| 1. |
- Skriver Hansen, Andreas, 1983, et al.
(författare)
-
Managing outdoor recreation aspects in coastal-marine national parks– Experiences and challenges from Sweden and Norway
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Proceedings for the International Symposium on Society and Resource Management (ISSRM), June 19-22, 2017 in Umeå.
-
Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper describes experiences and challenges in managing outdoor recreation in coastal-marine national parks as part of national strategies on Maritime Spatial Planning in Sweden and Norway. Both countries received their first coastal-marine national parks as late as in 2009, with two more established in Norway since then and two more under way, both in Sweden and in Norway. Like other land-based national parks, the purpose of coastal-marine national parks is to be containers of both environmental and recreational qualities, with a distinct focus on balancing use (recreation/tourism) and protection (conservation) aspects. However, while both countries have large experience on these matters in their land-based national parks (e.g. forest-, mountain-, and urban parks), experiences in coastal-marine national parks are limited. This is particularly the case when managing outdoor recreation aspects, such as providing quality recreational experiences or performing visitor monitoring activities. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with managers and experts in three coastal-marine national parks (one Swedish and two Norwegian parks), the paper reveals important challenges concerning outdoor recreation planning and management in coastal-marine national parks in Sweden and Norway. Main results show large differences in experience between planning and managing coastal-marine national parks versus traditional land-based national parks, including the problem that coastal-marine national parks are often managed based on experiences from their land-based equivalents. Particular identified challenges include working with outdoor recreation in open, free roaming landscapes as well as more administrative barriers, such as lack of education and resources among managers to work more actively with outdoor recreation aspects in the daily management. The paper therefore concludes that outdoor recreation aspects must receive a larger focus in coastal-marine national parks.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Franzén, Nils, 1987-
(författare)
-
Sense and Sensibility : Four Essays on Evaluative Discourse
- 2018
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The subject of this thesis is the nature of evaluative terms and concepts. It investigates various phenomena that distinguish evaluative discourse from other types of language use. Broadly, the thesis argues that these differences are best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative discourse serves to communicate that the speaker is in a particular emotional or affective state of mind.The first paper, “Aesthetic Evaluation and First-hand Experience”, examines the fact that it sounds strange to make evaluative aesthetic statements while at the same time denying that you have had first-hand experience with the object being discussed. It is proposed that a form of expressivism about aesthetic discourse best explains the data.The second paper, “Evaluative Discourse and Affective States of Mind”, discusses the problem of missing Moorean infelicity for expressivism. It is argued that evaluative discourse expresses states of mind attributed by sentences of the form “Nils finds it wrong to tell lies”. These states, the paper argues, are non-cognitive, and the observation therefore addresses the problem of missing infelicity.The third paper, “Sensibilism and Evaluative Supervenience”, argues that contemporary theories about why the moral supervenes on the non-moral have failed to account for the full extent of the phenomenon. Supervenience pertains not just to the moral but to the evaluative in general, it is a conceptual truth and it involves a relationship with a certain directionality. While all these points have been individually recognized at various points in the literature on moral supervenience, no theory accounts for all them. It is suggested that a kind of sensibilist semantics, according to which the extensions of evaluative terms are determined by how we feel about things, explains the full phenomenon.The fourth paper, “Sensibilism and Imaginative Resistance”, discusses why we refuse to accept strange evaluative claims as being true in fictions, even though we are happy to accept other types of absurdities as fictionally true. The paper argues that the sensibilist semantics outlined in the third article offers a good diagnosis of the puzzle and compares this to other approaches.
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| 4. |
- Hahn, Cedric Jasper, et al.
