| 1. |
- Chappell, Zsuzsanna, et al.
(författare)
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Recovery without normalisation : It's not necessary to be normal, not even in psychiatry
- 2023
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Ingår i: Clinical Ethics. - New York : Sage Publications. - 1477-7509 .- 1758-101X. ; 18:3, s. 298-305
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we argue that there are reasons to believe that an implicit bias for normalcy influences what are considered medically necessary treatments in psychiatry. First, we outline two prima facie reasons to suspect that this is the case. A bias for "the normal" is already documented in disability studies; it is reasonable to suspect that it affects psychiatry too, since psychiatric patients, like disabled people, are often perceived as "weird" by others. Secondly, psychiatry's explicitly endorsed values of well-being and function are hard to measure directly, which is why we see simpler box-ticking conceptions of recovery used in large research studies. This need not be problematic, but might lead to researchers and clinicians focusing too much on treatments that promote easy-to-measure proxies for recovery, instead of what actually matters to psychiatric patients themselves. Next, we provide examples of treatments and treatment decisions within two areas - self-injury and psychosis - which are hard to explain unless we assume that an implicit and harmful normalcy bias is at work. We conclude with some suggestions for clinicians and future research.
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| 2. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, Docent, 1977-
(författare)
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A wide-enough range of 'test environments' for psychiatric disabilities
- 2023
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Ingår i: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. - 1358-2461 .- 1755-3555. ; 94, s. 39-53
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The medical and social model of disability is discussed and debated among researchers, scholars, activists, and people in general. It is common to hold a mixed view, and believe that some disabled people suffer more from social obstacles and others from medical problems inherent in their bodies or minds. Rachel Cooper discusses possible 'test environments', making explicit an idea which likely plays an implicit part in many disability discussions. We place or imagine placing the disabled person in a range of different environments; if there is a relevant test environment in which they do fine, their problem was societal/external, if there is not, it was medical/internal. Cooper admits that deciding on the appropriate range of test environments is an ethical and political question. In this chapter, I argue that we often ought to widen our scope when discussing psychiatric disabilities.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, 1977
(författare)
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Accountability, Answerability and Freedom
- 2016
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Ingår i: Social Theory and Practice. - : Philosophy Documentation Center. - 0037-802X .- 2154-123X. ; 42:4, s. 681-705
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has been argued that we cannot be morally responsible in the sense required to deserve blame or punishment if the world is deterministic, but still morally responsible in the sense of being apt targets for moral criticism. Desert-entailing moral responsibility is supposed to be more freedom demanding than other kinds of responsibility, since it justifies subjecting people to blame and punishments, is non-consequentialist, and shown by thought experiments to be incompatible with determinism. In this paper, I will show that all these arguments can be resisted.
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| 5. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, Docent, 1977-
(författare)
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Agency and responsibility : the personal and the political
- 2023
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Ingår i: Philosophical Issues. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 1533-6077 .- 1758-2237. ; 33:1, s. 70-82
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, I review arguments according to which harsh criminal punishments and poverty are undeserved and therefore unjust. Such arguments come in different forms. First, one may argue that no one deserves to be poor or be punished, because there is no such thing as desert-entailing moral responsibility. Second, one may argue that poor people in particular do not deserve to remain in poverty or to be punished if they commit crimes, because poor people suffer from psychological problems that undermine their agency and moral responsibility. Third, one may argue that poor and otherwise marginalized people frequently face external obstacles that prevent them from taking alternative courses of action. The first kind of argument has its place in the philosophy seminar. Psychological difficulties may be important to attend to both in personal relationships and when holding ourselves responsible. Nevertheless, I argue that neither type of argument belongs in political contexts. Moral responsibility scepticism ultimately rests on contested intuitions. Labelling certain groups of people particularly irrational, weak-willed, or similar is belittling and disrespectful; such claims are also hard to prove, and may have the opposite effect to the intended one on people's attitudes. Arguments from external obstacles have none of these problems. Such arguments may not take us all the way to criminal justice reform, but in this context, we can supplement them with epistemic arguments and crime prevention arguments.
