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| 2. |
- Bram, Staffan, et al.
(författare)
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Systemperspektiv på brandsäkerhet till sjöss- en studie av organisering och användbarhet i brandskyddetpå RoPax-fartyg
- 2019
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Fires on RoPax ships can be very challenging and may inflict serious damage both to life,environment and property. The SEBRA project explored two different research themesthrough interviews and observations on four larger RoPax ships – firstly, the interactionbetween the crew, installations and environments relevant for fire protection, secondly,what governs the design of fire protective installations and working environmentsonboard.The study shows that proactive fire safety is a continuous process where the crews appliesmany different types of knowledge and experience. Several of the success factors identifiedin the study can be linked to prior research on resilient performance in critical operationsi.e. properties that allow people to deal with problems that are surprising and donot fully match existing routines.Key factors for good performance in the case of fire are good working conditions andeffective training, meaning working environments, systems, organizations and routinesthat fit the needs of the crew. However, the present study shows that a holistic approachis rarely applied to fire safety. Safety Management has a reactive bias, a clear focus oncompliance and pays limited attention to usability as a driver for safety. Observationsresulted in several findings of poor design that could undermine performance in the caseof a real fire.Flaws in fire safety design can be traced to the overall processes of ship design, buildingand revision. Ship design is a processed closely focused on cost and technical demands,rarely concerned with user needs and characteristics. When the fire protection consultantbecomes involved, many important design parameters are normally fixed and thereis little room for user-oriented fire installations and concerns.Future research is needed to strengthen shipping company learning processes and to giveusability a more prominent role in maritime Safety Management. There is also a need ofresearch demonstrating how usability can be integrated as a key value in ship design.
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| 3. |
- Degerman, Helene, et al.
(författare)
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Resilient performance in response to the 2015 refugee influx in the Øresund region
- 2018
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Ingår i: Safety and Reliability - Safe Societies in a Changing World - Proceedings of the 28th International European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2018. - 9780815386827 ; , s. 1313-1318
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- September 2015 saw a sharp increase in the influx of refugees in the Øresund region. In this study, resilience defined as flexible adaptation was taken as a baseline to guide interviews with societal infrastructure actors and NGOs engaged in managing the situation. Different actors had different organisational preconditions that influenced their ability to adapt to the new situation. Among the strongest drivers behind resilient performance were the organisation’s ways of relating to established rules, regulations, procedures and processes, the way relationships were formed between people and hierarchical layers within the organisations, and the perceived value of the human operator and the human contribution within the organisational whole. These values, in turn, determined how the organisations shaped many of the basic conditions that allowed resilient performance to develop. In the study it was found, for public actors in particular, that the criteria necessary to adapt to the situation were not met by organisational structures and processes.
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| 4. |
- Degerman, Helene, et al.
(författare)
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Systemperspektiv på industriell brandsäkerhet- en studie av organisering och användbarhet i brandskyddet
- 2019
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Industrial fires are associated with many challenges and potentially large consequencesfor life, environment and property. The SEBRA project aimed to investigate preconditionsfor a well-functioning fire safety system, applying a systems perspective on workand safety. Three main themes were explored through field work on Swedish industrialworkplaces; (1) How do operations and the staff interact with fire safety installations ineveryday work, (2) What is the main focus of fire safety design, how is it conducted andhow do the end results affect fire safety and (3) What are the success factors behind positiveoutcomes from incidents where the personnel alone has dealt with fires.During the course of operations conflicts may occur between production and fire safetysolutions e.g. fire doors, detectors, alarm systems and procedures, sometimes to thepoint where fire protective routines or installations are bypassed. A common answer tosuch issues is to strengthen administrative barriers such as rules, safety information andtraining. However, in an industrial organization where resources are already strained,even more checks and routines will only run the risk of aggravating the problem at hand.When an industrial building is constructed there are no processes or methods that canprotect user needs in the design of fire protection. In construction, the main incitementis to minimize cost. When user adaptation is disregarded, costs are effectively transferredto the operational stage in the forms of more inefficient production and lower safety levels.The industry needs to develop ways of understanding and incorporating long-term operativeneeds in short-term construction projects, so that fire protection can be moreclosely fitted to the circumstances and demands of operative personnel
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| 5. |
- Huffmeier, Johannes, et al.
(författare)
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Human contribution to safety of smart ships
- 2019
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Ingår i: Developments in the Collision and Grounding of Ships and Offshore Structures - Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Collision and Grounding of Ships and Offshore Structures, ICCGS 2019. - : CRC Press/Balkema. - 9780367433130 ; , s. 328-336
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many studies show that humans contribute to accidents, but research rarely addresses all the accidents that are avoided thanks to human capabilities. Today there is an interest in autonomous vessels and automation within shipping, often with arguments for safety and efficiency. Research from other domains suggests that automation can have unintended side-effects. Instead of increasing safety, automation may undermine people’s ability to understand the situation and make decisions, introducing new risks to the processes. To conclude that the frequency of accidents will be reduced proportionally to the people removed from the system neglects the dynamics of the socio-technical system and the positive human impact on maritime safety. Although shipping around Åland is not free of accidents and incidents, the system has a very good safety performance. The main purpose of the analysis is to analyze human impact on safe operation and performance exemplified by the vessels in Åland’s ferry lines.