(författare)
-
“Candidatus Ethanoperedens”, a Thermophilic Genus of Archaea Mediating the Anaerobic Oxidation of Ethane
- 2020
-
Ingår i: mBio. - 2161-2129 .- 2150-7511. ; 11:2
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Cold seeps and hydrothermal vents deliver large amounts of methane and other gaseous alkanes into marine surface sediments. Consortia of archaea and partner bacteria thrive on the oxidation of these alkanes and its coupling to sulfate reduction. The inherently slow growth of the involved organisms and the lack of pure cultures have impeded the understanding of the molecular mechanisms of archaeal alkane degradation. Here, using hydrothermal sediments of the Guaymas Basin (Gulf of California) and ethane as the substrate, we cultured microbial consortia of a novel anaerobic ethane oxidizer, “Candidatus Ethanoperedens thermophilum” (GoM-Arc1 clade), and its partner bacterium “Candidatus Desulfofervidus auxilii,” previously known from methane-oxidizing consortia. The sulfate reduction activity of the culture doubled within one week, indicating a much faster growth than in any other alkane-oxidizing archaea described before. The dominance of a single archaeal phylotype in this culture allowed retrieval of a closed genome of “Ca. Ethanoperedens,” a sister genus of the recently reported ethane oxidizer “Candidatus Argoarchaeum.” The metagenome-assembled genome of “Ca. Ethanoperedens” encoded a complete methanogenesis pathway including a methyl-coenzyme M reductase (MCR) that is highly divergent from those of methanogens and methanotrophs. Combined substrate and metabolite analysis showed ethane as the sole growth substrate and production of ethyl-coenzyme M as the activation product. Stable isotope probing demonstrated that the enzymatic mechanism of ethane oxidation in “Ca. Ethanoperedens” is fully reversible; thus, its enzymatic machinery has potential for the biotechnological development of microbial ethane production from carbon dioxide.IMPORTANCE In the seabed, gaseous alkanes are oxidized by syntrophic microbial consortia that thereby reduce fluxes of these compounds into the water column. Because of the immense quantities of seabed alkane fluxes, these consortia are key catalysts of the global carbon cycle. Due to their obligate syntrophic lifestyle, the physiology of alkane-degrading archaea remains poorly understood. We have now cultivated a thermophilic, relatively fast-growing ethane oxidizer in partnership with a sulfate-reducing bacterium known to aid in methane oxidation and have retrieved the first complete genome of a short-chain alkane-degrading archaeon. This will greatly enhance the understanding of nonmethane alkane activation by noncanonical methyl-coenzyme M reductase enzymes and provide insights into additional metabolic steps and the mechanisms underlying syntrophic partnerships. Ultimately, this knowledge could lead to the biotechnological development of alkanogenic microorganisms to support the carbon neutrality of industrial processes.
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| 5. |
- Haukeland, Jan Vider, et al.
(författare)
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Scandinavian National Parks moving from the mountain to the coast – is the management designed to handle the visitation pressure and the tourism industry interests?
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Proceedings for the International Congress on Coastal and Marine Tourism (CMT2017).
-
Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The focus in this paper is the management of nature-based tourism and outdoor recreation activities in coastal national parks in Norway, with Ytre Hvaler and Færder National Parks in Norway and Kosterhavet National Park in Sweden as case areas. National parks in the two countries have typically been localized in rural and remote alpine and forest regions, whereas coastal landscapes have been underrepresented. The research question we address is how well designed the coastal national park management system, with its jurisdiction, management regulations, management plans, professional competences, financial and staff resources at hand, etc., is to handle the large and diverse visitation pressure as well as various tourism industry interests. In 2009, the first coastal national park in Norway, Ytre Hvaler National Park, was established in southeastern Norway and in tandem with the launching of the neighboring coastal Kosterhavet National Park on the Swedish side of the national border. Færder National Park, a coastal national park localized on the western side of the outer Oslofjord, was inaugurated in 2013. The three national parks have a series of common features, as they comprise similar types of ragged coastal landscapes with archipelagos of islets and skerries, cultural and natural landscapes of high value, as well as unique marine ecosystems. The protected areas cover mostly marine territory and some relatively small terrestrial parts of the shoreline. Moreover, these attractive coastal environments, located in the proximity of Norway’s largest population centre, have since long been popular spaces for various forms of nature-based tourism and outdoor recreation activities such as boating, sun bathing, angling, camping, kayaking, windsurfing, scuba diving, etc. Many marinas, privately owned cabins, camping facilities, guesthouses, etc. also lead to a high and diverse visitation pressure in the protected areas. Our exploratory research is based on personal interviews with managers of the three national parks, conducted in October 2016, and analysis of relevant documents related to the National Park management. The qualitative data confirms that the national park management faces particular challenges in the coastal context connected to both the volume and the diversity of the visitation as well as accommodating tourism industry interests. The managers express that the inherited management regime originates from a period when there were mostly alpine national parks in the two countries. As a response to this deficiency, the coastal national park managers try to form professional networks amongst themselves and seek to learn from each other’s experiences and management practices.