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| 6. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, Docent, 1977-
(författare)
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Allegedly impossible experiences
- 2024
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Ingår i: Philosophical Psychology. - Abingdon : Routledge. - 0951-5089 .- 1465-394X.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople’s testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they nevertheless cannot conceive of. I look at influential texts in which philosophers attempt to analyze and understand depersonalization and thought insertion. They go astray because they keep using their own powers of conceivability as a guide to what is or is not humanly possible to experience. Several experiences labelled inconceivable and therefore impossible by these philosophers, are experiences I have had myself. Philosophers and others would be less likely to make this mistake if they would converse and collaborate more with the madpeople concerned. When this is not feasible, they should nevertheless strive to keep an open mind. Fantastical fiction may have a role to play here, by showing how bizarre experiences may nevertheless be prima facie conceivable.
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| 7. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, 1977-
(författare)
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Can we define mental health?
- 2022
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Annan publikation (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Can we draw a line between people with psychiatric disorders and those without? If we zoom in on a single individual, can we draw a line between that which is them or their self, and that which is the psychiatric condition? Well, in a sense it’s always possible to draw a line; all you need is pen and paper. But does the line track a real distinction, a truth which is out there for us to find? Or is it a construct? In short, is the line between people with psychiatric disorders and those without, and the line between a single person’s self and their condition, more like a shoreline or like a country border? I argue for the latter.
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, Docent, 1977-
(författare)
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Culpability
- 2024
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Ingår i: Handbook of the philosophy of medicine. - Dordrecht : Springer. - 9789401787062 - 9789401787062
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- People are morally responsible agents when they are sufficiently rational and in control of themselves. Morally responsible agents may or may not be morally responsible for particular actions, depending on whether they had sufficient control and the information needed in the situation at hand. We can be morally responsible for good, bad, or morally neutral actions. This chapter focuses on culpability – responsibility for bad actions. In cases of mental disorder, rationality and/or control may be diminished, and people might be unable to avail themselves of important information. Nevertheless, the exact difficulties that people struggle with vary, not only between diagnostic categories but within them as well. Culpability assessments are therefore complicated, and must ultimately be done on a case-by-case basis. Psychiatric patients who are exempted from culpability altogether, considered too irrational or out of control to be morally responsible agents at all, may feel dismissed and isolated. Moreover, culpability judgments in clinician-patient relationships are naturally quite fraught. Hierarchical relationships often result in one-sided responsibility practices. In these cases, a person in power holds another person culpable and, at the same time, dismisses attempts to be held culpable by others, most notably people subjected to their power. Finally, it is important to recognize that actions that seem strange and disturbing need not be culpable; they may be excused or even justified.
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| 10. |
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| 11. |
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| 12. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Det naturliga och trans
- 2020
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Ingår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift. - : Thales. - 0348-7482. ; 41:4, s. 13-19
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 13. |
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| 14. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, Docent, 1977-
(författare)
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Exemption, self-exemption, and compassionate self-excuse
- 2022
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Ingår i: International Mad Studies Journal. - Melbourne : Inside Out & Associates Australia. - 2653-7451. ; 1:1, s. e1-21
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Philosophers traditionally distinguish between excuses and exemptions. We can excuse someone and still see them as a participant in normal human relationships, but when we exempt someone, we see them as something to be managed and handled: we take an objective attitude to them. Madness is typically assumed to ground exemptions, not excuses. So far, the standard philosophical picture. Seeing other people as objects to be managed and handled rather than as persons with whom one can have relationships is, however, ethically problematic. If I am mad myself, consistently seeing myself this way becomes downright unsustainable. A better option, I will argue, is to fully appreciate my own difficulties and learn to show myself compassion and understanding. I, then, can excuse myself on those grounds. Furthermore, a compassionate self-excusing attitude leaves room for both nuance and improvement in a way that total exemption does not. Finally, I will argue that many mad actions ought to be considered justifiable and justified rather than in need of exemption or excuse.
