| 1. |
- Sjöberg, Eric, 1984-
(författare)
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Essays on Environmental Regulation, Management and Conflict
- 2013
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis consists of three different papers summarized as follows. In The political economy of environmental regulation, I study how enforcement of national environmental legislation differ across municipalities in Sweden depending on the local political situation. While the legislation is national, enforcement is decentralized. I find that municipalities where the Green Party joins the ruling political coalition issue more environmental fines than other municipalities. In pricing on the fish market I use Swedish data to study how size affects the price per kilo of fish for several species. In traditional fishery biomass models, fish stocks are treated as homogenous. New theoretical heterogeneous fishery models, where size is allowed to differ in a fish stock, have important implications for regulation, for example that it is optimal to regulate on numbers of fish instead of weight. However, prices in these models are assumed to be constant. My estimates can be used to shed some light on how prices change when the size composition of the catch changes. In my third and final chapter, Settlement under the threat of conflict - The cost of asymmetric information, I present a theoretical model where two players can divide a good peacefully or engage in a contest in order to obtain the entire good. I assume that one player's valuation of the good is private information and show how this affects the expected cost of the contest and thus the probability of peaceful settlement.
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| 2. |
- Artman, Henrik, 1968-, et al.
(författare)
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Effektiv miljötillsyn : slutrapport
- 2013
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Målsättningen har varit att ta fram ny kunskap inom miljötillsynen och därigenom uppnå en effektivare miljötillsyn samt att få in nya vetenskapliga perspektiv på miljötillsyn.I rapporten studeras metoder för inspektioner och det kommunikativa samspelet mellan inspektören och företrädare för den verksamhet som inspekteras, hur den institutionella ramen för inspektionsprocessen fungerar samt visar på möjligheter att mäta effekterna av inspektioner och tillsyn.Naturvårdsverket kommer att ha resultatet som ett kunskapsunderlag i fortsatt arbete med tillsynsvägledning och utveckling av hur tillsyn och tillsynsvägledning kan följas upp och utvärderas.
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| 3. |
- Forslid, Rikard, 1961-, et al.
(författare)
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Trade Costs and the Timing of Competition Policy Adoption
- 2011
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Ingår i: Canadian Journal of Economics. - : Wiley. - 0008-4085 .- 1540-5982. ; 44:1, s. 171-200
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper first presents stylized evidence showing how the date of the adoption of competition policy is correlated with country size. Smaller countries tend to adopt competition policy later. We then present a theoretical model with countries of different size, trade costs, and firms competing à la Cournot. In the model we show that reduced trade costs following from increasing globalization affect countries differently depending on their size. This has implications for the incentives to introduce competition policy. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical regularity presented.
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| 7. |
- Häckner, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Counterfeiting and Negative Consumption Externalities – A Closer Look
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1566-1679 .- 1573-7012. ; 15:4, s. 337-350
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We extend the work of Grossman and Shapiro (J Econ 103:79–100, 1988) on consumption externalities in prestige goods markets, and model a general aversion towards large levels of output interacting with an aversion towards copies in particular. These externalities play the role of protecting the market share of the producer of originals. We show that the well-established result under positive network externalities, that piracy is an equilibrium, extends to the case of negative consumption externalities. When externalities are pronounced enforcement should be strict, while in markets subject to moderate externalities there are no strong arguments in favor of a strict policy.
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Häckner, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Deregulating taxi services - a word of caution
- 1995
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Ingår i: Journal of Transport, Economics and Policy. - : University of Bath, School of Management. - 0022-5258. ; 29:2, s. 195-207
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper studies pricing and capacity decisions in markets for phone-ordered taxicabs. Taxi firms first choose capacities and then compete in prices. As firm demand increases, so does waiting time. This dampens competition and makes prices too high from the social point of view. Efficiency improves if firms choose large capacities. In a two-firm setting, equilibrium capacities are shown to be larger if both firms maximise total profits than if they maximise profits per cab. Hence, if fixed costs for entrant cabs are small, the market is more efficient in the former case.
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| 10. |
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| 11. |
- Häckner, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Every Viewer Has a Price : On the Differentiation of TV Channels
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Media Economics. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0899-7764 .- 1532-7736. ; 25:4, s. 220-243
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The authors analyzed the implications of targeted advertising on the equilibrium level of channel profile differentiation (e.g., in terms of political positioning), in free-to-air broadcasting industries. When consumers have no preferences over program content (e.g., entertainment vs. news) standard Hotelling type results apply. Market forces minimize differentiation while the optimal degree is at an intermediate level. As preferences over program content get somewhat stronger, the difference between optimal and market outcomes is initially reduced. However, when preferences over program content get more pronounced, minimal differentiation suddenly becomes optimal while market forces lead to excessive differentiation. Hence, policies aimed at increasing diversity are beneficial only when viewers care little about differences in program content.
