| 1. |
- Carlsson, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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The effect of ball temperature on ball speed and carry distance in golf drives
- 2018
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Ingår i: Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part P. - London, UK : Sage Publications. - 1754-3371. ; 233:2, s. 186-192
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of ball temperature on impact ball speed and carry distance during golf drives in a blind randomized test design. The balls were exposed to a temperature-controlled environment (4 °C, 18 °C, 32 °C, and 46 °C) for 24 h prior to the test and each temperature group consisted of 30 balls. The 120 drives were performed by an elite male golfer (handicap: 0.0) in an indoor driving range. All drives were measured by a Doppler-radar system to determine the club-head speed, launch angle, spin rate, ball speed, and carry distance. Differences between the groups were investigated using a one-way analysis of variance. The results indicated that ball-speed and carry-distance differences occurred within the four groups (p < 0.001 and p < 0.01, respectively). The post hoc analyses showed that the ball temperatures of 18 °C and 32 °C had greater ball speeds and carry distances than balls at 4 °C and 46 °C (all p < 0.05). The intervals for the between-group differences were 0.6–0.7 m s –1 and 2.9–3.9 m for ball speed and carry distance, respectively. Hence, the results showed that ball temperature influences both the ball speed and the carry distance. Based on the findings in this study, standardization of ball temperature should be factored into governing body regulation tests for golf equipment. © IMechE 2018.
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| 2. |
- Aravena, Claudia, et al.
(författare)
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Testing preference formation in learning design contingent valuation (LDCV) using advanced information and repetitive treatments
- 2015
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Policymakers have largely replaced Single Bounded Discrete Choice (SBDC) valuation by the more statistically efficient repetitive methods; Double Bounded Discrete Choice (DBDC) and Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE). Repetitive valuation permits classification into rational preferences: (i) a-priori well-formed; (ii) consistent non-arbitrary values “discovered” through repetition and experience; (Plott, 1996; List 2003) and irrational preferences; (iii) consistent but arbitrary values as “shaped” by preceding bid level (Tufano, 2010; Ariely et al., 2003) and (iv) inconsistent and arbitrary values. Policy valuations should demonstrate behaviorally rational preferences. We outline novel methods for testing this in DBDC applied to renewable energy premiums in Chile.
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| 3. |
- Aravena, Claudia, et al.
(författare)
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Testing preference formation in learning design contingent valuation (LDCV) using advanced information and repetitive treatments
- 2018
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Ingår i: Land Economics. - : University of Wisconsin Press. - 0023-7639 .- 1543-8325. ; 94:2, s. 284-301
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Policymakers have largely replaced single-bounded discrete choice valuation by the more statistically efficient repetitive method: double-bounded discrete choice and discrete choice experiments. Repetitive valuation permits classification into rational and irrational preferences: (1) a priori well formed; (2) consistent nonarbitrary values “discovered” through repetition and experience;, (3) consistent but arbitrary values as “shaped” by preceding bid level, and (4) inconsistent and arbitrary values. Policy valuations should demonstrate behaviorally rational preferences. We outline novel methods for testing this in double-bounded discrete choice experiments applied to renewable energy premiums in Chile
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| 4. |
- Blackman, Allen, et al.
(författare)
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A Contingent Valuation Approach to Estimating Regulatory Costs: Mexico’s Day without Driving Program
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - : University of Chicago Press. - 2333-5955 .- 2333-5963. ; 5:3, s. 607-641
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Little is known about the cost of environmental regulations that target households instead of firms, partly because of significant methodological and data challenges. We use the contingent valuation method to measure the costs of Mexico City’s Day without Driving program, which seeks to stem pollution and traffic congestion by prohibiting vehicles from being driven one day each week. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to focus directly on using stated preference methods to isolate and estimate the private costs ofan existing environmental regulation. We find that the Mexican program’s costs are substantial: up to US$130 per vehicle per year, which represents 1%–2% ofdrivers’ annual income and implies total costs ofUS$617 million per year. Recent research questions whether driving restrictions programs like Mexico City’s actually have environmental benefits. Our results suggest that whatever benefits these programs may have, they can be quite costly.
