| 1. |
- Brämberg, Elisabeth, et al.
(författare)
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Effects of work-directed interventions on return-to-work in people on sick-leave for to common mental disorders—a systematic review
- 2024
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Ingår i: International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health. - 0340-0131 .- 1432-1246.
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Forskningsöversikt (refereegranskat)abstract
- Purpose To evaluate the body of evidence of the effects of work-directed interventions on return-to-work for people on sick leave due to common mental disorders (i.e., mild to moderate depression, anxiety, adjustment disorders and reactions to severe stress).Methods The systematic review was conducted in accordance with an a priori developed and registered protocol (Prospero CRD42021235586). The certainty of evidence was assessed by two independent reviewers using the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluations.Results We reviewed 14,794 records published between 2015 and 2021. Of these, eight RCTs published in eleven articles were included in the analysis. Population: Working age adults (18 to 64 years), on sick leave due to mild to moderate depression, anxiety, adjustment disorders or reactions to severe stress. Intervention: Work-directed interventions. Comparator: No comparator, Standard care, or other measures. Outcome: return to work, number of days on sick leave, income. Overall, the effects of work-focused CBT and work-focused team-based support on RTW resulted in increased or faster return-to-work compared with standard care or no intervention (low certainty of evidence). The effects of Individual Placement and Support showed no difference in RTW compared with standard care (very low certainty of evidence).Conclusion Interventions involving the workplace could increase the probability of RTW. Areas in need of improvement in the included studies, for example methodological issues, are discussed. Further, suggestions are made for improving methodological rigor when conducting large scale trials.
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| 2. |
- Furberg, Elisabeth, 1979-
(författare)
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Advance Directives and Personal Identity
- 2012
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Advance directives are instructions given by patients – or potential patients – specifying what actions ought to be taken for their health in the event that they are no longer capable to make decisions due to illness or incapacity. Over the last decades, there has been a rising tide in favour of advance directives: not only is the use of such directives recommended by most medical and advisory bodies, they are also gaining increasing legal recognition in many parts of the world.This book, however, takes as its point of departure one of the most commonly discussed medical-ethical arguments against granting advance directives moral force: the Objection from Personal Identity. The adherers of this objection basically asserts that when there is lacking psychological continuity between the person who formulated the advance directive and the later patient to whom it supposedly applies, this seriously threatens the directive’s moral authority. And, further, that this is so because lacking sufficient psychological continuity implies that the author of the advance directive is numerically distinct from the later patient.Although this argument has some initial appeal, most philosophers in the advance directives debate maintain that the Objection from Personal Identity fails, but suggest different reasons as to why. Whereas some argue that the objection has no force because it rests on faulty beliefs about personal identity, others argue that we ought to grant advance directives moral authority even if the author and the later patient are numerically distinct beings. This book investigates some of the most influential of these arguments and reaches the conclusion that the Objection from Personal Identity has more to it than is usually recognized in the medical-ethical debate. Lacking sufficient psychological continuity between author and later patient, it is concluded, does threaten the moral authority of the advance directive.
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| 3. |
- Furberg, Elisabeth, 1979-
(författare)
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Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem?
- 2012
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Ingår i: The Journal of medicine and philosophy. - : Oxford University Press. - 0360-5310 .- 1744-5019. ; 37:1, s. 60-73
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The personal identity problem expresses the worry that due to disrupted psychological continuity, one person’s advance directive could be used to determine the care of a different person. Even ethicists, who strongly question the possibility of the scenario depicted by the proponents of the personal identity problem, often consider it to be a very potent objection to the use of advance directives. Aiming to question this assumption, I, in this paper, discuss the personal identity problem’s relevance to the moral force of advance directives. By putting the personal identity argument in relation to two different normative frameworks, I aim to show that whether or not the personal identity problem is relevant to the moral force of advance directives, and further, in what way it is relevant, depends entirely on what normative reasons we have for respecting advance directives in the first place.
