| 1. |
- James, Rachel A., et al.
(författare)
-
Attribution: How Is It Relevant for Loss and Damage Policy and Practice?
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Loss and Damage from Climate Change : Climate Risk Management, Policy and Governance - Climate Risk Management, Policy and Governance. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 9783319720258 - 9783319720265 ; , s. 113-154
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Attribution has become a recurring issue in discussions about Loss and Damage (L&D). In this highly-politicised context, attribution is often associated with responsibility and blame; and linked to debates about liability and compensation. The aim of attribution science, however, is not to establish responsibility, but to further scientific understanding of causal links between elements of the Earth System and society. This research into causality could inform the management of climate-related risks through improved understanding of drivers of relevant hazards, or, more widely, vulnerability and exposure; with potential benefits regardless of political positions on L&D. Experience shows that it is nevertheless difficult to have open discussions about the science in the policy sphere. This is not only a missed opportunity, but also problematic in that it could inhibit understanding of scientific results and uncertainties, potentially leading to policy planning which does not have sufficient scientific evidence to support it. In this chapter, we first explore this dilemma for science-policy dialogue, summarising several years of research into stakeholder perspectives of attribution in the context of L&D. We then aim to provide clarity about the scientific research available, through an overview of research which might contribute evidence about the causal connections between anthropogenic climate change and losses and damages, including climate science, but also other fields which examine other drivers of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. Finally, we explore potential applications of attribution research, suggesting that an integrated and nuanced approach has potential to inform planning to avert, minimise and address losses and damages. The key messages are In the political context of climate negotiations, questions about whether losses and damages can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change are often linked to issues of responsibility, blame, and liability. Attribution science does not aim to establish responsibility or blame, but rather to investigate drivers of change. Attribution science is advancing rapidly, and has potential to increase understanding of how climate variability and change is influencing slow onset and extreme weather events, and how this interacts with other drivers of risk, including socio-economic drivers, to influence losses and damages. Over time, some uncertainties in the science will be reduced, as the anthropogenic climate change signal becomes stronger, and understanding of climate variability and change develops. However, some uncertainties will not be eliminated. Uncertainty is common in science, and does not prevent useful applications in policy, but might determine which applications are appropriate. It is important to highlight that in attribution studies, the strength of evidence varies substantially between different kinds of slow onset and extreme weather events, and between regions. Policy-makers should not expect the later emergence of conclusive evidence about the influence of climate variability and change on specific incidences of losses and damages; and, in particular, should not expect the strength of evidence to be equal between events, and between countries. Rather than waiting for further confidence in attribution studies, there is potential to start working now to integrate science into policy and practice, to help understand and tackle drivers of losses and damages, informing prevention, recovery, rehabilitation, and transformation.
|
|
| 2. |
- Obersteiner, Michael, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
-
Managing Climate Risk
- 2001
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- At the heart of the traditional approach to strategy in the climate change dilemma liesthe assumption that the global community, by applying a set of powerful analyticaltools, can predict the future of climate change accurately enough to choose a clearstrategic direction for it. We claim that this approach might involve underestimatinguncertainty in order to lay out a vision of future events sufficiently precise to becaptured in a discounted cost flow analysis in integrated assessment models. However,since the future of climate change is truly uncertain, this approach might at best bemarginally helpful and at worst downright dangerous: underestimating uncertainty canlead to strategies that do not defend the world against unexpected and sometimes evencatastrophic threats. Another danger lies on the other extreme: if the global communitycan not find a strategy that works under traditional analysis or if uncertainties are toolarge that clear messages are absent, they may abandon the analytical rigor of theirplanning process altogether and base their decisions on good instinct and consensus ofsome future process that is easy to agree upon.In this paper, we try to outline a system to derive strategic decisions under uncertaintyfor the climate change dilemma. What follows is a framework for determining the levelof uncertainty surrounding strategic decisions and for tailoring strategy to thatuncertainty.Our core argument is that a robust strategy towards climate change involves thebuilding of a technological portfolio of mitigation and adaptation measures that includessufficient opposite technological positions to the underlying baseline emission scenariosgiven the uncertainties of the entire physical and socioeconomic system in place. In thecase of mitigation, opposite technological positions with the highest leverage areparticular types of sinks. A robust climate risk management portfolio can only workwhen the opposite technological positions are readily available when needed andtherefore they have to be prepared in advance. It is precisely the flexibility of thesetechnological options which has to be quantified under the perspective of the uncertainnature of the underlying system and compared to the cost of creating these options,rather than comparing their cost with expected losses in a net present value typeanalysis. We conclude that climate policy ― especially under the consideration of theprecautionary principle ― would look much different if uncertainties would be takenexplicitly into account.
|
|
| 3. |
- Ringsmuth, Andrew K., et al.
(författare)
-
Lessons from COVID-19 for managing transboundary climate risks and building resilience
- 2022
-
Ingår i: Climate Risk Management. - : Elsevier. - 2212-0963. ; 35
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- COVID-19 has revealed how challenging it is to manage global, systemic and compounding crises. Like COVID-19, climate change impacts, and maladaptive responses to them, have potential to disrupt societies at multiple scales via networks of trade, finance, mobility and communication, and to impact hardest on the most vulnerable. However, these complex systems can also facilitate resilience if managed effectively. This review aims to distil lessons related to the transboundary management of systemic risks from the COVID-19 experience, to inform climate change policy and resilience building. Evidence from diverse fields is synthesised to illustrate the nature of systemic risks and our evolving understanding of resilience. We describe research methods that aim to capture systemic complexity to inform better management practices and increase resil-ience to crises. Finally, we recommend specific, practical actions for improving transboundary climate risk management and resilience building. These include mapping the direct, cross-border and cross-sectoral impacts of potential climate extremes, adopting adaptive risk management strategies that embrace heterogenous decision-making and uncertainty, and taking a broader approach to resilience which elevates human wellbeing, including societal and ecological resilience.
|
|
