| 1. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
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Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. - : Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. - 1559-3061. ; 6:2
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman (2003) and Michael Ridge (2003, 2007) responded independently. Andrew Sepielli (forthcoming) has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for (Schroeder 2008) to account for normative certitude. We shall argue that the being for account of normative certitude is vulnerable to many problems shared by other noncognitivist theories. Furthermore, we shall argue that Sepielli’s account has its own problems: His favored normalization procedure for degrees of being for has highly problematic implications.
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| 2. |
- Bykvist, Krister, et al.
(författare)
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Expressivism and Moral Certitude
- 2009
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Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0031-8094 .- 1467-9213. ; 59:235, s. 202-215
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucialstructural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting forsubjects’ certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge haveindependently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection.We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view whichincorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith’s challenge, it isunlikely that ‘purer’ and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Bykvist, Krister, et al.
(författare)
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Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude : Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder
- 2017
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 95:4, s. 794-799
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.
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| 5. |
- Bykvist, Krister, et al.
(författare)
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What Matters in Metaethics
- 2019
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Ingår i: Analysis. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0003-2638 .- 1467-8284. ; 79:2, s. 341-349
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 6. |
- Danielsson, Sven, et al.
(författare)
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Brentano and the Buck-Passers
- 2007
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Ingår i: Mind (Print). - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0026-4423 .- 1460-2113. ; 116:463, s. 511-522
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buck-passing is known as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (the WKR problem): it seems quite possible that there is sometimes reason to favour an object although that object is not good and possibly very evil. The problem is to delineate exactly what distinguishes reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind. In this paper we offer a Brentano-style solution. We also note that one version of the WKR problem was put forward by G. E. Moore in his review of the English translation of Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Before getting to how our Brentano-style approach might offer a way out for Brentano and the buck-passers, we briefly consider and reject an interesting attempt to solve the WKR problem recently proposed by John Skorupski.
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| 7. |
- Eriksson, Björn, et al.
(författare)
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Moral Practice after Error Theory: Negotiationism
- 2019
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Ingår i: The End of Morality. - New York : Routledge. - 9780815358596 - 9781351122153 ; , s. 113-130
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We first deal with a few preliminary matters and discuss what-if any-distinct impact belief in moral error theory should have on our moral practice. Second, we describe what is involved in giving an answer to our leading question and take notice of some factors that are relevant to what an adequate answer might look like. We also argue that the specific details of adequate answers to our leading question will depend largely on context. Third, we consider three extant answers to our leading question: fictionalism, conservationism, and abolitionism. Of these three, conservationism seems most promising. However, conservationism leaves pertinent questions unanswered. In order to provide answers to these questions, and ultimately to provide an answer to our leading question, conservationism needs to be supplemented, yielding an account we call “negotiationism.” This final proposal is not neat and tidy, but it might work reasonably well in the moral environment in which error theorists are likely to find themselves.
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| 8. |
- Hirose, Iwao, et al.
(författare)
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Introduction to Value Theory
- 2015
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Ingår i: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. - New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780199959303 ; , s. 1-9
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Johansson, Jens, et al.
(författare)
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Against pluralism in metaethics
- 2015
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Ingår i: The Palgrave handbook of philosophical methods. - Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan. - 9781349576999 - 9781137344557 ; , s. 593-609
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Disagreement in ethics abounds. This has led some philosophers to argue that there is an irreducible plurality of moral values, duties, obligations, rights, etc., and that there is no universally valid way of balancing them. This kind of moral pluralism in combination with the absence of determinate rankings of values, duties, obligations, rights, etc., has been thought by some to imply that some cases of disagreement in ethics are rationally irresolvable, which in its turn, explains why disagreement in ethics abounds and remains pervasive.
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| 11. |
- Moberger, Victor, et al.
(författare)
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Moral Fictionalism : How and why?
- 2023
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Ingår i: Moral Fictionalism and Religious Fictionalism. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780198881865 ; , s. 64-85
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The central challenges for moral fictionalism are twofold: first, to explain how its recommendation that we abandon moral belief and assertion can be reconciled with its rationale of preserving the motivational efficacy of moral thought and discourse; second, to explain what the point is of replacing moral belief and assertion to begin with. This chapter clarifies these challenges and argues that Richard Joyce’s recent “metaphorist” version of fictionalism fares no better with respect to them than his earlier “narrationist” version. Just like its narrationist predecessor, metaphorist fictionalism fails to secure the motivational efficacy of moral thought and talk. The authors also find faults with yet more recent attempts at answering the above challenges for moral fictionalism, leaving the conservationist recommendation a more attractive alternative. This conclusion could be overturned if the conservationist proposal were sufficiently problematic in other respects, but the authors argue that it isn’t.
