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- Martinson, Claes, 1964
(författare)
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Allt går inte att reglera
- 2010
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Ingår i: GU Journalen. ; 2010:1-10
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 5. |
- Martinson, Claes, 1964, et al.
(författare)
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Functional and Unitary Approach to Transfer of Ownership – Can We Grow Together?
- 2010
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Ingår i: Presentation at seminar in Uppsala Law Faculty, 17 May 2010 - powerpoint.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The Europeanisation of private law can be described from the example of transfer of ownership. In this presentation there are two principal approaches to transfer of ownership. Even though this will at the same time seem to be two different approaches to private law as such, we will continue with the question if we can grow together? With “grow together” we mean either assimilation or enhancement, or both. We start with some general remarks and experiences on this topic. Against this background we continue with a few examples/ that we find interesting since they illustrate how this growth could take place, or not take place. Out of these examples we make a few constructive proposals: a) Use a dual approach to deal with problems on the common level! – How an unclear question of law within a common system could be dealt with through a dual approach. Use the other as a contrast to reach the full potential of the own! Use the other as a contrast to add and improve arguments!
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| 6. |
- Martinson, Claes, 1964, et al.
(författare)
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How do Intellectual property law regimes within the EU affect innovation activity?
- 2013
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Ingår i: Europeisk integration i svensk ekonomisk forskning. 21-24 maj 2013, Mölle.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper examines the relationship between patent law regimes and innovation activity. We use an index of patent strength developed by Ginarte & Park (1997) and regress this against two proxies for innovation activity: patent applications and patent grants. We control for legal origin, and conduct partial analyses for EU and non-EU countries. We find that the patent strength has an inversed U-shaped relation with innovation activity. We observe that this inversed U-shaped relation is stronger for abroad patent applications than domestic innovation activity. We observe the opposite effect within the EU countries sample. The relation between the patent strength and the innovation activity is U-shaped. We observe also that this relation is driven by the abroad patent applications. Our conclusions are that patent regimes seem to be more effectual on attracting abroad innovations and that integration, common agreement and strong patent law within the EU countries induce innovators to apply for abroad patents. We obtain similar results in our robustness analyses when we use patent grants as proxy for the innovation activity and re-run our regressions.
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| 7. |
- Martinson, Claes, 1964
(författare)
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Intellectual Property (with or) without Property
- 2012
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Ingår i: Presentation at seminar at Bond University, Gold Coast, Queensland, 16 March 2012.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Concerning intellectual property there is a need to switch perspectives depending on the issues we deal with. The issues are to be found in the area where IP-law and Property law overlap. For these issues the way to go is not to discard property, but to deal with the fact that IP has its own characteristics. Intellectual Resources and Intellectual Property are so different from property in many ways that an analysis needs to consider the differences. It is relevant to suggest an analysis where the thought of objects or transfers of objects on this market is taken lightly. In this analysis we see just relations and agreements between actors on the market. Through their agreements they divide the market itself. The IPR:s gives the actors different positions to act on the market. Through contracts on IPR the actors divide the positions of power to act on the market and prevent others from acting on this market. In other words, there are no transfers of property on this market! What is allocated is instead the positions to act and to prevent others from acting. It is on other words a market allocation of the power over competition! The purpose is not to criticise the IPR:s. It is not either to criticise that IPR:s and IR:s can be allocated through a market. It is just to hold that this view should be one of the perspectives to use when we deal with some of the conflicts, namely the four colliding transactions and the fifth issue of common good. This perspective is needed to design the regulation of the market.
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| 9. |
- Martinson, Claes, 1964
(författare)
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Lån i Telefon - dags att hantera vad vi har?
- 2010
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Ingår i: Svensk Juristtidning. ; 2010:3, s. 245-250
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Nya fenomen ställer ibland till svårigheter i rättstillämpningen. I fallet SMS-lån beror svårigheterna på att några av de rättsfrågor som aktualiseras är ideologiskt impregnerade samtidigt som delar av lagtexten är gammal. För att kunna hantera sådana frågor behövs metoder som kan användas trots dessa svårigheter. I denna artikel föreslås därför en konstruktiv analys för att hantera rättsfrågorna kring SMS-lån, ocker och oskälighet.
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| 10. |
- Martinson, Claes, 1964
(författare)
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Market for Ideas – A lawyers perspective : Intellectual Resources and Property Law – The Need for Constructive Thoughts on How to Solve Some Conflicts Around IPR-transactions
- 2012
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Ingår i: Conference presentation on the Market for Ideas conference, New Dehli, 2012 - powerpoint.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The value of intellectual resources depends on how they are regulated. To simplify trade and transactions it is common to regulate intellectual resources in terms of property. The evident advantage of this is that it enables trade and transactions. Thereby the resources can be allocated through the market. It is however not unproblematic to turn intellectual resources into property. The property concept entails many conceptions that are consequential to how the concept is used in all the different contexts that it is used. One category of such consequential conceptions concerns how conflicts concerning colliding transactions are dealt with. Property law deals with such problems as double sales, the acquirer’s priority in bankruptcy, the financier’s security interest, etc. The solutions of these conflicts have been constructed for objects with other characteristics than intellectual resources. They are therefore not well suited to handle the same kind of conflicts concerning intellectual resources. Since the property concept has a strong influence over the mind it is however hard to avoid that also the conflicts concerning intellectual resources will be dealt with as if they are property with more or less the same kind of characteristics like property usually have. My thesis is that it is necessary to switch between perspectives when dealing with intellectual resources. In some situations it has advantages to speak of intellectual resources in terms of property. When it comes to colliding transactions it is however important to treat intellectual resources from their own characteristics. The intellectual property rights are in reality just a way of regulating some aspects of who should be able to do what on the market. This fact needs to be considered when constructing solutions to the problems of colliding transactions. It could be noted that the idea to switch between perspectives in some ways follows the tradition of legal thought in Scandinavia. It can be useful to analyse the Market for Ideas from the perspective that there are transactions of objects on this market. What is allocated is instead the positions to act and to prevent others from acting. The perspective can be useful when trying to see possibilities for solutions to conflicts between interests connected to the contracts made on this market. These remarks can be useful when dealing with such traditional aspects as efficient allocation and market failure. There are connections to why the market does not work as other markets. If the allocation concerns not objects but positions to act and prevent others from acting, it becomes evident that there are alternatives to buying.
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