| 1. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
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Air pollution dynamics and the need for temporally differentiated road pricing
- 2015
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Ingår i: Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice. - : Elsevier BV. - 0965-8564. ; 75, s. 178-195
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper we investigate the effects of the temporal variation of pollution dispersion, traffic flows and vehicular emissions on pollution concentration and illustrate the need for temporally differentiated road pricing through an application to the case of the congestion charge in Stockholm, Sweden. By accounting explicitly for the role of pollution dispersion on optimal road pricing, we allow for a more comprehensive view of the economy– ecology interactions at stake, showing that price differentiation is an optimal response to the physical environment. Most congestion charges in place incorporate price bands to mitigate congestion. Our analysis indicates that, to ensure compliance with air quality standards, such price variations should also be a response to limited pollution dispersion.
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| 2. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Policy Spillovers in the regulation of multiple pollutants
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. - : Elsevier BV. - 0095-0696 .- 1096-0449. ; 87 (2018), s. 114-134
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control transboundary and local pollutants such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope. They are regulated by distinct entities, potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of the local pollutant are distorted if the regulators anticipate that transboundary pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The regulation is too stringent with diseconomies of scope, and not enough with economies of scope. In contrast, we obtain efficiency if the transboundary pollutant is regulated by emission taxes or tradable emission permits provided that the revenue from taxing emissions are redistributed to the countries in a lump-sum way and that the initial allocation of tradable emission permits is not linked to abatement costs.
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| 3. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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Strategic environmental regulation of multiple pollutants
- 2015
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control global and local pollution such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope. They are regulated by distinct entities (global versus local), potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of local pollution are distorted if the local regulators anticipate that global pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The regulation is too (not enough) stringent when abatement e¤orts exhibit economies (diseconomies) of scope. In contrast, we obtain e¢ ciency if the global pollutant is regulated by tax provided that the revenues from taxing emissions are redistributed to the local communities in a lump-sum way.
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| 4. |
- Ambec, Stefan, et al.
(författare)
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The informational value of environmental taxes
- 2019
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We propose informational spillovers as a new rationale for the use of multiple policy instruments to mitigate a single externality. We investigate the design of a pollution standard when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown and emissions are taxed. A firm might abate pollution beyond what is required by the standard by equalizing its marginal abatement costs to the tax rate, thereby revealing information about its abatement cost. We analyze how a regulator can take advantage of this information to design the standard. In a dynamic setting, the regulator relaxes the initial standard in order to induce more information revelation, which would allow her to set a standard closer to the first best in the second period. Updating standards, though, generates a ratchet effect since the low-cost firms might strategically hide their cost by abating no more than required by the standard. We provide conditions for the separating equilibrium to hold when firms act strategically. We illustrate our theoretical results with the case of NOx regulation in Sweden. We find evidence that the firms that are taxed experience more frequent standard updates.
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| 5. |
- Bonilla, Jorge, 1975, et al.
(författare)
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Refunded Emission Payments and Diffusion of NOx Abatement Technologies in Sweden
- 2015
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Ingår i: Ecological Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0921-8009. ; 116, s. 132-145
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper studies how different NOx abatement technologies have diffused under the Swedish system of refunded emission payments (REP) and analyzes the determinants of the time to adoption. The policy, under which the charge revenues are refunded back to the regulated firms in proportion to energy output, was explicitly designed to affect investment in NOx-reducing technologies. The main finding is that REP had a significant effect on the adoption of post-combustion technologies. Moreover, we also find some indications that the effects of REP have been enhanced by the existing system of individual emission standards. In particular, the effect of REP speeding up the pace of adoption of post-combustion technologies is considerably larger in those counties where stringent standards are in place.
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| 6. |
- Bonilla, J, et al.