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| 15. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Flourishing Dogs : The Case for an Individualized Conception of Welfare and Its Implications
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1187-7863 .- 1573-322X. ; 29:3, s. 425-438
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Martha Nussbaum argues that animals (including ourselves) are entitled to a flourishing life according to the norm for their species. Nussbaum furthermore suggests that in the case of dogs, breed norms as well as species norms are relevant. Her theses capture both common intuitions among laypeople according to which there is something wrong with the breeding of unnatural animals, or animals that are too different from their wild ancestors, and the dog enthusiast's belief that dogs departing from the norms for their breed are tragic. I argue that the high diversity of the dog species and the ultimate arbitrariness of breed norms support the thesis that a conception of welfare must be tied to what the individual requires in order to flourish. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the implications that an individualized (but sufficiently sophisticated) welfare conception has for the breeding of dogs for conformation shows, for the pet market and for the performance of various tasks for which we need working dogs.
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| 16. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, 1977
(författare)
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Irrational Option Exclusion
- 2018
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Ingår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 21:3, s. 537-551
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, I describe a hitherto overlooked kind of practical irrationality, which I call irrational option exclusion. An agent who suffers from this problem does not merely fail to act on her best judgement she fails to realize that the superior action is even an option for her. I furthermore argue that this kind of irrationality is serious enough to undermine moral responsibility. I show that an agent suffering from this problem has compromised reasons-responsiveness, does not really express her will through action, and has a hard time doing otherwise; thus, from the standpoint of several popular moral responsibility theories, we ought to conclude that her responsibility is at the very least diminished.
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| 17. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia M. I., 1977-
(författare)
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Responsibility problems for criminal justice
- 2014
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Ingår i: Frontiers in Psychology. - : Frontiers Media SA. - 1664-1078. ; 5
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 18. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia M. I.
(författare)
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Retributivism, Justification and Credence : The Epistemic Argument Revisited
- 2021
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Ingår i: Neuroethics. - : Springer. - 1874-5490 .- 1874-5504. ; 14:2, s. 177-190
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified under the circumstances, we ought not to do it. In this paper, I argue that we ought to dismantle harsh retributivist criminal justice systems for this reason; we cannot be sufficiently certain that the harm is justified. Gregg Caruso, Ben Vilhauer and others have previously argued for the same conclusion; however, my own version sidesteps certain controversial premises of theirs. Harsh retributivist criminal justice can only be morally right if the following three propositions are true: Moral responsibility exists, retributivism is right, and we can find out how much punishment offenders deserve for their crimes. Suppose that we initially assign a high credence to each of the three propositions; I assume for the sake of argument that there are good arguments in support of each. Nevertheless, these arguments ultimately depend on intuitions. Since we have philosophical peers whose intuitions differ from ours, we ought to downgrade our credence in each. However, even slightly less credence in each proposition means far less credence in a conjunction of all three. Since the stakes are high and there are morally safer options for a criminal justice system, we ought to dismantle harsh retributivist ones.
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| 19. |
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| 20. |
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| 21. |
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| 22. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, 1977
(författare)
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Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism
- 2016
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 44:3, s. 793-808
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- There are powerful arguments for free will scepticism. However, it seems obvious that some of our actions are done of our own free will. It has been argued that we can solve this puzzle by giving 'free' a contextualist analysis. In everyday contexts we are often allowed to ignore sceptical arguments, and can truly say that we acted freely. In the more demanding context of philosophy, it is true that we never do anything freely. Our freedom is elusive; it escapes us as soon as sceptical arguments are brought up. This kind of freedom contextualism has been criticized for conceding too much to the sceptic. Furthermore, it has problematic implications for moral responsibility. I develop an alternative contextualist analysis of 'free', according to which it is proper in certain contexts to ignore sceptical arguments even if they are brought up. Ignoring them is proper when doing so is necessary for engaging in an activity that is obviously justified. I argue that engaging in deliberation and inter-agential interaction with other people are obviously justified activities that require ignoring sceptical arguments. In these contexts, we do have a non-elusive kind of freedom.