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| 4. |
- Furberg, Elisabeth, 1979-
(författare)
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Ansvar för sin hälsa?: Problem och möjligheter med att tillämpa en ansvarsprincip inom hälso- och sjukvården
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Att låta individuellt ansvar för sin egen hälsa påverka hälso- och sjukvårdens prioriteringar är ett förslag som är välkänt och ofta diskuterat i prioriteringsdebatten, men också ett förslag som sällan får bifall. Varken i Norge eller i Sverige ansåg prioriteringsutredningarna att en ansvarsprincip vore lämplig i prioriteringssammanhang och hittills har förslaget om en ansvarsprincip inte realiserats.En anledning både till frågans fortsatta aktualitet och till utredningarnas tveksamhet är troligtvis dess bredd och komplexitet. En princip som den ovan föreslagna måste förstås i relation till redan existerande moraliska värderingar och uppfattningar, och frågan om en ansvarsprincip berör många olika värderingar och uppfattningar både när det gäller personligt ansvar och vilken roll detta ansvar bör ha inom hälso- och sjukvården. Syftet med föreliggande rapport är att belysa några av de problem (och möjligheter) som idén om en ansvarsprincip ställer oss inför.
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| 5. |
- Furberg, Elisabeth, 1979-
(författare)
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Are we persons or animals? Exposing an anthropocentric bias and suggesting a hybrid view
- 2017
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Ingår i: Ethics, Medicine and Public Health. - : Elsevier. ; 3:2, s. 279-287
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- One of the many philosophical fields of relevance to frequently discussed themes in bioethics is that of personal identity. The main question of the personal identity debate concerns our persistence conditions and asks: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for you and me to persist through time? What kinds of changes and events can beings such as us survive? The answer to these questions has bearing on several themes in bioethics, such as the moral status of a human foetus and the moral legitimacy of advance directives and living wills. In the philosophical debate, there are two main alternative answers to these questions. According to the Psychological View, we – human beings – are essentially persons and as such, we persist by our psychology. The opposing view – Animalism – rejects both claims of the Psychological View and asserts instead that we are essentially animals and that our persistence conditions are biological rather than psychological.1 In this paper, I expose what I believe to be an anthropocentric bias in the arguments of the two main proponents of each view – Lynn Rudder Baker and Eric Olson. Lynn Rudder Baker, I argue, vastly underestimates the mental capacities of non-human animals and attaches too much importance to the supposedly unique ability of humans to have a first-person perspective. Eric Olson, on the other hand, avoids this kind of outright anthropocentrism, but still exhibits some anthropocentric bias by neglecting the possibility that “animal” fails as a suitable substance concept and natural kind. Having exposed this anthropocentric bias in their respective arguments, I propose a hybrid view of personal identity. This is a view that accepts the claim that we are animals, as well as the claim that we persist by our psychology. Even if we accept Lynn Rudder Baker's constitution view, I suggest that we reject her assumption that only humans have the necessary mental capabilities needed to persist by their psychology. According to the suggested hybrid view, we are animals in the sense that we are constituted by one and although this claim falls just short of the claim that we are identical to an animal (which is the main claim of the Animalist), this worry is mitigated because there is no reason to believe that this relationship (between person and animal) and the fact that we persist by our psychology is something that separates us from other animals. According to the hybrid view I propose, we are animals in the very same sense of the term that (some, but not all) other species are.
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| 6. |
- Malmqvist, Erik, et al.
(författare)
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Ethical aspects of medical age assessment in the asylum process : a Swedish perspective
- 2018
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Ingår i: International journal of legal medicine. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0937-9827 .- 1437-1596. ; 132:3, s. 815-823
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to European regulations and the legisla-tions of individual member states, children who seek asylum have a different set of rights than adults in a similar position.To protect these rights and ensure rule of law, migration authorities are commonly required to assess the age of asylum seekers who lack reliable documentation, including throug hvarious medical methods. However, many healthcare professionals and other commentators consider medical age assessment to be ethically problematic. This paper presents a simplified and amended account of the main findings of a recent ethical analysis of medical age assessment in the asylum process commissioned by the Swedish National Board of Healthand Welfare. A number of ethical challenges related to conflicting goals, equality and fairness, autonomy and informed consent, privacy and integrity, and professional values and roles are identified and analysed. It is concluded that most of these challenges can be met, but that this requires a system where the assessment is sufficiently accurate and where adequate safeguards are in place. Two important ethical questions are found to warrant further analysis. The first is whether asylum seekers’consent to the procedure can be considered genuinely voluntary. The second is whether and how medica lage assessments could affect negative public attitudes towards asylum seekers or discriminatory societal views more generally.
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