| 1. |
- Adermon, Adrian, 1981-, et al.
(författare)
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Piracy and Music Sales : The Effects of An Anti-Piracy Law
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 105, s. 90-106
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The implementation of a copyright protection reform in Sweden in April 2009 suddenly increased the risk of being caught and punished for illegal file sharing. This paper investigates the impact of the reform on illegal file sharing and music sales using a difference-in-differences approach with Norway and Finland as control groups. We find that the reform decreased Internet traffic by 16% and increased music sales by 36% during the first six months. Pirated music therefore seems to be a strong substitute to legal music. However, the reform effects disappeared almost completely after six months, likely because of the weak enforcement of the law.
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 81:1, s. 207-219
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.
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| 3. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Positional preferences in time and space: Optimal income taxation with dynamic social comparisons
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 101, s. 1-23
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper concerns optimal redistributive non-linear income taxation in an OLG model, where people care about their own consumption relative to (i) other people's current consumption, (ii) own past consumption, and (iii) other people's past consumption. We show that both (i) and (iii) affect the marginal income tax structure whereas (ii) does not. We also derive conditions under which atemporal and intertemporal consumption comparisons give rise to exactly the same tax policy responses. On the basis of the available empirical estimates, comparisons with other people's current and past consumption tend to substantially increase the optimal marginal labor income tax rates. Yet, such comparisons may either increase or decrease the optimal marginal capital income tax rates. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. EL AB, 1990, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW102 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC
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| 4. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Tax policy and present-biased preferences : paternalism under international capital mobility
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 106:October, s. 298-316
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper deals with tax-policy responses to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Earlier research on optimal paternalism typically abstracts from capital mobility. If capital is mobile between countries, it may no longer be possible for national governments to control domestic savings via capital taxation (as in a closed economy). In this paper, we take a broad perspective on public policy responses to self-control problems by showing how these responses vary (i) between closed and open economies, (ii) between small open and large open economies, and (iii) depending on whether or not both source based and residence based capital taxes can be used.
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| 5. |
- Bernard, Mark, et al.
(författare)
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The subgroup problem : When can binding voting on extractions from a common pool resource overcome the tragedy of the commons?
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 91, s. 122-130
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using a common pool resource game protocol with voting we examine experimentally how cooperation varies with the level at which (binding) votes are aggregated. Our results are broadly in line with theoretical predictions. When players can vote on the behavior of the whole group or when leaders from each group can vote for the group as a whole, extraction levels from the common resource pool are close to the social optimum. When players extract resources individually, there is substantial overextraction. When players vote in subgroups, there is initially less overextraction but it increases over time. This suggests that in order for binding voting to overcome the tragedy of the commons in social dilemmas, it should ideally affect the group as a whole.
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| 6. |
- Bernard, Mark, et al.
(författare)
-
The subgroup problem: When can binding voting on extractions from a common resource pool overcome the tragedy of the commons?
- 2013
-
Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 91, s. 122-130
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using a common pool resource game protocol with voting we examine experimentally how cooperation varies with the level at which (binding) votes are aggregated. Our results are broadly in line with theoretical predictions. When players can vote on the behavior of the whole group or when leaders from each group can vote for the group as a whole, extraction levels from the common resource pool are close to the social optimum. When players extract resources individually, there is substantial overextraction. When players vote in subgroups, there is initially less overextraction but it increases over time. This suggests that in order for binding voting to overcome the tragedy of the commons in social dilemmas, it should ideally affect the group as a whole.
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| 7. |
- Boschini, Anne, et al.
(författare)
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Constructing Gender Differences in the Economics Lab
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 84:3, s. 741-752
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the effects of experimental design on male and female behavior in a dictator game. Following social identity we investigate how experimental procedure may affect outcome through gender priming, i.e. the activation of gender stereotypes specifying that women behave altruistically and men egoistically. We prime subjects by asking them to indicate their gender in a questionnaire, before playing the game. In our experiment, such gender priming is effective (i.e. creates a gender difference in generosity) in gender-mixed environments, but not in single-sex environments. Further, men are more sensitive to priming than women are.
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| 8. |
- Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, et al.
(författare)
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Gender differences in competitiveness and risk taking : comparing children in Colombia and Sweden
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 83:1, s. 11-23
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We explore gender differences in preferences for competition and risk among children aged 9-12 in Colombia and Sweden, two countries differing in gender equality according to macro indices. We include four types of tasks that vary in gender stereotyping when looking at competitiveness: running, skipping rope, math and word search. We find that boys and girls are equally competitive in all tasks and all measures in Colombia. Unlike the consistent results in Colombia, the results in Sweden are mixed, with some indication of girls being more competitive than boys in some tasks in terms of performance change, whereas boys are more likely to choose to compete in general. Boys in both countries are more risk taking than girls, with a smaller gender gap in Sweden.
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| 9. |
- Cornelissen, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Fairness spillovers : the case of taxation
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 90:June, s. 164-180
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is standardly assumed that individuals react to perceived unfairness or norm violations in precisely the same area or relationship where the original offense has occurred. However, grievances over being exposed to injustice may have even broader consequences and also spill over to other contexts, causing non-compliant behavior there. We present evidence that such “fairness spillovers” can incur large economic costs: a belief that there is unfairness in taxation in the sense that the rich do not pay enough taxes is associated with a twenty percent higher level of paid absenteeism from work.
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| 10. |
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