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| 12. |
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| 13. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Adam Smith av Bo Sandelin
- 2011
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Ingår i: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi. - 1402-2710 .- 2002-3383. ; 15:1, s. 51-57
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 14. |
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| 15. |
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| 16. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Axiological Investigations
- 2005
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The subject of this thesis is formal axiology, i.e., the discipline that deals with structural and conceptual questions about value. The main focus is on intrinsic or final value. The thesis consists of an introduction and six free-standing essays. The purpose of the introduction is to give a general background to the discussions in the essays. The introduction is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the subject matter and sketches the methodological framework. Section 2 discusses the supervenience of value, and how my use of that notion squares with the broader methodological framework. Section 3 defends the concept of intrinsic or final value. Section 4 discusses issues in value typology; particularly how intrinsic value relates to final value. Section 5 summarises the essays and provides some specific backgrounds to their respective themes.The six essays are thematically divided into four categories: The first two deal with specific issues concerning analyses of value. Essay 1 is a comparative discussion of competing approaches in this area. Essay 2 discusses, and proposes a solution to, a significant problem for the so called ‘buck-passing’ analysis of value. Essay 3 discusses the ontological nature of the bearers of final value, and defends the view that they are particularised properties, or tropes. Essay 4 defends conditionalism about final value, i.e., the idea that final value may vary according to context. The last two essays focus on some implications of the formal axiological discussion for normative theory: Essay 5 discusses the charge that the buck-passing analysis prematurely resolves the debate between consequentialism and deontology; essay 6 suggests that conditionalism makes possible a reconciliation between consequentialism and moral particularism.
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| 17. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Brentano's Metaethics
- 2017
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Ingår i: The Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. - New York : Routledge. - 9781138023444 - 9781315776460 ; , s. 187-195
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This chapter explains Franz Brentano's metaethical theory and how it purports to deal with such difficulties. Brentano explains correctness in emotions by analogy with correctness in judgements. For a judgement to be correct is for it to concord with a judgement made by someone who judges with self-evidence (Evidenz). Self-evident judgements are guaranteed to be correct, and they are based either on "inner perception" or on presentations of objects that are rejected apodictically. Brentano's metaethical theory concerns first and foremost the psychology of valuing and of moral judgement. Brentano is clearly a cognitivist about evaluative and moral judgement; such judgements are judgements about the correctness of feelings, and judgements are cognitive acts. However, one aspect of his position that seems congenial to contemporary expressivism. This has to do with expressivist treatments of disagreement. Brentano's views seem akin to the kind of foundationalist intuitionism that is traditionally associated with non-naturalism.
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| 18. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Buck-Passing Accounts
- 2013
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Ingår i: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell. - 9781405186414 - 9781444367072 ; , s. 625-636
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is a common view that there is an intimate tie between evaluative properties like goodness, badness, and betterness and appropriate responses to bearers of such properties. For instance, if an object is good there are reasons to favor it, or as some say, a favorable response would be fitting. Similarly, many people take there to be a close tie between deontic properties like rightness and wrongness and appropriate responses: if an action is wrong, there are reasons to respond disfavorably, e.g., to blame agents for performing actions of that type. According to buck‐passing accounts (henceforth BPA), evaluative and deontic properties do not themselves provide reasons for responses. Rather, reasons to respond in various ways are provided by good‐, bad‐, better‐, right‐, and wrong‐making properties.