(författare)
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Technical synergies and trade-offs between abatement of global and local air pollution
- 2018
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Ingår i: Environmental and Resource Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0924-6460 .- 1573-1502. ; 70:1, s. 191-221
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we explore the synergies and tradeoffs between abatement of global and local pollution. We build a unique dataset of Swedish combined heat and power plants with detailed boiler-level data 2001–2009 on not only production and inputs but also on emissions of CO2 and NOx. Both pollutants are regulated by strict policies in Sweden. CO2 is subject to theEuropean UnionEmissionTrading Scheme and Swedish carbon taxes;NOx— as a precursor of acid rain and eutrophication—is regulated by a heavy fee. Using a quadratic directional output distance function, we characterize changes in technical efficiency as well as patterns of substitutability in response to the policies mentioned. The fact that generating units face a trade-off between the pollutants indicates the need for policy coordination.
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| 7. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
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Carbon Pricing: Transaction Costs of Emissions Trading vs. Carbon Taxes
- 2015
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper we empirically compare the transaction costs from monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of two environmental regulations directed to cost-efficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions: a carbon dioxide (CO2) tax and a tradable emissions system. We do this in the case of Sweden, where a set of firms are covered by both types of regulations, i.e., the Swedish CO2 tax and the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). This provides us with an excellent case study as it allows us to disentangle the costs of each regulation from other firm-specific variables that might affect the overall cost of MRV procedures. Our results indicate that the MRV costs of CO2 taxation do not depend on firms’ emissions, while they do in the case of the EU ETS. For firms of equivalent emissions’ size, the MRV costs are lower for CO2 taxation than for the EU ETS, which confirms the general view that regulating emissions upstream by means of a CO2 tax yields lower transaction costs vis-á-vis downstream regulation by means of emission trading.
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| 8. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
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Environmental Policy and the Size Distribution of Firms
- 2015
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper we analyze the effects of environmental policies on the size distribution of firms. We model a stationary industry where the observed size distribution is a solution to the profit maximization problem of heterogeneous firms that differ in terms of their energy efficiency. We compare the equilibrium size distribution under emission taxes, uniform emission standards, and performance standards. Our results indicate that, unlike emission taxes and performance standards, emission standards introduce regulatory asymmetries favoring small firms. These asymmetries cause significant detrimental effects on total output and total welfare, yet lead to reduced emissions and help preserve small businesses.
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| 9. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
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Environmental policy, technology adoption and the size distribution of firms
- 2018
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Ingår i: Energy Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0140-9883 .- 1873-6181. ; 72, s. 470-485
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The potential impacts of strict environmental policies on production costs and firms' competitiviness are central to the choice of which policy to implement. However, not all the industries nor all firms within an industry are affected in the same way. In this paper, we investigate the effects of emission taxes, uniform emission standards, and performance standards on the size distribution of firms. Our results indicate that, unlike emission taxes and performance standards, emission standards introduce regulatory asymmetries favoring small firms. On the contrary, emission taxes and performance standards reduce to a lower extent profits of larger firms but they do modify the optimal scale of firms. We also show that when the regulatory asymmetries created by emissions standards are taken into account, the profitability of emissions reducing technologies is higher under emission standards than under market-based instruments.
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| 10. |
- Coria, Jessica, 1979, et al.
(författare)
-
Fiscal Federalism, Interjurisdictional Externalities and Overlapping Policies
- 2018
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper, we analyze the effects of the interaction between national and local policies designed to reduce an environmental externality that causes environmental damages both nationally and locally. We formulate a theoretical model to develop hypotheses regarding the combined effects of such policies on the stringency of the local policies and on firms’ emissions reductions. To test our hypotheses, we use actual data for Sweden, where emissions of nitrogen oxides from combustion plants are subject to a heavy national tax and to individual emissions standards set by county authorities. Our analytical findings suggest that it is unlikely that local regulators will impose emissions standards stringent enough to achieve further reductions than those induced by the national tax. This is confirmed in our data, where most emissions reductions can be attributed to the national tax and the effects of the emissions standards are not significant.
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