| 1. |
- Basso, Henrique
(författare)
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Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium
- 2009
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1889 .- 1879-1743. ; 33:8, s. 1617-1629
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper analyzes the effectiveness of delegation in solving the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy using a microfounded general equilibrium model where delegation and reappointment are explicitly included into the government's strategy. The method of Chari and Kehoe [1990. Sustainable plans. Journal of Political Economy 98 (4), 783–802] is applied to characterize the entire set of sustainable outcomes. Countering McCallum's [1995. Two fallacies concerning central-bank independence. American Economic Review 85 (2), 207–211] second fallacy, delegation is able to eliminate the time inconsistency problem, with the commitment policy being sustained under discretion for any intertemporal discount rate.
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| 2. |
- Josephson, Jens
(författare)
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A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. - : Elsevier: 24 months. - 0165-1889. ; 32:5, s. 1569-1599
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using simulations, we then apply this criterion to three types of symmetric 2 x 2 games for a class of learning rules that can be represented by the parametric model of Camerer and Ho [1999. Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games. Econometrica 67, 827-874]. This class contains stochastic versions of reinforcement and fictitious play as extreme cases. We find that only learning rules with high or intermediate levels of hypothetical reinforcement are evolutionarily stable, but that the stable parameters depend on the game. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 3. |
- Josephson, Jens
(författare)
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Stochastic Adaptation in Finite Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations
- 2009
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1889 .- 1879-1743. ; 33:8, s. 1543-1554
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n -player games played by heterogeneous populations containing best repliers, better repliers, and imitators. Individuals select strategies by applying a personal learning rule to a sample from a finite history of past play. We give sufficient conditions for convergence to minimal closed sets under better replies and selection of a Pareto dominant such set. Finally, we demonstrate that the stochastically stable states are sensitive to the sample size by showing convergence to the risk-dominant equilibrium for sufficiently small sample size and to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium for sufficiently large sample size in 2×2 coordination games.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Puu, Tönu, 1936-
(författare)
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The Hicksian Trade Cycle with Floor and Ceiling Dependent on Capital Stock
- 2007
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1889 .- 1879-1743. ; 31:2, s. 575-592
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article reconsiders the Hicksian multiplier-accelerator model with 'floor' and 'ceiling'. The new thrust is that these constraints are tied to the actual stock of capital, the floor to the depreciation on this stock, the ceiling to capital as a limiting production factor according to the fixed proportions technology that also underlies the principle of acceleration. For capital formation just the Hicksian investment theory is used. The result is one unified model creating economic growth and growth rate cycles.
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| 6. |
- Tramontana, Fabio, et al.
(författare)
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Cournot duopoly when the competitors operate multiple production plants
- 2009
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1889 .- 1879-1743. ; 33:1, s. 250-265
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article considers a Cournot duopoly under an isoelastic demand function and cost functions with built-in capacity limits. The special feature is that each firm is assumed to operate multiple plants, which can be run alone or in combination. Each firm has two plants with different capacity limits, so each has three cost options, the third being to run both plants, dividing the load according to the principle of equal marginal costs. As a consequence, the marginal cost functions come in three disjoint pieces, so the reaction functions, derived on basis of global profit maximization, may also consist of disjoint pieces. This is reflected in a particular bifurcation structure, due to border-collision bifurcations and to particular basin boundaries, related to the discontinuities. It is shown that stable cycles may coexist, and the non-existence of unstable cycles constitutes a new property. We also compare the coexistent short periodic solutions in terms of the resulting real profits.
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