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| 5. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Cooperation in teams: the role of identity, punishment, and endowment distribution
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0047-2727. ; 126:June 2015, s. 25-38
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Common identity and peer punishment have been identified as crucial means to reduce free riding and promote cooperation in teams. This paper examines the relative importance of these two mechanisms under two income distributions in team cooperation. In a repeated public good experiment, we use different combinations of homogeneous/heterogeneous endowments, strong/weak identity, and absence/ presence of peer punishment. We find that without punishment, a strong identity can raise cooperation in homogenous and heterogeneous teams, but that the effect depends on the strength of the identity. When punishment is introduced, the impact of punishment depends on the strength of the identitybuilding activity and the effectiveness of punishment. Furthermore, we find no evidence of stronger cooperation or punishment in teams with strong identity. These findings provide important implications for management policy makers in organizations: ex ante income heterogeneity should be implemented in teams with caution, and the decision of whether identity or punishment is a more effective norm enforcement mechanism in teams is rather sensitive to their interaction and relative strengths.
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| 6. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Cost of Power Outages for Manufacturing Firms in Ethiopia: A Stated Preference Study
- 2018
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Having a reliable supply of electricity is essential for the operation of any firm. In most developing countries, however, electricity supply is highly unreliable. In this study, we estimate the cost of power outages for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, using a stated preference survey. We find that the willingness to pay, and thus the cost of power outages, is substantial. The estimated willingness to pay for a reduction of one power outage corresponds to a tariff increase of 16 percent. The willingness to pay for reducing the average length of a power outage by one hour corresponds to a 33 percent increase. The compensating variation for a zero-outage situation corresponds to about three times the current electricity cost. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity in costs across sectors, firm sizes, and levels of electricity consumption. Policy makers could consider this observed heterogeneity when it comes to aspects such as where to invest to improve reliability and different types of electricity contracts.
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| 7. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Demand effects in stated preference surveys
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. - : Elsevier BV. - 0095-0696 .- 1096-0449. ; 90, s. 294-302
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2018 Elsevier Inc. We argue that demand effects in stated preference studies are understudied. By demand effects, we mean anything in the survey that unintentionally influences respondents’ beliefs about appropriate behavior, which in turn might affect their responses in the survey. We implement two methods for measuring and implicitly reducing the influence of demand effects. The first approach—random selection of good to be valued—does not have any effect on respondent behavior. The second approach—a demand script and a control question with feedback—has a sizable and statistically significant effect on respondent behavior. In particular, estimated marginal willingness to pay for improvements in water quality are substantially (around 50 percent) lower than a control treatment; we attribute this decrease to a reduced demand effect. Our results suggest that stated preference methods tend to lead to biased willingness-to-pay estimates due to demand effects, but that the bias can be reduced using simple measures.
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| 8. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Do people exaggerate how happy they are? Using a promise to induce truth-telling
- 2018
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Ingår i: Oxford Economic Papers. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0030-7653 .- 1464-3812. ; 70:3, s. 784-798
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We investigate a novel approach to reduce measurement error in subjective well-being (SWB) data. Using a between-subject design, half of the subjects are asked to promise to answer the survey questions truthfully to make them commit to truth-telling. We find a statistically significant difference between mean stated well-being between the two samples (with and without a promise). People are consistently found to exaggerate their happiness and for several different aspects of life, without a promise. We then investigate to what extent the differences in stated well-being also affect the inference from regressions models on the determinants of SWB. The effect on the covariates are only weakly statistically significant and only for a few variables, if we compare the samples with and without the promise. Thus, this means that the policy implications based on an SWB study only marginally depends on whether we include a truth-telling question or not.
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| 9. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Doing good with other people’s money: An experiment on people’s (un)willingness to grant others the freedom to choose
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 2214-8043. ; 71, s. 79-87
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We augment a standard allocation experiment to investigate whether, and to what extent, individuals are willing to limit others’ choices and change their own choices concerning an environmental project when they are given responsibility for others’ decisions. We observe the allocator's own donation, the donation he chooses for his group (including himself), and the minimum donation he requires the other group members to make. We find that donations dictated to the whole group are, on average, lower than individual donations and consistent with the allocator's beliefs about what the other group members donate. Additionally, we observe that most allocators force the others to donate a positive, though low, amount. Thus, unlimited freedom of choice is rejected by the majority of the participants.
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| 10. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Funding a new bridge in rural Vietnam:a field experiment on social influence and default contributions
- 2015
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Ingår i: Oxford Economic Papers. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0030-7653 .- 1464-3812. ; 67:4, s. 987-1014
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Public goods provision is essential for economic development. Yet there is limited evidence regarding contributions to local public goods in developing countries. This article analyses a field experiment where all 200 households in a village in rural Vietnam make real contributions to a public good that is very important for them in daily life—a bridge. We study the role of social influence (that people may be more willing to co-operate if others do) and the effects of the default alternative in the choice situation. We find significant and substantial (in the order of magnitude of 15–25%) effects of both social influence and defaults but only when providing low reference or default contributions.
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