| 1. |
- Ahlberg, Erik, et al.
(författare)
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"Vi klimatforskare stödjer Greta och skolungdomarna"
- 2019
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Ingår i: Dagens nyheter (DN debatt). - 1101-2447.
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- DN DEBATT 15/3. Sedan industrialiseringens början har vi använt omkring fyra femtedelar av den mängd fossilt kol som får förbrännas för att vi ska klara Parisavtalet. Vi har bara en femtedel kvar och det är bråttom att kraftigt reducera utsläppen. Det har Greta Thunberg och de strejkande ungdomarna förstått. Därför stödjer vi deras krav, skriver 270 klimatforskare.
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| 2. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Policy Spillovers in the regulation of multiple pollutants
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. - : Elsevier BV. - 0095-0696 .- 1096-0449. ; 87 (2018), s. 114-134
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control transboundary and local pollutants such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope. They are regulated by distinct entities, potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of the local pollutant are distorted if the regulators anticipate that transboundary pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The regulation is too stringent with diseconomies of scope, and not enough with economies of scope. In contrast, we obtain efficiency if the transboundary pollutant is regulated by emission taxes or tradable emission permits provided that the revenue from taxing emissions are redistributed to the countries in a lump-sum way and that the initial allocation of tradable emission permits is not linked to abatement costs.
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| 3. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Prices vs Quantities with Multiple Pollutants
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We examine the choice of policy instrument price, quantity, or a mix of the two when two pollutants are regulated and firms’ abatement costs are private information. A key parameter that affects this choice is the technological externality between the abatement efforts involved, i.e., whether they are substitutes or complements. If they are complements, a mix policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on the other is sometime preferable, even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mix policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.
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| 4. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. - : Elsevier BV. - 0095-0696 .- 1096-0449. ; 22:1, s. 123-140
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas
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| 5. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Strategic environmental regulation of multiple pollutants
- 2015
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control global and local pollution such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope. They are regulated by distinct entities (global versus local), potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of local pollution are distorted if the local regulators anticipate that global pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The regulation is too (not enough) stringent when abatement e¤orts exhibit economies (diseconomies) of scope. In contrast, we obtain e¢ ciency if the global pollutant is regulated by tax provided that the revenues from taxing emissions are redistributed to the local communities in a lump-sum way.
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| 6. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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The informational value of environmental taxes
- 2019
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We propose informational spillovers as a new rationale for the use of multiple policy instruments to mitigate a single externality. We investigate the design of a pollution standard when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown and emissions are taxed. A firm might abate pollution beyond what is required by the standard by equalizing its marginal abatement costs to the tax rate, thereby revealing information about its abatement cost. We analyze how a regulator can take advantage of this information to design the standard. In a dynamic setting, the regulator relaxes the initial standard in order to induce more information revelation, which would allow her to set a standard closer to the first best in the second period. Updating standards, though, generates a ratchet effect since the low-cost firms might strategically hide their cost by abating no more than required by the standard. We provide conditions for the separating equilibrium to hold when firms act strategically. We illustrate our theoretical results with the case of NOx regulation in Sweden. We find evidence that the firms that are taxed experience more frequent standard updates.
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| 7. |
- Ambec, S., et al.
(författare)
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The informational value of environmental taxes
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0047-2727. ; 199
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We propose informational spillovers as a new rationale for the use of multiple policy instruments to mitigate a single externality. We investigate the design of a pollution standard when the firms' abatement costs are unknown and emissions are taxed. A firm might abate pollution beyond what is required by the standard by equalizing its marginal abatement costs to the tax rate, thereby revealing information about its abatement cost. We analyze how a regulator can take advantage of this information to design the standard. In a dynamic setting, the regulator relaxes the initial standard in order to induce more information revelation, which would allow her to set a standard closer to the first best in the future. Updating standards, though, generates a ratchet effect since a low-cost firm might strategically hide its cost by abating no more than required by the standard. We characterize the optimal standard and its update across time depending on the firm's abatement strategy. We illustrate our theoretical results with the case of NOx regulation in Sweden. We find evidence that the firms that pay the NOx tax experience more frequent standard updates and more stringent revisions than those who are exempted. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 8. |
- Bonilla, Jorge, 1975, et al.
(författare)
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Diffusion of NOx abatement technologies in Sweden
- 2014
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper studies how different NOx abatement technologies have diffused under the Swedish system of refunded emissions charges and analyzes the determinants of the time to adoption. The policy, under which the charge revenues are refunded back to the regulated firms in proportion to energy output, was explicitly designed to affect investment in NOx-reducing technologies. The results indicate that a higher net NOx charge liability, i.e. a reduction in tax liabilities net of the refund due to the new technology, increases the likelihood of adoption, but only for end-of-pipe post-combustion technologies. We also find some indication that market power considerations in the heat and power industry reduce the incentives to abate emissions through investment in postcombustion technologies. Adoption of post-combustion technologies and the efficiency improving technology of flue gas condensation are also more likely in the heat and power and waste incineration sectors, which is possibly explained by a large degree of public ownership in these sectors.
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| 9. |
- Bonilla, Jorge, 1975, et al.
(författare)
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Refunded Emission Payments and Diffusion of NOx Abatement Technologies in Sweden
- 2015
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Ingår i: Ecological Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0921-8009. ; 116, s. 132-145
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper studies how different NOx abatement technologies have diffused under the Swedish system of refunded emission payments (REP) and analyzes the determinants of the time to adoption. The policy, under which the charge revenues are refunded back to the regulated firms in proportion to energy output, was explicitly designed to affect investment in NOx-reducing technologies. The main finding is that REP had a significant effect on the adoption of post-combustion technologies. Moreover, we also find some indications that the effects of REP have been enhanced by the existing system of individual emission standards. In particular, the effect of REP speeding up the pace of adoption of post-combustion technologies is considerably larger in those counties where stringent standards are in place.
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| 10. |
- Bonilla, Jorge, 1975, et al.
(författare)
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Synergies and Trade-offs between Climate and Local Air Pollution: Policies in Sweden
- 2012
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper, we explore the synergies and tradeoffs between abatement of global and local pollution. We built a unique dataset of Swedish heat and power plants with detailed boiler-level data 2001-2009 on not only production and inputs but also emissions of CO2 and NOx. Both pollutants are subject to strict policies in Sweden. CO2 is subject to multiple levels of governance using environmental instruments such as the EU ETS and Swedish carbon taxes; NOx – as a precursor of acid rain and eutrophication – is regulated by a heavy fee. Using a quadratic directional output distance function, we characterize changes in technical efficiency as well as patterns of substitutability in response to the policies mentioned. The fact that generating units face a trade-off between the pollutants indicates a need for policy coordination.
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