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| 6. |
- Huffmeier, Johannes, et al.
(författare)
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Human Impact on Safety of Shipping
- 2018
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Humans, especially the crews have an important role in the safe operation of ships. The crews, given the right circumstances are able to safely maneuver, navigate, maintain and operate the vessel. The crews are dependent on many factors that enable this work, from the design of the vessel and work place, the procedures, processes given by the ship management and the business approach the ship owner applies to the vessel.The traffic to and from Åland is an advanced transport system that enables safe ferry services in shipping fairways with narrow passages, meeting and crossing traffic as well as winter navigation - a shipping system combining people and technology to create safe transport.The introduction of more automation requires a systems perspective and will not be a straight forward development. Total autonomy as proposed by some technology developers is often neglecting the functions and roles that humans have on maritime safety and the business case for increased automation neglects the full contribution of humans onboard. Total autonomy will therefore require high-end products that are built on standardized complex systems. Controlling and monitoring these systems will set new requirements on operators to uphold situated understanding in these complex systems.Many aspects will be affected by increased automation towards smart shipping - regulations, organization, workplace, working methods, HMI, roles and skills. To cope with the foreseen changes it is important to develop further training, skills, experience, openness in the organization and familiarization giving the future crews the right pre-conditions to succeed in the future, as well as mindful design and integration of newly automated systemsIn the future, the ISM code will likely have to change to improve the interaction between land organisations and crews in order to facilitate better integration of split responsibilities and split physical locations by the management system which in the long run allows for an increased land-based monitoring and controlof vessels’ systems and move certain tasks to shore to lower workload onboard, which should be one of the main drivers for automation.
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| 7. |
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IMPROVER D2.2 Report of criteria for evaluating resilience
- 2016
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In the recent years, the focus has moved from critical infrastructure protection to that of resilience. But how do we know whether a critical infrastructure is resilient or not, how can it be evaluated, measured and enhanced? Drawing on, combining and developing the ideas of the existing literature and practices, the current report develops a holistic, easy-to-use and computable methodology to evaluate critical infrastructure resilience, called Critical Infrastructure Resilience Index (CIRI). The methodology is applicable to all types of critical infrastructure, including a possibility to tailor it to the specific needs of different sectors, facilities and hazard scenarios. The proposed methodology is especially suitable for organizational and technological resilience evaluation, but permits including also elements of societal resilience indicators to the evaluations. The methodology is based on four levels of hierarchically organized indicators. Level 1 consists of the phases well known from the so-called crisis management cycle. Under these phases, we find sets of Level 2 rather generic indicators. Thus under level 1 ‘Prevention’, for instance, we may find a Level 2 indicator such as ‘Resilient design’, further divided into Level 3 more detailed indicators such as ‘Physical robustness’, ‘Cyber robustness’, ‘Redundancy’, ‘Modularity’, and ‘Independency’. The task is to study these indicators on Level 4 in the context of concrete critical infrastructure facilities and hazard scenarios, that is, applying Level 3 indicators into concrete circumstances. The methodology then permits to transfer quantitative, semi-quantitative and qualitative evaluations of individual sector-specific resilience indicators into uniform metrics, based on process maturity levels. This in turn makes it possible to give a specific critical infrastructure, or its part, a resilience value on the scale 0-5. While the real resilience value becomes clear only when one engages in the analysis of several indicators, the methodology can be used also as a step-by-step measurement and development tool for resilience, without necessary immediately engaging in time-consuming total resilience analysis. The user of this methodology is supposed to be the operator of critical infrastructure, or part of it, in the spirit of self-auditing. In case it would be implemented in a wider scale, in cooperation between the operators and authorities, it would give the authorities a holistic picture about the respective society’s critical infrastructure resilience. In this report, we draw a concise picture of the methodology and illustrate how this methodology could be applied to a specific infrastructure and hazard scenario.
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| 8. |
- Leroux, Jerome, et al.
(författare)
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FIRESAFE II Detection and Decision
- 2017
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Early detection of fire and quick activation of the fire extinguishing system are often considered as the main keys to successful fire management, allowing to prevent loss of life and damage to the ship and cargo.This report presents a Formal Safety Assessment on detection and on decision of extinguishing system activation following a ro-ro space fire incident on any ro-ro passenger ship.The safety level was estimated for three generic ships representing the world fleet of RoPax ships (Cargo, Standard, and Ferry RoPax) and a cost-effectiveness assessment was performed on six Risk Control Options (RCO), taking into account potential differences between newbuildings and existing ships.From a detection perspective, only the RCO Combined smoke and heat detection was found cost-effective for Standard and Ferry newbuildings (but not for existing ships).From a decision perspective, the RCO Improved markings/signage for way-finding and localisation and Alarm System Design & Integration met the cost-effectiveness criteria on all three generic ships, except for the Existing Cargo RoPax ships for the latter RCO. The RCO Preconditions for Early Activation of Drencher System was found cost-effective for Standard and Ferry RoPax ships.
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