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| 6. |
- Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen, et al.
(författare)
-
Context as knowledge
- 2022
-
Ingår i: Mind and language. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0268-1064 .- 1468-0017. ; 37:4, s. 543-563
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has been argued that common ground information is unsuited to the role that contexts play in the theory of indexical and demonstrative reference. This paper explores an alternative view that identifies shared information with what is common knowledge among the participants. We argue this view of shared information avoids the problems for the common ground approach concerning reference while preserving its advantages in accounting for communication.
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| 7. |
- Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen, et al.
(författare)
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Information centrism and the nature of contexts
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 94:2, s. 301-314
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Information Centrism is the view that contexts consist of information that can be characterized in terms of the propositional attitudes of the conversational participants. Furthermore, it claims that this notion of context is the only one needed for linguistic theorizing about context-sensitive languages. We argue that Information Centrism is false, since it cannot account correctly for facts about truth and reference in certain cases involving indexicals and demonstratives. Consequently, contexts cannot be construed simply as collections of shared information.
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| 8. |
- Kvistad, Silje Agnethe Stokke, et al.
(författare)
-
Impact of previous disease-modifying treatment on safety and efficacy in patients with MS treated with AHSCT
- 2022
-
Ingår i: Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry. - : BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. - 0022-3050 .- 1468-330X. ; 93:8, s. 844-848
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Background: Autologous haematopoietic stem cell transplantation (AHSCT) is a highly effective treatment for multiple sclerosis (MS). The impact of previous long-lasting disease-modifying treatments (DMT) for safety and efficacy of AHSCT is unknown.Objective: To explore whether previous DMTs with long-lasting effects on the immune system (anti-CD20 therapy, alemtuzumab and cladribine) affect treatment-related complications, long-term outcome and risk of new MS disease activity in patients treated with AHSCT.Methods: Retrospective observational study of 104 relapsing remitting patients with MS treated by AHSCT in Sweden and Norway from 2011 to 2021, grouped according to the last DMT used ≤6 months prior to AHSCT. The primary outcomes were early AHSCT-related complications (mortality, neutropenic fever and hospitalisation length), long-term complications (secondary autoimmunity) and proportion of patients with No Evidence of Disease Activity (NEDA-3 status): no new relapses, no MRI activity and no disease progression during the follow-up.Results: The mean follow-up time was 39.5 months (range 1-95). Neutropenic fever was a common AHSCT-related complication affecting 69 (66%) patients. There was no treatment-related mortality. During the follow-up period, 20 patients (19%) were diagnosed with autoimmunity. Occurrence of neutropenic fever, hospitalisation length or secondary autoimmunity did not vary dependent on the last DMT used prior to AHSCT. A total of 84 patients (81%) achieved NEDA-3 status, including all patients (100%) using rituximab, alemtuzumab or cladribine before AHSCT.Conclusion: This study provides level 4 evidence that AHSCT in patients previously treated with alemtuzumab, cladribine or rituximab is safe and efficacious.
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| 9. |
-
Lying : language, knowledge, ethics, and politics
- 2018
-
Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Philosophers have been thinking about lying for several thousand years, yet this topic has only recently become a central area of academic interest for philosophers of language, epistemologists, ethicists, and political philosophers. Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics provides the first dedicated collection of philosophical essays on the emerging topic of lying. Adopting an inter-subdisciplinary approach, this volume breaks new methodological ground in exploring the ways that a better understanding of language can inform the study of knowledge, ethics, or politics - and vice-versa. How can we lie when it is unclear what exactly we believe, or when we have contradictory beliefs? Can corporations lie, and if so how? Is lying always wrong, or always at least prima facie wrong? What can one learn from a liar? Can we lie to mindless machines? These engaging questions and many more are explored at length in this accessible reference text.
