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- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Investeringsbedömning och modern finansiell teori
- 2020
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- I boken behandlas utförligt traditionell investeringskalkylering och relaterade räntebaserade metoder och tekniker för att avgöra investeringsars lönsamhet inför investgeringsbeslut. Under devisen att investering och finansiering utgör olika sidor av samma mynt redogörs även för betydelsen av investeringars finansiering. Bokens läsare ges en gedigen grund för att förstå det finansiella systemets roll och hur investeringars värdeskapande är sammanlänkat med finansieringen. I boken demonstreras också hur kassaflödesmodeller kan tillämpas vid företagsvärdering inför beslut om att investera i enstaka aktieposter eller uppköp av hela företag. Här uppmärksammas även värdering av immateriella tillgångar, såsom patent och nya idéer.
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| 2. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Investeringsbedömning och modern finansiell teori - övningsbok med lösningar
- 2023
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Den här övningsboken kompletterar läroboken Investeringsbedömning och modern finansiell teori med såväl grundläggande som mer avancerade övningsuppgifter med utförliga lösningsförslag. Boken innehåller även lösningsförslag till övningsuppgifter i läroboken. Övningsboken innehåller över 140 övningsuppgifter och följer lärobokens struktur.
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| 3. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Modelling banks’ lending and deposits using the aggregate equilibrium approach
- 2023
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Ingår i: 2023 Wolpertinger Annual Conference, August 31th - September 3rd, Finland, University of Vaasa.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We use the aggregate equilibrium approach (AEA) framework to demonstrate how different degrees of bank competition on lending and deposits markets affect market efficiency, bank profitability, and social welfare. We explain why an interbank market among banks with different costs for producing loans and deposits improves the efficiency of financial intermediation. Banks with imbalances in their loans could benefit by borrowing from banks with surplus of deposits. In the presence of an interbank market for lending and deposits, we show that banks’ aggregate profits increase without affecting the surplus of banks’ customers.
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| 4. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Technology Transfers, Efficiency Gains and Surplus Thresholds:An Aggregate Equilibrium Approach Analysis
- 2023
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Ingår i: World Finance Conference, Norway August 2nd-4th 2023, University of Agder.
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- We illustrate how an aggregate equilibrium approach can be applied to analyze the efficiency gains and social welfare effects of transfers of sufficiently large, but nondrastic, technological innovations among firms in an industry characterized by diseconomies of scale. In particular, we demonstrate how the approach can be used to identify a range of intermediate cost differences between firms where technology transfer through collusion will be optimal for competing firms and the society, including thresholds for when consumers will be indifferent to whether firms in an industry compete or collude. In addition, we discuss how a per-unit royalty license fee, which is partly paid upfront for a minimum required quantity, can be used by the licensor to restrict the quantity output of the licensee(s), and ensure the stability of collusion. We suggest that this licensing contract, which has implications for policymakers and practitioners, may explain why technology transfers often occur in highly technological industries among otherwise competing firms with market power.
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| 5. |
- Mallios, Aineas, 1988, et al.
(författare)
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The Relation Between Patent Pledgeability and Credit Rationing
- 2023
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Ingår i: Carbó-Valverde, S., Cuadros-Solas, P.J. (eds) New Challenges for the Banking Industry - Searching for Balance Between Corporate Governance, Sustainability and Innovation. - : Palgrave Macmillan Cham. - 2523-336X .- 2523-3378. - 9783031329302
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze the economic issue raised when financial intermediaries refuse to supply credit to a borrower even at a higher rate than that posted by lenders. We suggest that patent-backed loans can be used as a contracting device to reduce credit rationing in loan markets characterized by imperfect information. Patents have become among the most valuable assets of firms in high-technology industries. They determine the production of goods and contain information about the firms’ credit quality. Patents can also be used by banks to screen borrowers. We provide a theoretical foundation showing that patents used as collateral may reduce the level of information asymmetry in loan markets and facilitate also bank lending. Using a setup of financial intermediation with capital constrained entities and imperfect information, we suggest that patent pledging can be used to minimize credit rationing. This may lead to more investment in innovation and more growth
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| 6. |
- Elliot, Viktor, et al.
(författare)
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Anti-Money Laundering Regulation and Supply Chain Trade Finance
- 2020
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Ingår i: International Trade Law & Regulation. - 1357-3136. ; 26:4, s. 246-261
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- New, and stricter, Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regulations are under progress. This article discusses potential unintended consequences for supply chain trade finance. We elaborate on how banks in the Nordic region have adapted in light of the recent AML scandals and the new regulatory regime.
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| 7. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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A Theoretical Analysis of Collusion Involving Technology Licensing Under Diseconomies of Scale
- 2024
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Ingår i: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. - 1935-1704. ; 24:1, s. 263-297
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study focuses on firms with cost-efficient technology that use licensing to influence product market behaviour, market prices and outputs and the resulting welfare effects. We show how licensing fees can be constructed that lead to identical collective industry outputs as under collusion while industry output is equal to or higher than that achieved under competition and sustained in equilibrium. Hence, consumers are either indifferent to firms’ collusion or better off when they do collude, whereas firms (producers) are always better off due to the improved cost efficiency of integrating the new production technology. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why technology licensing is observed in highly concentrated industries characterised by significant diseconomies of scale relative to demand. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating how technology licensing involving collusion can reduce the dissipation effect and improve social welfare in oligopolistic industries. An important policy implication is that collusion involving technology licensing should not always be challenged by antitrust authorities, particularly when it does not transfer welfare from consumers to producers.
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