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| 12. |
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| 13. |
- Häckner, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Marknadsrätten i ett samhällsperspektiv
- 2017
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Ingår i: Amici Curiae. - Stockholm : Jure. - 9789172236653 ; , s. 313-319
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 18. |
- Häckner, Jonas, 1962-, et al.
(författare)
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Tax incidence in oligopolistic markets?
- 2022
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765 .- 1873-7374. ; 213
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper discusses how incidences of unit taxes and ad valorem taxes are related to various market characteristics under imperfect competition. Incidence is higher the more competitive markets are. More specifically, it is higher the wider the firms' product ranges, the lower the degree of market concentration and the lower the degree of product differentiation, and higher in Bertrand markets compared to Cournot markets. Furthermore, the incidence is higher for unit taxes than for ad valorem taxes. The relative difference between unit and ad valorem tax incidence is larger the lower marginal costs and taxes are.
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| 19. |
- Häckner, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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The effectiveness of environmental inspections in oligopolistic markets
- 2017
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Ingår i: Resources and Energy Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0928-7655 .- 1873-0221. ; 48, s. 83-97
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study focuses on the consequences of inducing compliance with environmental legislation through inspections in oligopolistic markets. Adherence to the law is associated with environmental gains, but also with losses in surpluses as firms incur abatement costs. By relating the net social benefit of deterring breaches of legislation to inspection costs, the impact of various market characteristics on the effectiveness of inspections can be assessed, thus providing guidance for environmental inspection agencies that have to prioritize among sectors given a fixed budget.
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| 20. |
- Häckner, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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The equilibrium compliance rate among regulated firms
- 2020
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Ingår i: International Review of Law and Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0144-8188 .- 1873-6394. ; 63
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study develops a framework for the strategic interaction of firms that have to decide between adhering to and violating legislation. Depending on how deterring enforcement is various degrees of compliance with the law will arise in equilibrium. For an agency that targets a certain compliance rate more resources per firm should be allocated to industries with strong demand and high costs for adhering to legislation. Whenever some degree of non-compliance among competing firms can be expected, more inspection resources are needed in markets where products are highly differentiated and/or the number of firms is small.
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| 21. |
- Häckner, Jonas, 1962-, et al.
(författare)
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The strategic interaction between cartels and anti-trust authorities
- 2022
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Ingår i: International Review of Law and Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0144-8188 .- 1873-6394. ; 70
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We present a model of the interaction between firms agreeing on a degree of collusion and a competition authority that simultaneously determines the allocation of resources to enforcement of anti-trust legislation. An increase in demand is associated with tougher enforcement and a lower degree of collusion. A stronger competitive pressure first decreases the degree of collusion and increases the level of enforcement, then increases both the degree of collusion and the level of enforcement, and eventually increases the degree of collusion and decreases the level of enforcement. Simulation results indicate that a move from the EU penalty regime to the tougher US standard with treble damages would mainly impact on the enforcement intensity and to a much lesser extent affect the degree of collusion.
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| 24. |
- Häckner, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Welfare effects of taxation in oligopolistic markets
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Theory. - : Elsevier BV. - 0022-0531 .- 1095-7235. ; 163, s. 141-166
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper discusses how marginal costs of public funds are related to various market characteristics under imperfect competition. Under a quite general tax scheme, these costs turn out to be lower the wider the firms' product ranges, the lower the degree of market concentration and the lower the degree of product differentiation. Moreover, marginal costs of taxation are lower in Bertrand markets compared to Cournot markets. In cases when marginal costs of public funds cannot easily be assessed we ask if pass-through rates can provide useful information for policy makers. The market characteristics that we analyze are shown to have opposite effects on pass-through and marginal costs of public funds. It is also demonstrated that the marginal cost of public funds is generally lower for ad valorem taxes than for unit taxes. The main results are based on a linear demand system, but a number of extensions confirm that our main results are reasonably robust.
