| 1. |
- Arechar, Antonio A., et al.
(författare)
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“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games
- 2017
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 104, s. 726-743
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We let participants indicate their intended action in a repeated game experiment where actions are implemented with errors. Even though communication is cheap talk, we find that the majority of messages were honest (although the majority of participants lied at least occasionally). As a result, communication has a positive effect on cooperation when the payoff matrix makes the returns to cooperation high; when the payoff matrix gives a lower return to cooperation, communication reduces overall cooperation. These results suggest that cheap talk communication can promote cooperation in repeated games, but only when there is already a self-interested motivation to cooperate.
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| 2. |
- Dreber Almenberg, Anna, et al.
(författare)
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It’s the thought that counts:The role of intentions in noisy repeated games
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681. ; 116:5, s. 481-499
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We examine cooperation in repeated interactions where intended actions are implemented with noise but intentions are perfectly observable. Observable intentions lead to more cooperation compared to control games where intentions are unobserved, allowing subjects to reach similar cooperation levels as in games without noise. Most subjects condition exclusively on intentions, and use simpler, lower-memory strategies compared to games where intentions are unobservable. When the returns to cooperation are high, some subjects are tolerant, using good outcomes to forgive attempted defections; when the returns to cooperation are low, some subjects are punitive, using bad outcomes to punish accidental defections.
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| 3. |
- Dreber Almenberg, Anna, et al.
(författare)
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Slow to anger and fast to forgive: Cooperation in an uncertain world : Cooperation in an uncertain world
- 2012
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Ingår i: American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282. ; 102:2, s. 720-749
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were “lenient” in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were “forgiving” in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment. (JEL C72, C73, D81)
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| 4. |
- Dreber Almenberg, Anna, et al.
(författare)
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Weighing Reward and Punishment - Response
- 2009
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Ingår i: Science. - : American Association for the Advancement of Science. - 0036-8075 .- 1095-9203. ; 326:5960, s. 1632-1633
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 5. |
- Dreber Almenberg, Anna, et al.
(författare)
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Who cooperates in repeated games : The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 98, s. 41-55
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We explore the extent to which altruism, as measured by giving in a dictator game (DG), accounts for play in a noisy version of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We find that DG giving is correlated with cooperation in the repeated game when no cooperative equilibria exist, but not when cooperation is an equilibrium. Furthermore, none of the commonly observed strategies are better explained by inequity aversion or efficiency concerns than money maximization. Various survey questions provide additional evidence for the relative unimportance of social preferences. We conclude that cooperation in repeated games is primarily motivated by long-term payoff maximization and that even though some subjects may have other goals, this does not seem to be the key determinant of how play varies with the parameters of the repeated game. In particular, altruism does not seem to be a major source of the observed diversity of play. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
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| 6. |
- Dreber Almenberg, Anna, et al.
(författare)
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Winners don't punish
- 2008
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Ingår i: Nature. - : Nature Publishing Group. - 0028-0836 .- 1476-4687. ; 452:7185, s. 348-351
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 7. |
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