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| 23. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, 1977
(författare)
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Obesity and Obligation
- 2015
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Ingår i: Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. - : Project Muse. - 1054-6863 .- 1086-3249. ; 25:1, s. 89-110
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The belief that obese people ought to lose weight and keep it off is widespread, and has a profound negative impact on the lives of the obese. I argue in this paper that most obese people have no such obligation, even if obesity is bad, and caused by calorie input exceeding output. Obese people do not have an obligation to achieve long-term weight loss if this is impossible for them, is worse than the alternative, or requires such an enormous effort in relation to what stands to be gained that this option is supererogatory rather than obligatory. It is highly plausible that most obese people fall into one of these three groups. Politicians may still have obligations to fight obesity, but they ought to do so through progressive politics rather than blaming and shaming.
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| 24. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, et al.
(författare)
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Patronizing praise
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Ethics. - : Springer Netherlands. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 26, s. 663-682
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Praise, unlike blame, is generally considered well intended and beneficial, and therefore in less need of scrutiny. In line with recent developments, we argue that praise merits more thorough philosophical analysis. We show that, just like blame, praise can be problematic by expressing a failure to respect a person’s equal value or worth as a person. Such patronizing praise, however, is often more insidious, because praise tends to be regarded as well intended and beneficial, which renders it harder to recognize and object to. Among other things, a philosophical analysis of patronizing praise helps people on the receiving end articulate why they feel uncomfortable or offended by it, shows patronizing praisers how their praise is problematic, and provides input for further philosophical analysis of blame. In the first section of the paper, we discuss how hypocritical praise, just like hypocritical blame, can fail to respect the equality of persons by expressing that the praiser applies more demanding moral standards to the praisee than to themself. We further discuss obstructionist praise, which loosely corresponds to complicit blame, and can similarly express that certain moral standards apply to others but not to the praiser. In the second part of the paper, we discuss another variety of patronizing praise. Praise can be an inaccurate appraisal of a person based on irrelevant considerations – like race, gender, or class – and thereby constitute a failure to recognize their equal worth as a person. We identify three ways in which such praise can manifest.
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| 25. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, 1977-
(författare)
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Practical Perspective Compatibilism
- 2012
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions.The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is that of choosing what to do and how to act. We see that we are free when we view things from a practical perspective. Determinism cannot threaten our practical freedom, since from a practical perspective we must choose what to do even if everything ultimately is determined. I argue that practical freedom is sufficient freedom-wise for moral agency and moral responsibility because morality is action-guiding. Right and wrong are concepts to be employed in deliberation and advice. This is a strong reason to regard factors irrelevant to deliberators and advisers as irrelevant when making judgements of right and wrong, and whether somebody had some other kind of freedom than practical freedom is irrelevant to deliberators and advisers. There are also prima facie reasons to regard moral responsibility as tied to rightness and wrongness, so that agents are blameworthy when they did wrong (or subjectively wrong, or what would have been wrong given their state of information and so on) and praiseworthy when they did right (subjectively right and so on). I also show that no classic arguments for incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility work when directed against practical perspective compatibilism.Finally, this thesis discusses metaethics in relation to compatibilism. Since competing theories imply the falsity of some respected metaethical positions, metaethical considerations lend further support to practical perspective compatibilism.
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| 26. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Psychosis and Intelligibility
- 2021
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Ingår i: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. - : Johns Hopkins University Press. - 1071-6076 .- 1086-3303. ; 28:3, s. 233-249
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When interacting with other people, we assume that they have their reasons for what they do and believe, and experience recognizable feelings and emotions. When people act from weakness of will or are otherwise irrational, what they do can still be comprehensible to us, since we know what it is like to fall for temptation and act against one’s better judgment. Still, when someone’s experiences, feelings and way of thinking is vastly different from our own, understanding them becomes increasingly difficult. Delusions and psychosis are often seen as marking the end of intelligibility. In this article, I argue first for the importance of seeing other people as intelligible as long as this is at all possible. Second, I argue, based on both previous literature and my own lived experience, that more psychotic phenomena than previously thought can be rendered at least somewhat intelligible. Besides bizarre experiences like illusions, hallucinations, and intense feelings of significance, I also explain what it is like to lose one’s bedrock, and how this loss impacts which beliefs one has reason to reject. Finally, I give an inside account of some disturbances of reason, and show that there are important similarities between certain psychotic reasoning problems and common non-pathological phenomena.