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| 19. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Doubts about Intrinsic Value
- 2015
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Ingår i: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. - New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780199959303 ; , s. 44-59
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 20. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Error theory and reasons for belief
- 2011
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Ingår i: Reasons for belief. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. - 9781107006874 - 9781139042703 ; , s. 75-93
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 21. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Error Theory in Metaethics
- 2017
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Ingår i: The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. - New York : Routledge. - 9781138812208 - 9781315213217 ; , s. 58-71
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Error theories have been proposed and defended in several different areas of philosophy. In addition to ethics, there are error theories about numbers, color, free will, and personal identity. Moral error theories differ in scope. Theories at one end of the spectrum take normative judgments in general—of which moral judgments are a subclass—to be uniformly false, whereas theories at the other end of the spectrum take only a subclass of moral judgments—example those concerning duty and obligation, but not those concerning virtue and vice—to be uniformly false. Moral error theorists typically join forces with non-naturalist realists, against naturalism and non-cognitivism. Facts that are normative in the reason-implying sense are irreducibly normative, and they are very different. Many non-naturalist realists and error theorists maintain that it is impossible to give a plausible naturalistic account of moral facts, precisely because they are irreducibly normative; moral naturalism therefore falls prey to the "normativity objection".
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| 22. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
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Ewing, A. C.
- 2013
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Ingår i: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell. - 9781405186414 - 9781444367072 ; , s. 1817-1823
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A. C. Ewing (1899–1973) came last in the tradition of British moral philosophers that began with Henry Sidgwick and continued with H. A. Prichard, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and C. D. Broad. Philosophers in this tradition shared a nonnaturalist realist view of moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, but they differed on the relations between normative concepts and on normative ethics. Ewing made substantial contributions to these controversies and anticipated several moves in the contemporary debates as he sought to reconcile putatively incompatible views. Attempts to find conciliatory “middle ways” are a recurring theme in Ewing's work. This essay focuses on three main topics: moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, the relation between intrinsic goodness and ought, and utilitarianism and Rossian deontology. Finally, it describes briefly Ewing's work in other areas of moral philosophy.
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| 23. |
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| 24. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge
- 2009
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Ingår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 12:4, s. 365-378
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable isfor that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object ofcertain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if anobject is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FAanalyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such that it ought to befavoured; others hold that value is analyzable in terms of reasons or requirements to favour.All these variants of the FA analysis are subject to a partiality challenge: there arecircumstances in which some agents have reasons to favour or disfavour some object—due tothe personal relations in which they stand to the object—without this having any bearing onthe value of the object. A. C. Ewing was one of the first philosophers to draw attention to thepartiality challenge for FA analyses. In this paper I explain the challenge and considerEwing's responses, one of which is preferable to the other, but none of which is entirelysatisfactory. I go on to develop an alternative Brentano-inspired response that Ewing couldhave offered and that may well be preferable to the responses Ewing actually did offer.
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| 25. |
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| 26. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons
- 2006
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 84:4, s. 525-534
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.
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| 27. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism
- 2011
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Ingår i: Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780199606382 - 9780199606375 ; , s. 181-204
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 28. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. (ed.)
- 2013
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 91:4, s. 821-824
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 29. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Hume's Sentimentalism : Not Non-Cognitivism
- 2021
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Ingår i: Belgrade Philosophical Annual. - 0353-3891. ; 1:34, s. 95-111
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper considers and argues against old and recent readings of Hume according to which his account of moral judgement is non-cognitivist. In previous discussions of this topic, crucial metaethical distinctions—between sentimentalism and non-cognitivism and between psychological and semantic non-cognitivism—are often blurred. The paper aims to remedy this and argues that making the appropriate metaethical distinctions undermines alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations of Hume. The paper focuses in particular on Hume’s so-called ‘motivation argument’ and argues that it is a poor basis for non-cognitivist interpretations. While there is textual support for attributing to Hume what may be called ‘modally weak’ motivational internalism, there is no solid textual support for attributing to him either psychological or semantic non-cognitivism. The paper also challenges briefly some further alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations. It concludes by offering some positive evidence against such interpretations, namely that Hume appears to hold that there are moral beliefs and moral knowledge.
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| 30. |
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| 31. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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'In Defence of Mooreanism'
- 2023
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Ingår i: Value, Morality, and Social Reality. - Lund : Lund University Press. - 9789189415652 ; , s. 277-286
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Abstract. In his recent book The Value Gap (2021), Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen defends a pluralist view of final goodness and goodness-for, according to which neither concept is analysable in terms of the other. In this paper I defend a specific version of monism, namely so-called ‘Mooreanism’, according to which goodness-for is analysable partly in terms of final goodness. Rønnow-Rasmussen offers three purported counterexamples to Mooreanism. I argue that Mooreanism can accommodate two of them. The third is more problematic, but this is in the end not a decisive objection.