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| 10. |
- Michaelson, Eliot, et al.
(författare)
-
Introduction
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Lying. - : Oxford University Press. - 9780198743965 ; , s. 1-36
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This introductory chapter first offers a sketch of the history of philosophical thinking about lying and insincerity. It traces some of the themes in this literature in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, early modern casuists, David Hume, Thomas Reid, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, through to twentieth-century philosophy. The chapter highlights some of the issues discussed in the contemporary literature, as represented in this collection of essays. It then presents an overview of the essays included in this volume. Some comments on the connections between them are offered, as well as on their relation to the historical debate.
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| 11. |
- Schoubye, Anders J., et al.
(författare)
-
What is Said?
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Noûs. - : Wiley. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068. ; 50:4, s. 759-793
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning (what is said) using the notion of a question under discussion. This account (i) explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined (yet seem truth conditionally incomplete), (ii) provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences (in general) can come to have enriched meanings in context, and (iii) shows why various alternative views, e.g. so-called Radical Contextualism, Moderate Contextualism, and Semantic Minimalism, are partially right in their respective analyses of the problem, but also all ultimately wrong. Our analysis achieves this result using a standard truth conditional and compositional semantics and without making any assumptions about enriched logical forms, i.e. logical forms containing phonologically null expressions.
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| 12. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
And and And*
- 2013
-
Ingår i: Brevity. - Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780199664986 ; , s. 198-214
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 13. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Bullshitting
- 2019
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Ingår i: The Oxford handbook of lying. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780198736578 ; , s. 264-276
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 14. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Bullshitting
- 2018
-
Ingår i: The Oxford Handbook of Lying. - : Oxford University Press. - 9780198736578
-
Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This chapter provides an overview of reactions to Harry Frankfurt’s influential theory of bullshitting, addressing the four main features he ascribes to it, and considers some alternatives to Frankfurt’s account. Among others, issues raised by Thomas Carson and G. A. Cohen are examined in the discussion. A proposal to characterize bullshitting in terms of Gricean maxims is discussed, and it is argued that these views fail to capture the full range of cases. Here, works by Stokke and Don Fallis are cited. An alternative view that analyzes bullshitting in terms of the speaker’s attitudes toward the communal project of inquiry is canvassed, and the chapter ends by discussing the relation between bullshitting and lying.
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| 15. |
- Stokke, Andreas, et al.
(författare)
-
Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference Toward Truth
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Ergo. - : MICHIGAN PUBLISHING. - 2330-4014. ; 4, s. 277-309
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper is about some of the ways in which people sometimes speak while being indifferent toward what they say. We argue that what Harry Frankfurt called 'bullshitting' is a mode of speech marked by indifference toward inquiry, the cooperative project of reaching truth in discourse. On this view bullshitting is characterized by indifference toward the project of advancing inquiry by making progress on specific subinquiries, represented by so-called questions under discussion. This account preserves the central insight of Frankfurt's influential analysis of bullshitting in seeing the characteristic of bullshitting as indifference toward truth and falsity. Yet we show that speaking with indifference toward truth is a wider phenomenon than the one Frankfurt identified. The account offered in this paper thereby agrees with various critics of Frankfurt who argue that bullshitting is compatible with not being indifferent toward the truth-value of one's assertions. Further, we argue that, while bullshitting and lying are not mutually exclusive, most lies are not instances of bullshitting. The account thereby avoids the problem that Frankfurt's view ultimately is insufficient to adequately distinguish bullshitting and lying.
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| 16. |
- Stokke, Andreas, et al.
(författare)
-
Context as Knowledge
-
Ingår i: Mind and language. - 0268-1064 .- 1468-0017.
