| 1. |
- Friedrichsen, Jana, et al.
(författare)
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Social status concerns and the political economy of publicly provided private goods
- 2021
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Ingår i: Economic Journal. - : Oxford University Press. - 0013-0133 .- 1468-0297. ; 131:633, s. 220-246
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyse the political economy of the public provision of private goods when individuals care about their social status. Status concerns motivate richer individuals to vote for the public provision of goods they themselves buy in markets: a higher provision level attracts more individuals to the public sector, enhancing the social exclusivity of market purchases. Majority voting may lead to a public provision that only a minority of citizens use. Users in the public sector may enjoy better provision than users in the private system. We characterise the coalitions that can prevail in a political equilibrium.
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| 2. |
- Cornelissen, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Fairness spillovers : the case of taxation
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 90:June, s. 164-180
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is standardly assumed that individuals react to perceived unfairness or norm violations in precisely the same area or relationship where the original offense has occurred. However, grievances over being exposed to injustice may have even broader consequences and also spill over to other contexts, causing non-compliant behavior there. We present evidence that such “fairness spillovers” can incur large economic costs: a belief that there is unfairness in taxation in the sense that the rich do not pay enough taxes is associated with a twenty percent higher level of paid absenteeism from work.
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| 3. |
- Cornelissen, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Perceived unfairness in CEO compensation and work morale
- 2011
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier. - 0165-1765 .- 1873-7374. ; 110:1, s. 45-48
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- CEO compensation that is perceived to be excessive regularly causes agitation in the population. Using German data, we show that perceiving CEO pay to be unfair has economic repercussions in terms of lower work morale.
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| 4. |
- Friedrichsen, Jana, et al.
(författare)
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Social image concerns and welfare take-up
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0047-2727 .- 1879-2316. ; 168:December, s. 174-192
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live off others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of “taxpayers” vote for the public transfer.
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| 5. |
- Goerg, Sebastian J., et al.
(författare)
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Norm Violations and Behavioral Spillovers : Evidence From the Lab and The Field
- 2024
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper explores the contagion effects of norm-violating behavior across decision situations.Through a series of laboratory and field experiments, we empirically establish the conditions under which norm-breaking behavior in one decision situation leads individuals who observe this to violatennorms in other, distinct decision situations. Our laboratory findings show that these spillover effects are more pronounced when the norms underlying the decision situations are perceived to be similar. However, spillovers can also affect decision situations governed by relatively dissimilar norms if the observers of norm violations have had the opportunity to first violate the same norm as the observed violator themselves. In an accompanying field experiment, we underscore the economic importance of norm similarity for spillover effects. When workers are exposed to information about celebrities evading taxes, they exhibit significantly higher rates of workplace theft than those in the control group, yet this exposure does not negatively affect work morale.
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| 6. |
- Goerg, Sebastian J., et al.
(författare)
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Norm violations and behavioral spillovers : Evidence from the lab and the field
- 2024
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Ingår i: European Economic Review. - : Elsevier. - 0014-2921 .- 1873-572X. ; 166
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explores the contagion effects of norm-violating behavior across decision situations. Through a series of laboratory and field experiments, we empirically establish the conditions under which norm-breaking behavior in one decision situation leads individuals who observe this to violate norms in other, distinct decision situations. Our laboratory findings show that these spillover effects are more pronounced when the norms underlying the decision situations are perceived to be similar. However, spillovers can also affect decision situations governed by relatively dissimilar norms if the observers of norm violations have had the opportunity to first violate the same norm as the observed violator themselves. In an accompanying field experiment, we underscore the economic importance of norm similarity for spillover effects. When workers are exposed to information about celebrities evading taxes, they exhibit significantly higher rates of workplace theft than those in the control group, yet this exposure does not negatively affect work morale.
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| 7. |
- König, Tobias, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
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Tax structure and government expenditures with tax equity concerns
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 90:June, s. 137-153
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We augment a standard tax model by concerns about tax equity: people get upset when labour is taxed more heavily than capital. Even the slightest concern for tax equity invalidates the common tenet that capital remains tax-exempt in small open economies. This holds for exogenous as well as for endogenous government expenditures and irrespective of whether concerns with tax equity only cause emotional discomfort or also impact on work incentives. If concerns with tax equity get more intense, the economy may choose higher taxes on labour and move to the downward sloped part of its Laffer curve. For endogenous government spending, stronger concerns with tax equity may lead to a larger size of the public sector.
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