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| 32. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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In Defence Of Moral Error Theory
- 2010
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Ingår i: New Waves in Metaethics. - Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan. - 9780230251618 - 9780230251625 ; , s. 62-84
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 33. |
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| 34. |
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| 35. |
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| 36. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Metaethics
- 2013
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Ingår i: International Encyclopedia of Ethics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell. - 9781444367072 ; , s. 3219-3235
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Moral philosophers often ask whether abortion is morally permissible, whether the suffering of nonhuman animals is on a par morally with human suffering, and whether an action is morally right if and only if it maximizes happiness. Political philosophers often ask whether persons have inviolable rights to their bodies and whether distributive inequality that benefits the worst off is morally acceptable. These are all examples of first-order moral questions. But such questions are not the business of moral and political philosophers only. First-order moral questions pervade everyday thinking and acting: Is it wrong to eat meat? Ought one to donate more to charities? Is there reason to vote in elections?
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| 37. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Metaethics Out of Speech Acts? Moral Error Theory and the Possibility of Speech
- 2019
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Ingår i: Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. - : Routledge. - 9781138318335 - 9780429454677 ; , s. 73-85
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Are there moral facts? According to moral nihilism, the answer is no. Some moral nihilists are moral error theorists, who think that moral judgements purport to refer to moral facts, but since there are no moral facts, moral judgements are uniformly false or untrue. Terence Cuneo has recently raised an original and potentially very serious objection to moral error theory (Cuneo 2014). According to Cuneo’s ‘normative theory of speech’, normative facts, some of which are moral facts, are crucially involved in explanations of how it is that we are able to perform illocutionary speech acts, such as asserting, promising, and commanding. Many versions of moral error theory reject not only moral facts, but also normative facts of the kind Cuneo takes to be among the prerequisites of our abilities to perform illocutionary speech acts. If Cuneo’s argument is successful, then, moral error theory has the unsettling implication that we do not speak, and possibly that we cannot speak. I shall argue, however, that the argument ultimately fails, chiefly because its core premise fails to establish that illocutionary speech acts are normative in the first place.
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| 38. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Moral and Epistemic Error Theory : The Parity Premise Reconsidered
- 2018
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Ingår i: Metaepistemology. - : Oxford University Press. - 9780198805366 ; , s. 107-121
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative reasons and consequently no moral facts. A popular response to moral error theory utilizes the so-called ‘companions in guilt’ strategy and argues that if moral reasons are irreducibly normative, then epistemic reasons are too. This is the Parity Premise, on the basis of which critics of moral error theory draw the Parity Conclusion that if there are no irreducibly normative reasons, there are no moral reasons and no epistemic reasons. From the Parity Conclusion and Epistemic Realism (the view that there are epistemic reasons), it follows that it is false that there are no irreducibly normative reasons. In this paper, I argue that the Parity Premise and the Parity Conclusion can both plausibly be rejected.
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| 39. |
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| 40. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Nihilism and the Epistemic Profile of Moral Judgment
- 2019
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Ingår i: The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. - New York : Routledge. - 9781138816121 - 9781315719696 ; , s. 304-315
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Moral nihilism is the view that there are no moral facts or moral truths. It is the ontological component of moral error theory, which is the best-known and most comprehensive metaethical theory that involves moral nihilism. My main aim is to discuss some consequences of endorsing moral error theory or believing to some degree that moral error theory is true. In §2, I consider the implications for ordinary moral thought and discourse and the epistemological consequences for moral theorizing. In §3, I consider a recent challenge, according to which moral judgments do not have the epistemic profile that moral error theory alleges. I shall argue in §3–5 that the challenge can be met and that there is evidence that moral error theory is in fact correct about the epistemic profile of moral judgments.
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| 41. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory : Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 13:4, s. 461-473
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory.
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| 42. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Précis of Moral Error Theory : History, Critique, Defence
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 13:4, s. 397-402
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (henceforth met) examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This precis is a brief summary of the book's content.