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 17. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Conventional Implicature, Presupposition, and Lying
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). ; 91, s. 127-147
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Introduction. Most philosophers agree that lies are assertions.1 In particular, most agree that you lie only if you assert something you believe to be false.2 You can avoid lying if you can avoid asserting disbelieved information. A well-known strategy of cunning disingenuousness is to mislead by asserting something one believes to be true and thereby convey something one believes to be false.Thinking about the nature of lying, and in particular the important relation between lying and other ways of deceiving with language, therefore involves thinking about what can be asserted by particular utterances.3 In ‘Lucifer’s Logic Lesson: How to Lie with Arguments’, Roy Sorensen tries to expand the canvas by drawing attention to a species of information that is conveyed by a variety of utterances, but which has received relatively little attention in the philosophy of language. This is the category of conventional implicature. Sorensen notes that conventional implicatures are typically thought to be assertions, as opposed to conversational implicatures, one of the chief characteristics of which is that they are not asserted. While conversational implicatures provide the default strategy for misleading while avoiding lying, Sorensen suggests that conventional implicatures will be lies in the right circumstances.Sorensen is interested in a particular type of construction, namely, the construction P therefore Q. He argues that therefore contributes a conventional implicature to such utterances, and that if what is conventionally implicated is believed to be false by the speaker, she is lying.Five interrelated claims can be distilled from Sorensen’s (2017) discussion:(s1) You lie only if you make an assertion (p. 106).(s2) Conventional implicatures are assertions (p. 110).(s3) You can lie with conventional implicatures (p. 107).(s4) P therefore Q conventionally implicates that P implies Q (p. 106).4(s5) You can lie with P therefore Q (even if you believe P and believe Q) (p. 105).My plan is as follows. In §ii, I will comment on (s1) and (s2). §§iii–v will be concerned with (s4) and (s5). Finally, §vi will turn to (s3). We will see that there is reason to agree with (s1)–(s3) while disagreeing with (s4)–(s5). In other words, there is reason to agree that conventional implicatures are asserted, and therefore you can lie with conventional implicatures. But I think the case Sorensen focuses on, that of therefore, is ill-chosen. We will see that the evidence suggests that therefore is a presupposition trigger, rather than a conventional implicature trigger. This means that the implication relation conveyed by P therefore Q is presupposed, and not asserted, by utterances of such constructions. Hence, since I agree with (s1), I will reject (s5). I think the relevant examples are not outright lies, although they may be misleading.
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| 18. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
De Se Thinking and Modes of Presentation
- 2022
-
Ingår i: Belgrade Philosophical Annual. - : Centre for Evaluation in Education and Science (CEON/CEES). - 0353-3891 .- 2956-0357. ; 35:2, s. 69-87
-
Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- De se thoughts have traditionally been seen to be exceptional in mandating a departure from orthodox theories of attitudes. Against this, skeptics about the de se have argued that the de se phenomena demand no more of our theories of attitudes than traditional Frege cases. In this camp one view is that the de se can be accounted for by MOPs in the same way that MOPs can account for how it can be rational to believe, for instance, "Hesperus is shining" while also believing "Phosphorus is shining." This paper formulates some minimal conditions that de se MOPs must have in order to explain the relevant de se phenomena. Some potential replies are answered. I conclude that de se MOPs are not exceptional.
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| 19. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Fabrication and Testimony
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Lying. - : Oxford University Press. - 9780198743965
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This chapter is concerned with the question, what are the conditions under which insincerity blocks testimonial knowledge and what are the conditions under which testimonial knowledge may be acquired in the face of insincere testimony? The chapter argues that when insincerity blocks testimonial knowledge, the insincerity involved is a kind of unreliability. In particular, insincere testimony—in particular, lying—is seen to involve fabrication, that is, making something up. It is argued that acquiring testimonial knowledge requires that the testimony be given on a reliable basis. Yet fabrication is not a reliable basis for testimony, and hence this explains why lying testimony typically does not yield testimonial knowledge. By contrast, the chapter shows that, in cases where listeners acquire testimonial knowledge from insincere testifiers, the testimony is given on a reliable basis.