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| 25. |
- Jakobsson, Maria, 1974-
(författare)
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Empirical Studies on Merger Policy and Collusive Behaviour
- 2007
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis consists of four studies focusing on empirical issues in industrial organization.Bid Rigging in Swedish Procurement Auctions: Using a unique data set of procurement auctions carried out by the Swedish National Road Administration, this paper addresses the issue of bid rigging in the Swedish asphalt-paving sector. Both market characteristics and the fact that the Swedish Competition Authority in 2003 initiated legal proceedings against a group of firms active in the market indicate the existence of collusive behaviour. If firms act competitively, they should submit independent bids, conditional on firm- and auction-specific differences. Reduced-form equations are estimated and the hypothesis of conditional independence is tested by analysing if the difference between observed and predicted bids correlates between firms. If negative correlation is observed, one possible explanation is bid rigging. The overall results indicate that collusion may be widespread in the industry and suggest further investigation of the market.Collusion in Procurement Auctions: Structural Estimation of Bidders' Costs: In this paper, the aim is to analyse the existence of collusion in asymmetric asphalt-procurement auctions. Firms that behave competitively should have private costs that are independent, conditional on available firm- and auction-specific information. The hypothesis of conditional independence can be tested and if it is rejected, a possible explanation is collusion. Using a constrained strategy equilibrium concept in solving for equilibrium bid strategies and firms' private costs makes it possible to test the hypothesis of conditional independence while at the same time controlling for firms' strategic considerations. The analysis is based on bid data from procurement auctions carried out in Sweden during the 1990's. The findings are that the hypothesis of conditional independence can be rejected for about half the firm-pairs that are tested. This suggests that collusive behaviour is plausible in the investigated market.An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission’s Merger Decisions: Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the European Commission (EC) and logit-regression techniques, we analyse the EC’s decision process. We find that the probability of a phase-2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties’ market shares. The probabilities increase also when the Commission finds high entry barriers or that the market structure post-merger is conductive to collusion. We do not find significant effects of “political” variables, such as the nationality of the merging firms.Comparing Merger Policies: The European Union versus the United States: Merger regulation affects large transactions in the market for corporate control in both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). This paper compares and contrasts the relevant enforcement policies. US enforcement is broader-based as it attacks oligopoly, unilateral, and dominant firm concerns, while the EU policy focused almost entirely on market dominance. Our analysis of the enforcement policies shows that analytical and evidence considerations have more of an effect in the US, while institutional considerations matter more in the EU. Considering only cases subject to a theory of market dominance (dominant firm), the EU regime appears, on average, slightly more aggressive than US policy for relatively weak cases, while the US policy appears more aggressive for strong cases.
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| 26. |
- Nilsson, Tobias, 1974-
(författare)
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Essays on Voting and Government Inefficiency
- 2004
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on political economics.The first essay, The Effects on Political Rent-seeking of Allowing Campaign Contributions in Politics, presents a theoretical analysis of the effects on political rent-seeking of allowing campaign contributions in politics. I define rents as the difference between taxes and government spending. In a two-income group framework, I find that rents are higher when neither of the groups give campaign contributions, as compared to the case when both groups do. The mechanism behind this result is that candidates need campaign contributions in order to increase their probability of election success and voters will give campaign contributions to the candidate committed to the lowest level of rents. Rents are also found to be decreasing (increasing) in income inequality, when only the rich (poor) income group gives campaign contributions.The second essay, Government Inefficiency and Campaign Contributions, deals with campaign contributions and inefficiency in policy making. Intuitively, the interaction rests on a trade-off for political candidates between the need for campaign contributions (to win the election) and the effort associated with decreasing government inefficiency. Hence, voters will decrease the contributions to candidates likely to run a relatively less efficient policy. The main theoretical findings are that the inefficiency in the candidates' platforms is increasing in income inequality among voters, while their received campaign contributions are decreasing in income inequality. These predictions are empirically tested using US state level data for the period 1977-1995, and found to be statistically significant.The third essay, Explaining the Spending on Elderly Care in Swedish Municipalities Using Economic Theory, is, as indicated by the title, an empirical examination of local public spending in Sweden. This essay examines if the spending on elderly care in Swedish municipalities can be explained by the identity of the median voter using the voter characteristics (i) age, (ii) sex and (iii) income. The findings yield support for the median voter theory in the sense that the share of women in the population is found to negatively affect municipalities' spending on elderly care. On average, spending increases by 3-7 %, if the share of women in the population decreases by one standard deviation.
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| 27. |
- Nyberg, Sten, 1962-, et al.
(författare)
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Vanity and Congestion : A Study of Reciprocal Externalities
- 1996
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Ingår i: Economica. - : JSTOR. - 0013-0427 .- 1468-0335. ; 63:249, s. 97-111
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper models a private goods oligopoly market characterized by negative and reciprocal externalities. Although firms compete in prices, and products are undifferentiated in equilibrium, the price-cost margin turns out to be positive. From a social perspective, the equilibrium price is higher than what is motivated by the negative externality. Hence welfare can be improved by means of a price ceiling. Finally, industries with high fixed costs would be expected to exhibit a high degree of concentration on the supply side and considerable price-cost margins.
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| 28. |
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