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| 27. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Purebred Dogs and Canine Wellbeing
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. - : Springer. - 1187-7863 .- 1573-322X. ; 27:3, s. 417-430
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Breeders of purebred dogs usually have several goals they want to accomplish, of which canine wellbeing is one. The purpose of this article is to investigate what we ought to do given this goal. Breeders typically think that they fulfil their wellbeing-related duties by doing the best they can within their breed of choice. However, it is true of most breeders that they could produce physically and mentally healthier dogs if they switched to a healthier breed. There are a few breeds that are healthier than other breeds as well as mutts; we could maximize wellbeing for the next generations by focusing all our breeding resources on those. However, in the long run such a strategy would severely deplete the canine gene pool. If we are to breed for wellbeing in the long run, we must thus weigh the benefits of selection against physical and mental problems against the benefits of genetic diversity. The optimal breeding strategy for canine wellbeing is to preserve many breeds, though not all of them. Furthermore, we ought to combine strict health programs with looser barriers between breeds. Such a policy conflicts with the goal of breed preservation, at least if we think of breeds as populations registered within kennel clubs rather than types of dogs, but not with the goal of producing good working dogs capable of performing various tasks.
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| 28. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Radical psychotic doubt and epistemology
- 2023
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Ingår i: Philosophical Psychology. - : Routledge. - 0951-5089 .- 1465-394X. ; 36:8, s. 1482-1506
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, i support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced cchoice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much-needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers.
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| 29. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise
- 2016
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Ingår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 19:5, s. 1225-1240
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has been argued that in a deterministic universe, no one has any reason to do anything. Since we ought to do what we have most reason to do, no one ought to do anything either. Firstly, it is argued that an agent cannot have reason to do anything unless she can do otherwise; secondly, that the relevant ‘can’ is incompatibilist. In this paper, I argue that even if the first step of the argument for reason incompatibilism succeeds, the second one does not. It is argued that reasons require alternative possibilities, because reasons are action-guiding. A supposed reason to do the impossible, or to do what was inevitable anyway, could not fill this function. I discuss different interpretations of the claim that reasons are action-guiding, and show that according to one interpretation it is sufficient that the agent believes that she has several alternative options. According to other interpretations, the agent must really have alternative options, but only in a compatibilist sense. I suggest that an interpretation of action-guidance according to which reasons can only guide actions when we have several options open to us in an incompatibilist sense cannot be found. We should therefore assume that reasons and obligations are compatible with determinism.
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| 30. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, Docent, 1977-
(författare)
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Retributivism and the objective attitude
- 2024
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Ingår i: Diametros. - Krakow : Jagiellonian University. - 1733-5566. ; 21:79, s. 56-73
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has been argued that a retributivist criminal justice system treats offenders with a respectlacking in alternative criminal justice systems; retributivism presumably recognizes that offenders are fellow members of the moral community who can be held responsible for their actions. One version of the respect argument builds on P.F. Strawson’s moral responsibility theory. According to Strawson, we may take either a participant or objective attitude toward other people. The former is the default attitude when interacting with other adults, whereas the latter is fit for children and the mentally disabled or ill, whom we merely try to manage and handle as best we can. The participant attitude also involves holding people responsible when they do wrong. Supposedly, a retributivist criminal justice system functions as a natural continuation of our everyday, participant, and responsibility-holding practices, unlike alternative systems that adopt an objective attitude toward offenders. I argue that this is wrong. The participant atti-tude requires reciprocity and, usually, some level of equality too. Even an idealized retributivist system has little room for this, not to mention the flawed versions of this system we see in reality.
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| 31. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Retributivism and uncertainty : Why do we punish criminals?
- 2021
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Annan publikation (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Why do we have a criminal justice system? What could possibly justify the state punishing its citizens? Retributivism is the view that we ought to give offenders the suffering that they deserve for harming others.
