| 1. |
- Alem, Yonas, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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Distributional preferences in adolescent peer networks
- 2023
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 26, s. 223-248
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study distributional preferences in adolescent peer networks. Using incentivized choices between allocations for themselves and a passive agent, children are classified into efficiency-loving, inequality-loving, inequality-averse, and spiteful types. We find that pairs of students who report a friendship link are more likely to exhibit the same preference type than other students who attend the same school. The relation between types is almost completely driven by inequality-loving and spiteful types. The role of peer networks in explaining distributional preferences goes beyond network composition effects. A low rank in academic performance and a central position within the network relate positively to a higher likelihood of being classified as spiteful. Hence, social hierarchies seem to be correlated with distributional preference types.
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| 2. |
- Dannenberg, Astrid, et al.
(författare)
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research
- 2020
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 23:3, s. 716-749
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they play the game. In this paper, we review the experimental literature of the last 20 years on the choice of institutions and describe what has been learned about the quality and the determinants of institutional choice. Cooperative subjects and subjects with optimistic beliefs about others often vote in favor of the institution. Almost all institutions improve cooperation if they are implemented, but they are not always implemented by the players. Institutional costs, remaining free-riding incentives, and a lack of learning opportunities are identified as the most important barriers. Unresolved cooperation problems, like global climate change, are often characterized by these barriers. The experimental results also show that cooperation tends to be higher under endogenously chosen institutions than exogenously imposed institutions. However, a significant share of players fails to implement the institution and they often perform poorly, which is why we cannot conclude that letting people choose is better than enforcing institutions from outside.
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| 3. |
- Giebe, Thomas, Dr, et al.
(författare)
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Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions
- 2023
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 27, s. 80-108
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, 'cross-game learning' may rather be understood as 'cross-game transfer', as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.
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| 4. |
- Grimm, S., et al.
(författare)
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Sharing or gambling? On risk attitudes in social contexts
- 2021
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 24, s. 1075-1104
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Decisions under risk are often embedded in a social context that we usually abstract from when studying decision-making in the laboratory. In contrast to that practice, our experiment investigates whether risk-taking is affected by social comparisons. In particular, we focus on situations where some amount of money has to be allocated to two parties: either the amount can be shared, or a random device allocates the entire amount to one of the parties. We find that the social context of the decision matters strongly: When participants are in a disadvantageous initial position compared to the other party, they select the risky option much more often than in a purely individual decision, identical in all other respects. Overall, we find that individuals are relatively more risk-seeking in the socially unfavorable domain than in isolation, in contrast to the favorable one, where we find no or little change in elicited risk attitudes in comparison to an isolated decision.
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| 5. |
- Holm, Håkan J., et al.
(författare)
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Strategic decisions : behavioral differences between CEOs and others
- 2020
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 23:1, s. 154-180
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study whether CEOs of private firms differ from other people with regard to their strategic decisions and beliefs about others’ strategy choices. Such differences are interesting since CEOs make decisions that are economically more relevant, because they affect not only their own utility or the well-being of household members, but the utility of many stakeholders inside and outside of the organization. They also play a central role in shaping values and norms in society. We expect differences between both groups, because CEOs are more experienced with strategic decision making than comparable people in other professional roles. Yet, due to the difficulties in recruiting this high-profile group for academic research, few studies have explored how CEOs make incentivized decisions in strategic games under strict controls and how their choices in such games differ from those made by others. Our study combines a stratified random sample of 200 CEOs of medium-sized firms with a carefully selected control group of 200 comparable people. All subjects participated in three incentivized games—Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Battle-of-the-Sexes. Beliefs were elicited for each game. We report substantial and robust differences in both behavior and beliefs between the CEOs and the control group. The most striking results are that CEOs do not best respond to beliefs; they cooperate more, play less hawkish and thereby earn much more than the control group.
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| 6. |
- Karmeliuk, M., et al.
(författare)
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Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions
- 2022
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 25, s. 1327-1348
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However, we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we provide evidence that the observed difference could be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions seem to play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.
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| 7. |
- Lagerkvist, Carl-Johan
(författare)
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Endowments, expectations, and the value of food safety certification: experimental evidence from fish markets in Nigeria
- 2023
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 26, s. 1060-1084
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the impact of endowments and expectations on reference point formation and measure the value of food safety certification in the context of fish trading on real markets in Nigeria. In our field experiment, consumers can trade a known food item for a novel food item that is superior in terms of food safety--or vice versa. Endowments matter for reference point formation, but we also document a reverse endowment effect for a subsample of respondents. The effect of expectations about future ownership is weak and mixed. While expectations seem to affect bidding behavior for subjects "trading up" to obtain the certified food product (a marginally significant effect), it does not affect bids for subjects "trading down" to give up this novel food item. Finally, willingness to pay for safety certified food is large for our respondents-our estimate of the premium is bounded between 37 and 53% of the price of conventional, uncertified food.
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| 8. |
- Ranehill, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Gender preference gaps and voting for redistribution
- 2022
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 25, s. 845-875
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- There is substantial evidence that women tend to support different policies and political candidates than men. Many studies also document gender differences in a variety of important preference dimensions, such as risk-taking, competition and pro-sociality. However, the degree to which differential voting by men and women is related to these gaps in more basic preferences requires an improved understanding. We conduct an experiment in which individuals in small laboratory "societies" repeatedly vote for redistribution policies and engage in production. We find that women vote for more egalitarian redistribution and that this difference persists with experience and in environments with varying degrees of risk. This gender voting gap is accounted for partly by both gender gaps in preferences and by expectations regarding economic circumstances. However, including both these controls in a regression analysis indicates that the latter is the primary driving force. We also observe policy differences between male- and female-controlled groups, though these are substantially smaller than the mean individual differences-a natural consequence of the aggregation of individual preferences into collective outcomes.
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| 9. |
- Sutter, M., et al.
(författare)
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Where to look for the morals in markets?
- 2020
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-4157 .- 1573-6938. ; 23:1, s. 30-52
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- There is a heated debate on whether markets erode social responsibility and moral behavior. However, it is a challenging task to identify and measure moral behavior in markets. Based on a theoretical model, we examine in an experiment the relation between trading volume, prices and moral behavior by setting up markets that either impose a negative externality on third parties or not. We find that moral behavior reveals itself in lower trading volume in markets with a negative externality, while prices mostly depend on the market structure. We further investigate individual characteristics that explain trading behavior in markets with negative externalities.
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