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| 43. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Projectivism and Error in Hume's Ethics
- 2011
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Ingår i: Hume Studies. - : Project Muse. - 0319-7336 .- 1947-9921. ; 37:1, s. 19-42
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This essay argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but this paper argues that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive metaethics, that is, his account of vulgar moral thought and discourse, and his revisionary metaethics, that is, his account of how vulgar moral thought and discourse could be reformed so as to no longer involve error. This essay concludes that Hume is a projectivist and an error theorist in descriptive metaethics, while he is a projectivist and a subjectivist in revisionary metaethics.
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| 44. |
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| 45. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
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Quasi-realism and normative certitude
- 2021
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Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; :198, s. 7861-7869
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, such as whether euthanasia is permissible or whether utilitarianism is true. However, accommodating the phenomenon of degrees of normative certitude is a difficult challenge for non-cognitivist and expressivist views, according to which normative judgements are desire-like attitudes rather than beliefs (Smith, in: Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5: 305–320, 2002). Several attempts have been made on behalf of non-cognitivism and expressivism to meet the challenge (Lenman in: Non-cognitivism and the dimensions of evaluative judgment, Brown Electronic Article Review Service, 2003; Ridge in Synthese 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1884-7; Ridge in: Shafer-Landau (ed) Studies in metaethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Sepielli in Philos Stud 160: 191–207, 2012; Eriksson and Francén Olinder in Aust J Philos 94: 719–735, 2016). These attempts have all been found wanting (Bykvist and Olson in Philos Q 59:202–215, 2009, Aust J Philos 95:794–799, 2017; Bykvist and Olson 2012). Michael Ridge has recently offered a quasi-realist solution, according to which expressivists can say exactly what cognitivists say about certitude, including normative certitude. In this paper, we explain the basic problem and Ridge’s quasi-realist solution. We then argue that the quasi-realist account of normative certitude faces severe difficulties that do not arise for cognitivist accounts, according to which normative judgements are beliefs.
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| 46. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism : Reviewing Price's Review
- 2014
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Ingår i: Philosophical Papers. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0556-8641 .- 1996-8523. ; 43:3, s. 429-445
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper revisits Richard Price’s Review of the Principal Questions in Morals (1757/1787). Price was a defender of rationalism about ethics and he anticipated many views and arguments that became influential as the metaethical and ethical debates evolved over the later centuries. The paper explores and assesses Price’s arguments in favour of rationalism and against sentimentalism, with a view to how they bear on the modern metaethical debate.
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| 47. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Reasons and the New Non-Naturalism
- 2009
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Ingår i: Spheres of Reason. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780199572939 ; , s. 164-182
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This essay focuses on two recent trends in metaethics. One is the revival of non-naturalistic realism, or just non-naturalism for short. The other is the preoccupation with reasons. The two trends are not unconnected. The renewal of interest in non-naturalism seems to have gained fuel from the preoccupation with reasons. The essay distinguishes between old and new non-naturalism. Old non-naturalism places intrinsic goodness at the normative centre stage; new non-naturalism places the notion of a reason at the normative centre stage. There is a presentiment about, that new non-naturalism’s shift of focus from intrinsic goodness to reasons promises to make non-naturalism a more credible and viable metaethical position. This line of thinking involves a fallacy I propose to call the extensional fallacy. Unmasking the extensional fallacy reveals that the notion of a reason is no less problematic than the notion of intrinsic goodness, and that the supervenience of the normative on the natural is no less problematic for new non-naturalism than for old non-naturalism. Another currently popular view is this: On old non-naturalism goodness is reason-providing. But since it is intuitively incredible that goodness is reason-providing, old non-naturalism must be rejected in favour of new non-naturalism. The idea that goodness is not reason-providing is intuitively compelling and I argue that old non-naturalism is perfectly consistent with this idea; the contrary view is based on dubious readings of Moore.
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| 49. |
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| 50. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
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Regimenting Reasons
- 2005
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Ingår i: Theoria. - : Wiley. - 0040-5825 .- 1755-2567. ; 71:3, s. 203-214
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The Belief-Desire model (the B-D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It is necessary to go beyond common philosophical practice and distinguish not merely between two such different uses but to make a tripartite distinction. Our aim is largely conciliatory: we grant the main parts of the points made by Stoutland and Dancy but argue that once the B-D model has been properly stated, and different uses of the term ‘reason’ sufficiently regimented, the B-D proponent is able to accommodate their respective criticisms within the framework of the B-D model and thereby undermine their case against the model.
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