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| 20. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Features of Referential Pronouns and Indexical Presuppositions
- 2022
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Ingår i: Inquiry. - 0020-174X .- 1502-3923. ; 65:8, s. 1083-1115
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper demonstrates that the presuppositions triggered by the 1st and 2nd persons behave differently in important ways from those triggered by the 3rd person and the genders. While the 1st and 2nd persons trigger indexical presuppositions, the 3rd person and the genders do not. I show that the presuppositions triggered by the 1st and 2nd persons are not susceptible to presupposition failure of the kind familiar from ordinary presuppositions. Such failures occur for the 3rd person and the genders. Moreover, the presuppositions triggered by the 1st and 2nd persons do not exhibit the projection behavior of ordinary presuppositions. The 3rd person and the genders do. I sketch a semantics in which the relevant difference is between presuppositions that impose constraints on functions from contexts to intensions (characters) and presuppositions that impose constraints on intensions.
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| 21. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Fiction and Importation
- 2022
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Ingår i: Linguistics and Philosophy. - : Springer Nature. - 0165-0157 .- 1573-0549. ; 45:1, s. 65-89
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Importation in fictional discourse is the phenomenon by which audiences include information in the story over and above what is explicitly stated by the narrator. This paper argues that importation is distinct from generation, the phenomenon by which truth in fiction may outstrip what is made explicit, and draws a distinction between fictional truth and fictional records. The latter comprises the audience’s picture of what is true according to the narrator. The paper argues that importation into fictional records operates according to principles that also govern ordinary conversation. An account of fictional records as a species of common ground information is proposed. Two sources of importation are described in detail, presupposition accommodation and conversational implicatures. It is shown that presuppositions are both mandatorily imported and mandatorily generated. By contrast, conversational implicatures are neither mandatorily imported nor mandatorily generated. The paper distinguishes conversational implicatures from contextual inferences. Both rely on background assumptions, yet conversational implicatures moreover depend on assumptions concerning Gricean cooperation.
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| 22. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Fictional force
- 2023
-
Ingår i: Philosophical Studies. - : Springer Nature. - 0031-8116 .- 1573-0883. ; 180:10-11, s. 3099-3120
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper argues for an account of fictional force, the central characteristic of the kind of non-assertoric speech act that authors of fictions are engaged in. A distinction is drawn between what is true in a fiction and the fictional record comprising what the audience has been told. The papers argues that to utter a sentence with fictional force is to intend that its content be added to a fictional record. It is shown that this view accounts for phenomena such as conversational implicatures in fictional discourse. Moreover, the view is seen to provide an attractive way of distinguishing fictional utterances from assertoric utterances. As a consequence, this account of fictional force offers a satisfactory way of distinguishing fiction from lying.
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| 23. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Fictional Names and Co-Identification
- 2023
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Ingår i: PHILOSOPHERS IMPRINT. - : Michigan Publishing. - 1533-628X. ; 23:19, s. 1-23
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 24. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Fictional Names and Individual Concepts
- 2021
-
Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer Nature. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 198:8, s. 7829-7859
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper defends a version of the realist view that fictional characters exist. It argues for an instance of abstract realist views, according to which fictional characters are roles, constituted by sets of properties. It is argued that fictional names denote individual concepts, functions from worlds to individuals. It is shown that a dynamic framework for understanding the evolution of discourse information can be used to understand how roles are created and develop along with story content. Taking fictional names to denote individual concepts provides accounts of a number of uses of fictional names. These include non-fictional uses, fictional uses, metafictional uses, interfictional uses, counterfictional uses, and negative existentials. It is argued that this account is not open to objections that have been raised in the literature.
