretical payoff, and the idea that a fundamental linguistic level of analysis supplies normative guidance for theorizing political legitimacy.
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