| 1. |
- Stevens, DR, et al.
(författare)
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Cycloheximide resistance conferred by novel mutations in ribosomal protein L41 of Chlamydomonas reinhardtii
- 2001
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Ingår i: Molecular General Genetics. - Berlin : Springer-Verlag. - 0026-8925 .- 1432-1874. ; 264:6, s. 790-795
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Although most eukaryotic cells are sensitive to the 80S ribosome inhibitor cycloheximide (CYH), naturally occurring CYH resistance is widespread amongst yeast species. The primary determinant of resistance appears to be a single residue within ribosomal protein L41; resistance is acquired by the substitution of a conserved proline (P-56) by a glutamate residue. We have isolated the L41 gene (RPL41) from the green alga Chlamydomonas and investigated the molecular basis of CYH resistance in various mutant strains. In both the wild-type strain and the mutant act-1, a proline is found at the key position in L41.; However, analysis of six independently isolated act-2 mutants reveals that all have point mutations that replace the proline with either leucine or serine. Of the two changes, the leucine mutation confers significantly higher levels of CYH resistance. This work identifies the ACT-2 locus as RPL41 and provides a possible dominant marker for nuclear transformation of C. reinhardtii.
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| 2. |
- Voorneveld, Mark, et al.
(författare)
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Cost allocations in Shortest Path games
- 2002
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Ingår i: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. - Springer : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1432-2994 .- 1432-5217. ; 56, s. 323-340
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A class of cooperative games arising from shortest path problems is defined. These shortest path games are totally balanced and allow a population-monotonic allocation scheme. Possible methods for obtaining core elements are indicated; first, by relating to the allocation rules in taxation and bankruptcy problems, second, by constructing an explicit rule that takes opportunity costs into account by considering the costs of the second best alternative and that rewards players who are crucial to the construction of the shortest path. The core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell are shown to coincide. Finally, noncooperative games arising from shortest path problems are introduced, in which players make bids or claims on paths. The core allocations of the cooperative shortest path game coincide with the payoff vectors in the strong Nash equilibria of the associated noncooperative shortest path game.
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