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| 32. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, Docent, 1977-
(författare)
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Skepticism om moraliskt ansvar och samhällsdebatt
- 2024
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Ingår i: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi. - Stockholm : Thales. - 1402-2710 .- 2002-3383. ; 28:1, s. 6-21
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Filosofer och andra debattörer hänvisar ibland till skepticism om moraliskt ansvar när de argumenterar för en mer rehabiliteringsinriktad kriminalvård och ett tryggare välfärdssamhälle. Om vi underminerar tron på moraliskt ansvar, resonerar de, så underminerar vi därmed tron på förtjänta bestraffningar och förtjänt fattigdom. Skepticism-baserad argumentation för samhällsreformer lider dock av flera problem. Påvisade skillnader i hjärnan mellan olika grupper bevisar inte frånvaron av moraliskt ansvar hos vissa. Total skepticism om moraliskt ansvar innebär att rika och mäktiga saknar ansvar de också. Filosofiska argument både för och emot existensen av moraliskt ansvar bottnar i slutändan i intuitioner, som skiljer sig från person till person. Det är bättre att fokusera på empiriskt grundade argument som visar att människor har begränsad kontroll över sin situation. Sådana argument övertygar förstås inte alla, men det finns inga magiska argument som gör det.
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| 33. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Solving the self-illness ambiguity : the case for construction over discovery
- 2022
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Ingår i: Philosophical Explorations. - : Routledge. - 1386-9795 .- 1741-5918. ; 25:3, s. 294-313
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are–their selves–and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which belongs to the mental illness. I argue that no such border exists, and that attempts to find it might even render the felt ambiguity worse. Instead, any solution must be constructivist; the patient (and others) should deliberate and discuss what to identify with or not. I further argue that psychiatric patients need not see their mental illness as wholly distinct from themselves to avoid ‘identifying with their diagnoses' in a problematic way. Finally, we can excuse problematic behaviour by mentally ill people–in fact, we can do so in a more nuanced and constructive way–while rejecting the view that the mental illness is wholly distinct from the patient’s self.
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| 34. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, Docent, 1977-, et al.
(författare)
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Strategy, pyrrhonian scepticism and the allure of madness
- 2024
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Ingår i: European journal of analytic philosophy. - Rijeka : University of Rijeka. - 1849-0514.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Justin Garson introduces the distinction between two views on Madness we encounter again and again throughout history: Madness as dysfunction, and Madness as strategy. On the latter view, Madness serves some purpose for the person experiencing it, even if it’s simultaneously harmful. The strategy view makes intelligible why Madness often holds a certain allure – even when it’s prima facie terrifying. Moreover, if Madness is a strategy in Garson’s metaphorical sense – if it serves a purpose – it makes sense to use consciously chosen strategies for living with Madness that doesn’t necessarily aim to annihilate or repress it as far as possible. In this paper, we use our own respective stories as case studies. We have both struggled to resist the allure of Madness, and both ended up embracing a kind of Pyrrhonian scepticism about reality instead of clinging to sane reality.
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| 35. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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The agential perspective : a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument
- 2020
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Ingår i: Philosophical Studies. - Dordrecht : Springer. - 0031-8116 .- 1573-0883. ; 177, s. 1935-1951
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- One of the most influential arguments against compatibilism is Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Professor Plum, the main character of the thought experiment, is manipulated into doing what he does; he therefore supposedly lacks moral responsibility for his action. Since he is arguably analogous to an ordinary agent under determinism, Pereboom concludes that ordinary determined agents lack moral responsibility as well. I offer a hard-line reply to this argument, that is, a reply which denies that this kind of manipulation is responsibility undermining. I point out that fully fleshed-out manipulated characters in fiction can seem morally responsible for what they do. This is plausibly because we identify with such characters, and therefore focus on their options and the reasons for which they act rather than the manipulation. I further argue that we ought to focus this way when interacting with other agents. We have no reason to trust the incompatibilist intuitions that arise when we regard manipulated agents from a much more detached perspective.
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| 36. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Theories of Psychosis versus What It Is Like
- 2021
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Ingår i: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. - : Johns Hopkins University Press. - 1071-6076 .- 1086-3303. ; 28:3, s. 257-258
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 37. |
- Lager, Ida, et al.