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| 25. |
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| 26. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Free Indirect Discourse in Non-Fiction
- 2021
-
Ingår i: Frontiers in Communication. - : Frontiers Media S.A.. - 2297-900X. ; 6
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper considers some uses of Free Indirect Discourse within non-fictional discourse. It is shown that these differ from ordinary uses in that they do not attribute actual thoughts or utterances. I argue that the explanation for this is that these uses of Free Indirect Discourse are not assertoric. Instead, it is argued here that they are fictional uses, that is, they are used with fictional force like utterances used to tell a fictional story. Rather than making assertions about the actual world, these occurrences of Free Indirect Discourse introduce localized fictional scenarios from which audiences are meant to learn factual information. As such, they exhibit some of the ways in which the involvement of perspective in historical fiction has been shown to facilitate learning and retention of information.
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| 27. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Insincere Testimony
-
Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 28. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Insincerity
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Noûs. - : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068.
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper argues for an account of insincerity in speech according to which an utterance is insincere if and only if it communicates something that does not correspond to the speaker's conscious attitudes. Two main topics are addressed: the relation between insincerity and the saying-meaning distinction, and the mental attitude underlying insincere speech. The account is applied to both assertoric and non-assertoric utterances of declarative sentences, and to utterances of non-declarative sentences. It is shown how the account gives the right results for a range of cases.
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| 29. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Insincerity
- 2014
-
Ingår i: Noûs. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068. ; 48:3, s. 496-520
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 30. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Intention-sensitive semantics
- 2010
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Ingår i: Synthese. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 175:3, s. 383-404
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 31. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Lies, Harm, and Practical Interests
- 2019
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Ingår i: Philosophy and phenomenological research. - : Wiley. - 0031-8205 .- 1933-1592. ; 98:2, s. 329-345
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper outlines an account of the ethics of lying, which accommodates two main ideas about lying. The first of these, Anti‐Deceptionalism, is the view that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive. The second, Anti‐Absolutism, is the view that lying is not always morally wrong. It is argued that lying is not wrong in itself, but rather the wrong in lying is explained by different factors in different cases. In some cases such factors may include deceptive intentions on the part of the liar. In other cases, where such intentions are not found, the wrong in lying may be explained by other factors. Moreover, it is argued that the interaction between considerations against lying and considerations against telling the truth are sensitive to the practical interests of those lied to. When the topic of the lie in question matters little to the victim's rational decision making, the threshold for when considerations against telling the truth can outweigh considerations against lying are lowered. This account is seen to explain why lying to avoid little harm is sometimes permissible, and sometimes not.
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| 32. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Lying and asserting
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Philosophy. - 0022-362X .- 1939-8549. ; 110:1, s. 33-60
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 33. |
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| 34. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Lying and Misleading in Discourse
- 2016
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Ingår i: Philosophical Review. - : Cornell University Press. - 0031-8108 .- 1558-1470. ; 125:1, s. 83-134
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 35. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Lying and Misleading in Discourse
- 2016
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Ingår i: Philosophical Review. ; 125:1, s. 83-134
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying issensitive to discourse structure. It is shown that whether an utterance is a lie or is merelymisleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-calledquestions under discussion. It is argued that to mislead is to disrupt the pursuit of thegoal of inquiry, i.e., to discover how things are. Lying is seen as a special case requiringassertion of disbelieved information, where assertion is characterized as a mode of con-tributing information to a discourse that is sensitive to the state of the discourse itself.The resulting account is applied to a number of ways of exploiting the lying-misleadingdistinction, involving conversational implicature, incompleteness, presuppositions, andprosodic focus. It is shown that assertion, and hence lying, is preserved from subques-tion to superquestion under a strict entailment relation between questions, and ways oflying and misleading in relation to multiple questions are discussed
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| 36. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Lying, deceiving, and misleading
- 2013
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Ingår i: Philosophy Compass. - : Wiley. - 1747-9991. ; 8:4, s. 348-359
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 37. |
- Stokke, Andreas, et al.
(författare)
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Lying, Deception, and Epistemic Advantage
- 2020
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Ingår i: The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language. - : Routledge.
