| 11. |
- Alem, Yonas, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Decision-making within the household: The role of division of labor and differences in preferences
- 2023
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 207, s. 511-528
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We use a field experiment to identify how differences in preferences and spousal influence result in low willingness to pay (WTP) for technologies that can benefit all household members. We create income-earning opportunities to empower households and conduct an actual stove purchase experiment to elicit their WTP for fuel, time, and indoor air pollution-reducing improved cookstoves. The decision to buy the stove was randomly assigned to either wives, husbands, or couples using either individually or jointly earned income. Experimental results suggest that wives, who often are responsible for cooking and collecting fuelwood, are willing to pay 57% more than husbands and 39% more than couples. Wives who made the stove purchase decision alone using the income they earned alone are willing to pay 67% more than husbands who made the purchase decision alone. We also find that couples’ WTP is similar to that of husbands, implying that husbands dominate joint decisions. A follow-up survey conducted 15 months after the stove purchase shows that the treatments do not affect stove use. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the division of labor, preference difference, and spousal influence within the household when promoting the adoption of new household technologies. Improving access to cash for poor women would likely enable them to make decisions consistent with their preferences.
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| 12. |
- Alem, Yonas, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Why (field) experiments on unethical behavior are important: Comparing stated and revealed behavior
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 156, s. 71-85
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Understanding unethical behavior is essential to many phenomena in the real world. We carry out a field experiment in a unique setting that varies the levels of reciprocity and guilt in an ethical decision. A survey more than one year before the field experiment allows us to compare at the individual level stated unethical behavior with revealed behavior in the same situation in the field. Our results indicate a strong discrepancy between stated and revealed behavior, regardless of the specific treatment in the field experiment. This suggests that, given a natural setting, people may actually behave inconsistently with the way in which they otherwise "brand" themselves. Our findings raise caution about the interpretation of stated behavioral measures commonly used in research on unethical behavior. In addition, we show that inducing reciprocity and guilt leads to a decrease in unethical behavior. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 13. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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How Much Do We Care About Absolute versus Relative Income and Consumption?
- 2005
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 56, s. 405-421
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We find, using survey-experimental methods, that most individuals are concerned with both relative income and relative consumption of particular goods. The degree of concern varies in the expected direction depending on the properties of the good. However, contrary to what has been suggested in the previous literature, we find that relative consumption is also important for vacation and insurance, which are typically seen as non-positional goods. Further, absolute consumption is also found to be important for cars and housing, which are widely regarded as highly positional. © 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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| 14. |
- Andersson, Claes, 1973
(författare)
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Splitting the replicator: generalized Darwinism and the place of culture in Nature
- 2011
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 80:3, s. 657-669
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The concept of Replication has been turned around, moved about and hammered upon in search for a good fit in the puzzle of Generalized Darwinism for a long time. The present paper represents a different take on the formulation of a Generalized Darwinism and on Replication. Replication in evolutionary biology is argued to combine two functions: (i) the production of propositions (Synthesis) and (ii) the retention of propositions over time (Memory). By insisting on universally grouping these two functions together the Replicator–Interactor (RI) framework is here argued to suffer from a fundamental ontological mismatch that no amount of bending and stretching of the concept can avoid. When we allow different packaging of Interaction, Synthesis and Memory (ISM) for different systems, we produce much less empirical friction. Replication then emerges as an important special case, but where replication is not the right model, the ISM model brings a range of issues into the open that remain hidden from an RI viewpoint. Also, when we reserve replication for the cases where it really fits we retain the strong theoretical power and empirical relevance by which it gained its fame in evolutionary biology.
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| 15. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 81:1, s. 207-219
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.
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| 16. |
- Angelova, Vera, et al.
(författare)
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Competition and fatigue
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 198, s. 236-249
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study how subjects deal with fatigue in a sequence of tournaments that are linked through fatigue spillovers. We develop a model that allows us to predict the consequences of varying the severity of competition as well as the ease of recovery over time. Even in the presence of fatigue, effort should positively respond to an increase in incentives in a single tournament. A less obvious consequence is the need for strategic resting before and after that tournament. We test our theory using a chosen-effort experiment. While an increase in incentives in the second of three tournaments does lead to higher effort in that tournament, we observe only a tendency for the predicted strategic resting before and after. The increase in incentives does not yield the predicted higher total effort. When recovery is made harder, effort responds negatively as predicted. We complement our study with a real-effort task. Subjects seem to have difficulties simultaneously dealing with physical fatigue as well as the cognitive problem of allocating effort over time.
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| 17. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Positional preferences in time and space: Optimal income taxation with dynamic social comparisons
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 101, s. 1-23
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper concerns optimal redistributive non-linear income taxation in an OLG model, where people care about their own consumption relative to (i) other people's current consumption, (ii) own past consumption, and (iii) other people's past consumption. We show that both (i) and (iii) affect the marginal income tax structure whereas (ii) does not. We also derive conditions under which atemporal and intertemporal consumption comparisons give rise to exactly the same tax policy responses. On the basis of the available empirical estimates, comparisons with other people's current and past consumption tend to substantially increase the optimal marginal labor income tax rates. Yet, such comparisons may either increase or decrease the optimal marginal capital income tax rates. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. EL AB, 1990, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW102 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC
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| 18. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Relative consumption of housing : marginal saving subsidies and income taxes as a second-best policy?
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 116, s. 439-450
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper analyzes whether marginal taxation of labor and capital income are useful second best instruments for internalizing the externalities caused by conspicuous housing consumption, when the government is unable to implement a first best corrective tax on housing wealth. The rationale for studying income taxation in this particular context is that first best taxes on housing wealth may be infeasible (at least in a shorter time perspective), while income taxes indirectly affect both the level and composition of accumulated wealth. We show that a suboptimally low tax on housing wealth provides an incentive for the government to subsidize financial saving and tax labor income at the margin.
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| 19. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Tax policy and present-biased preferences : paternalism under international capital mobility
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 106:October, s. 298-316
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper deals with tax-policy responses to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Earlier research on optimal paternalism typically abstracts from capital mobility. If capital is mobile between countries, it may no longer be possible for national governments to control domestic savings via capital taxation (as in a closed economy). In this paper, we take a broad perspective on public policy responses to self-control problems by showing how these responses vary (i) between closed and open economies, (ii) between small open and large open economies, and (iii) depending on whether or not both source based and residence based capital taxes can be used.
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| 20. |
- Arvaniti, Maria, et al.
(författare)
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Temptation in consumption and optimal taxation
- 2023
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 205, s. 687-707
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article aims to integrate temptation preferences into the theory of optimal taxation with heterogenous agents and asymmetric information. Consumers are tempted to over-consume a commodity which may lead to an over-supply of labor. Resisting this temptation implies a utility cost and any policy that reduces this cost is welfare improving. We uncover novel channels for government intervention and the interaction between the welfare improving and redistributive roles of public policy. We also identify a commitment mechanism that works through the endogenous labor choice and affects the design and effectiveness of the optimal tax policy.
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