(författare)
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Acyltransferases Regulate Oil Quality in Camelina sativa Through Both Acyl Donor and Acyl Acceptor Specificities
- 2020
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Ingår i: Frontiers in Plant Science. - : Frontiers Media SA. - 1664-462X. ; 11
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Camelina sativais an emerging biotechnology oil crop. However, more information is needed regarding its innate lipid enzyme specificities. We have therefore characterized several triacylglycerol (TAG) producing enzymes by measuringin vitrosubstrate specificities using different combinations of acyl-acceptors (diacylglycerol, DAG) and donors. Specifically,C. sativaacyl-CoA:diacylglycerol acyltransferase (DGAT) 1 and 2 (which both use acyl-CoA as acyl donor) and phospholipid:diacylglycerol acyltransferase (PDAT, with phosphatidylcoline as acyl donor) were studied. The results show that the DGAT1 and DGAT2 specificities are complementary, with DGAT2 exhibiting a high specificity for acyl acceptors containing only polyunsaturated fatty acids (FAs), whereas DGAT1 prefers acyl donors with saturated and monounsaturated FAs. Furthermore, the combination of substrates that resulted in the highest activity for DGAT2, but very low activity for DGAT1, corresponds to TAG species previously shown to increase inC. sativaseeds with downregulated DGAT1. Similarly, the combinations of substrates that gave the highest PDAT1 activity were also those that produce the two TAG species (54:7 and 54:8 TAG) with the highest increase in PDAT overexpressingC. sativaseeds. Thus, thein vitrodata correlate well with the changes in the overall fatty acid profile and TAG species inC. sativaseeds with altered DGAT1 and PDAT activity. Additionally,in vitrostudies ofC. sativaphosphatidycholine:diacylglycerol cholinephosphotransferase (PDCT), another activity involved in TAG biosynthesis, revealed that PDCT accepts substrates with different desaturation levels. Furthermore, PDCT was unable to use DAG with ricineoleyl groups, and the presence of this substrate also inhibited PDCT from using other DAG-moieties. This gives insights relating to previousin vivostudies regarding this enzyme.
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| 38. |
- Larsson, Johanna, et al.
(författare)
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Bacterial contamination of suction catheter tips during aortic valve replacement surgery: a prospective observational cohort study.
- 2015
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Ingår i: Patient safety in surgery. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1754-9493. ; 9
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Bacterial mediastinitis is a severe complication after open heart surgery. The infection causes prolonged hospitalization and an increased mortality risk. Observations from orthopaedic surgery showed that the suction catheter used during surgery is commonly contaminated with bacteria. The aim of this study was to describe the prevalence of suction catheter contamination in cardiac surgery and to study if suction time influences the contamination risk.
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| 39. |
- Moberg, Christina, et al.
(författare)
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De unga gör helt rätt när de stämmer staten
- 2022
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Ingår i: Aftonbladet. - 1103-9000.
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- 1 620 forskare och lärare i forskarvärlden: Vi ställer oss bakom Auroras klimatkrav
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| 40. |
- Singh, Sukhi, 1990, et al.
(författare)
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Adrenaline enhances in vitro platelet activation and aggregation in blood samples from ticagrelor-treated patients
- 2018
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Ingår i: Research and Practice in Thrombosis and Haemostasis. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 2475-0379. ; 2:4, s. 718-725
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Background: Temporarily improved platelet reactivity may reduce the bleeding in patients on antiplatelet therapy who have ongoing bleeding or who are in need of acute surgery. Adrenaline can bind to adrenergic alpha(2A)-receptors on platelets and potentially enhance platelet reactivity.Objective: To assess if adrenaline can improve adenosine diphosphate (ADP)-induced platelet aggregation and activation in blood samples from patients on dual antiplatelet therapy with acetylsalicylic acid (ASA) and the ADP-receptor antagonist ticagrelor.Methods: Blood samples were collected from a total of forty acute coronary syndrome patients on dual antiplatelet therapy with ASA and ticagrelor. ADP-induced platelet aggregation (by impedance aggregometry) and activation (by flow cytometry) were assessed before and after supplementation with adrenaline and/or platelet concentrate.Results: Adrenaline supplementation (770 nmol L-1) increased median ADP-induced aggregation from 15 (25-75th percentiles: 10-20) to 26 (18-38) aggregation units. The effect was independent of concomitant platelet supplementation. Adrenaline also increased ADP-induced platelet activation: from 40% (36-54%) to 83% (74-88%) platelets with active fibrinogen receptor (binding PAC-1) and from 13% (7-21%) to 35% (18-50%) P-selectin-expressing platelets.Conclusions: Adrenaline potentiated ADP-induced platelet aggregation and activation in blood samples from ticagrelor-treated patients. Adrenaline infusion may be a new method to enhance platelet function in ticagrelor-treated patients who are in need of acute surgery or have ongoing bleeding. In vivo studies are needed to confirm the present results.