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 38. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Lying, sincerity, and quality
- 2019
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Ingår i: The Oxford handbook of lying. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780198736578 ; , s. 134-148
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 39. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
-
Lying, Sincerity, and Quality
- 2018
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Ingår i: The Oxford Handbook of Lying. - : Oxford University Press. - 9780198736578
-
Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This chapter considers various ways of theorizing about lying from the point of view of Gricean Quality maxims. It first discusses attempts to characterize lying as a violation of the First Maxim of Quality and then turns to views of lying in terms of the supermaxim of Quality. The chapter suggests that both these types of view on lying give the wrong results on non-deceptive lies, the difference between lies and ironic statements, and the difference between lying and misleading. The chapter finishes by considering the view that lies are insincere assertion in relation to the Gricean view that Quality maxims have a special status in relation to the other maxims and the Cooperative Principle.
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| 40. |
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| 41. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Metaphors and Martinis : a response to Jessica Keiser
- 2017
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Ingår i: Philosophical Studies. - : SPRINGER. - 0031-8116 .- 1573-0883. ; 174:4, s. 853-859
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both these claims are false.
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| 42. |
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| 43. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Navigation and Indexical Thought
- 2022
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Ingår i: Erkenntnis. - : Springer. - 0165-0106 .- 1572-8420. ; 87
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper argues for a moderate form of essentialism about indexical thought (also known as de se, first-person, or egocentric thought). According to this moderate essentialism, there is a significant category of intentional action that necessarily involves indexical thought. This category of action is navigation, that is, intentionally moving from one location to another by using public information about the world such as a map or a set of directions. It is shown that anti-essentialists face a challenge in accounting for this kind of action without accepting the involvement of indexical thought or something equivalent. The conclusion that navigation necessarily requires indexical thought is neutral on the strong essentialist claim that there is a special class of indexical propositional attitudes that mandate rejecting standard theories of propositional attitudes. The conclusion is also neutral on the strong essentialist claim that any kind of intentional action necessarily requires indexical thought.
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| 44. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Paternalistic Lying and Deception
- 2018
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Ingår i: The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism. - : Routledge. - 9781138956100
-
Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 45. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Proposing, Pretending, and Propriety : A Response to Don Fallis
- 2017
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 95:1, s. 178-183
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This note responds to criticism put forth by Don Fallis of an account of lying in terms of the Stalnakerian view of assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Fallis objects by presenting an example to show that one can lie even though one does not propose to make what one says common ground. It is argued here that this objection does not present a problem for the view of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. Responding to the objection brings out important features of this view of discourse and of assertion.
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| 46. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Protagonist projection
- 2013
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Ingår i: Mind and language. - : Wiley. - 0268-1064 .- 1468-0017. ; 28:2, s. 204-232
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 47. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Protagonist Projection, Character Focus, and Mixed Quotation
- 2021
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Ingår i: The Language of Fiction. - Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780191881534 - 9780198846376 ; , s. 379-404
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This chapter compares two kinds of perspective-shifting language. The first is so-called “protagonist projection” (Holton 1997; Stokke 2013). The second phenomenon is sometimes known as “character focus.” The chapter argues that both protagonist projection and character focus should be analyzed as forms of mixed quotation. Drawing on the work of Potts (2007) and Maier (2014, 2015), mixed quotation is seen as interacting with two dimensions of interpretation, one corresponding to the use component of mixed quotation, the other corresponding to the mention component. It proposes that the mention component of mixed quotation can be interpreted modally. As a result, protagonist projection and character focus can be seen to have the same semantics, while they differ pragmatically. In particular, while protagonist projection pragmatically conveys attributions of beliefs, character focus does not.
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| 48. |
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| 49. |
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| 50. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Truth and Context Change
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Philosophical Logic. - : Springer Netherlands. - 0022-3611 .- 1573-0433. ; 43:1, s. 33-51
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Some dynamic semantic theories include an attempt to derive truth-conditional meaning from context change potential. This implies defining truth in terms of context change. Focusing on presuppositions and epistemic modals, this paper points out some problems with how this project has been carried out. It then suggests a way of overcoming these problems. This involves appealing to a richer notion of context than the one found in standard dynamic systems.
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