| 1. |
- Belot, M., et al.
(författare)
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Providing Advice to Jobseekers at Low Cost: An Experimental Study on Online Advice
- 2019
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Ingår i: Review of Economic Studies. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0034-6527 .- 1467-937X. ; 86:4, s. 1411-1447
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We develop and evaluate experimentally a novel tool that redesigns the job search process by providing tailored advice at lowcost. We invited jobseekers to our computer facilities for twelve consecutive weekly sessions to search for real jobs on our web interface. For one-half, instead of relying on their own search criteria, we use readily available labour market data to display relevant alternative occupations and associated jobs. The data indicate that this broadens the set of jobs they consider and increases their job interviews especially for participants who otherwise search narrowly and have been unemployed for a few months.
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| 2. |
- Burchardi, Konrad B., et al.
(författare)
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Migrants, Ancestors, and Foreign Investments
- 2019
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Ingår i: The Review of Economic Studies. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0034-6527 .- 1467-937X. ; 86:4, s. 1448-1486
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We use 130 years of data on historical migrations to the U.S. to show a causal effect of the ancestry composition of U.S. counties on foreign direct investment (FDI) sent and received by local firms. To isolate the causal effect of ancestry on FDI, we build a simple reduced-form model of migrations: Migrations from a foreign country to a U.S. county at a given time depend on (1) a push factor, causing emigration from that foreign country to the entire U.S., and (2) a pull factor, causing immigration from all origins into that U.S. county. The interaction between time-series variation in origin-specific push factors and destination-specific pull factors generates quasi-random variation in the allocation of migrants across U.S. counties. We find that doubling the number of residents with ancestry from a given foreign country relative to the mean increases the probability that at least one local firm engages in FDI with that country by 4 percentage points. We present evidence that this effect is primarily driven by a reduction in information frictions, and not by better contract enforcement, taste similarities, or a convergence in factor endowments.
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| 3. |
- Burkart, Mike, et al.
(författare)
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Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control
- 2015
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Ingår i: Review of Economic Studies. - : Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy E - Oxford Open Option D / Wiley: No OnlineOpen. - 1467-937X .- 0034-6527. ; 82:3, s. 922-962
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article analyses how outsiders, such as bidders or activist investors, overcome the lack of coordination and information among dispersed shareholders. We identify the two basic means to achieve this goal. First, the outsider must relinquish private benefits in a manner that is informative about security benefits. We show under which conditions this is feasible and which acquisition strategies used in practice meet these conditions. Second, the outsider can alternatively use derivatives to drive a wedge between her voting power and her economic interest in the firm. Such unbundling of ownership and control, while typically considered a source of corporate governance problems, is an efficient response to the frictions dispersed ownership causes for control contestability. We also show that unbundling comes with costs and benefits for the bidder’s incentives to improve firm value.
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| 4. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
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Confining the Coase theorem: Contracting, ownership, and free-riding
- 2016
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Ingår i: Review of Economic Studies. - : Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy E - Oxford Open Option D / Wiley: No OnlineOpen. - 1467-937X .- 0034-6527. ; 83:2, s. 547-586
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- If individuals own the right to take any action that they please, and are free to contract about behaviour, will outcomes be efficient in all situations? That is, does the Coase theorem hold? We study this classic question through the lens of a non-cooperative model of contract negotiations, considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations. In either case, we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players. But if participation is voluntary, and there are more than two players, there are situations in which all consistent equilibria are inefficient. Specifically, the provision of public goods tends to be inefficiently low due to strategic abstention from contracting. Free-riding on others' agreements can be avoided if individuals do not own all their actions. When actions involve the use of assets, efficient action ownership may correspond to collective rather than individual asset ownership.
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| 5. |
- Harstad, Bård, et al.
(författare)
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Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes
- 2017
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Ingår i: The Review of Economic Studies. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 0034-6527 .- 1467-937X. ; 84:4, s. 1708-1734
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article provides a flexible model of resource extraction, such as deforestation, and derives the optimal conservation contract. When property rights are “strong” and districts are in charge of extracting their own resources to get revenues, conservation in one district benefits the others since the reduced supply raises the sales price. A central authority would internalize this positive externality and thus conserve more. When property rights are instead weak and extraction is illegal or costly control, conservation in one district increases the price and thus the profit from illegally depleting the resource in the other districts. The externality from conservation is then negative, and centralization would lead to less conservation. We also derive the optimal conservation contract, and we explain when the principal, who values conservation, benefits from contracting with the districts directly even when contracting with a central authority would have led to more conservation, and vice versa.
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| 6. |
- Heller, Yuval, et al.
(författare)
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Observations on Cooperation
- 2018
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Ingår i: Review of Economic Studies. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0034-6527 .- 1467-937X. ; 85:4, s. 2253-2282
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner’s Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner’s past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types. The presence of committed agents destabilizes previously proposed mechanisms for sustaining cooperation. We present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in various environments. Moreover, we show that under an additional assumption of stationarity, this combination of strategies is essentially the unique mechanism to support full cooperation, and it is robust to various perturbations. Finally, we extend the results to a setup in which agents also observe actions played by past opponents against the current partner, and we characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation.
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| 7. |
- Sangiorgi, Francesco, et al.
(författare)
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Uncertainty, Information Acquisition, and Price Swings in Asset Markets
- 2015
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Ingår i: Review of Economic Studies. - : Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy E - Oxford Open Option D / Wiley: No OnlineOpen. - 1467-937X .- 0034-6527. ; 82:4, s. 1533-1567
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article analyses costly information acquisition in asset markets with Knightian uncertainty about the asset fundamentals. In these markets, acquiring information not only reduces the expected variability of the fundamentals for a given distribution (i.e. risk). It also mitigates the uncertainty about the true distribution of the fundamentals. Agents who lack knowledge of this distribution cannot correctly interpret the information other investors impound into the price. We show that, due to uncertainty aversion, the incentives to reduce uncertainty by acquiring information increase as more investors acquire information. When uncertainty is high enough, information acquisition decisions become strategic complements and lead to multiple equilibria. Swift changes in information demand can drive large price swings even after small changes in Knightian uncertainty
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| 8. |
- Majlesi, Kaveh, et al.
(författare)
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Poor Little Rich Kids? The Role of Nature versus Nurture in Wealth and Other Economic Outcomes and Behaviors
- 2019
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Ingår i: Review of Economic Studies. - 0034-6527.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Wealth is highly correlated between parents and their children; however, little is known about the extent to which these relationships are genetic or determined by environmental factors. We use administrative data on the net wealth of a large sample of Swedish adoptees merged with similar information for their biological and adoptive parents. Comparing the relationship between the wealth of adopted and biological parents and that of the adopted child, we find that, even prior to any inheritance, there is a substantial role for environment and a much smaller role for pre-birth factors and we find little evidence that nature/nurture interactions are important. When bequests are taken into account, the role of adoptive parental wealth becomes much stronger. Our findings suggest that wealth transmission is not primarily because children from wealthier families are inherently more talented or more able but that, even in relatively egalitarian Sweden, wealth begets wealth. We further build on the existing literature by providing a more comprehensive view of the role of nature and nurture on intergenerational mobility, looking at a wide range of different outcomes using a common sample and method. We find that environmental influences are relatively more important for wealth-related variables such as savings and investment decisions than for human capital. We conclude by studying consumption as an overall measure of welfare and find that, like wealth, it is more determined by environment than by biology.
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