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| 41. |
- Singh, Sukhi, 1990, et al.
(författare)
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Adrenaline Improves Platelet Reactivity in Ticagrelor-Treated Healthy Volunteers
- 2019
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Ingår i: Thrombosis and Haemostasis. - : Georg Thieme Verlag KG. - 0340-6245 .- 2567-689X. ; 119:5, s. 735-743
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- BACKGROUND: Administration of agents that enhance platelet reactivity may reduce the perioperative bleeding risk in patients treated with the adenosine diphosphate (ADP)-receptor antagonist ticagrelor. Adrenaline potentiates ADP-induced aggregation and activation in blood samples from ticagrelor-treated patients, but it has not previously been evaluated in vivo.METHODS: Ten healthy male subjects were included in an interventional study. A loading dose of ticagrelor (180 mg) was administered, followed 2 hours later by a gradually increased intravenous adrenaline infusion (0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 µg/kg/min; 15 minutes at each step). Blood pressure, heart rate, platelet aggregation (impedance aggregometry), platelet activation (flow cytometry), clot formation (rotational thromboelastometry) and adrenaline plasma concentration were determined before and after ticagrelor administration and at the end of each adrenaline step.RESULTS: = 0.007).CONCLUSION: Infusion of adrenaline at clinically relevant doses improves in vivo platelet reactivity and clot formation in ticagrelor-treated subjects. Adrenaline could thus potentially be used to prevent perioperative bleeding complications in ticagrelor-treated patients. Studies in patients are necessary to determine the clinical importance of our observations.TRIAL REGISTRY NUMBER: ClinicalTrials.gov NCT03441412.
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| 42. |
- Skibniewski, Mikolaj, et al.
(författare)
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Long-term antithrombotic therapy after coronary artery bypass grafting in patients with preoperative atrial fibrillation. A nationwide observational study from the SWEDEHEART registry
- 2023
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Ingår i: American Heart Journal. - : Elsevier BV. - 0002-8703 .- 1097-6744. ; 257, s. 69-77
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Aims To provide data guiding long-term antithrombotic therapy after coronar y arter y by-pass grafting (CABG) in patients with preoperative atrial fibrillation (AF). Methods and results From the SWEDEHEART registry, we included all patients, between January 2006 and September 2016, with preoperative AF and CHA2DS2-VASC score >2, undergoing CABG. Based on dispensed prescriptions 12 to 18 months after CABG, patients were divided in 3 groups: use of platelet inhibitors (PI) only, oral anticoagulant (OAC) only or a combination of OAC + PI. Outcomes were: Major adverse cardiac and cerebrovascular events (MACCE, [all-cause death, myocardial infarction, or stroke]), net adverse clinical events (NACE, [MACCE or bleeding]) and the individual components of NACE. Inverse probability of treatment weighting was used to adjust for the non-randomized study design. Among 2,564 patients, 1,040 (41%) were treated with PI alone, 1,064 (41%) with OAC alone, and 460 (18%) with PI + OAC. Treatment with PI alone was associated with higher risk for MACCE (adjusted HR 1.43, 95% CI 1.09-1.88), driven by higher risk for stroke and MI, compared with OAC alone. Treatment with PI + OAC, was associated with higher risk for NACE (adjusted HR 1.40, 95% CI 1.06-1.85), driven by higher risk for bleeds, compared with OAC alone. Conclusion In this real-world observational study, a high proportion of patients with AF, undergoing CABG, did not receive a long-term OAC therapy. Treatment with OAC alone was associated with a net clinical benefit, compared with PI alone or PI + OAC. (Am Heart J 2023;257:69-77.)
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