| 1. |
|
|
| 2. |
- Björklund, Fredrik, et al.
(författare)
-
Recent work: Motivational internalism
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Analysis. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0003-2638 .- 1467-8284. ; 72:1, s. 124-137
-
Forskningsöversikt (refereegranskat)
|
|
| 3. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969, et al.
(författare)
-
Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 13:1, s. 101-112
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch's book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch's position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch's two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch's handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objections having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.
|
|
| 4. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-, et al.
(författare)
-
Motivational Internalism : Contemporary Debates
- 2015
-
Ingår i: Motivational Internalism. - New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780199367955 ; , s. 1-25
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as a problem for non-cognitivists. The last decades have seen a number of developments of internalist positions and arguments for and against internalism. This chapter provides a structured overview of the more important themes, including the development of new forms of conditional internalism, deferred internalism, and non-constitutional internalism, as well as the emergence of empirically-based arguments and new forms of a posteriori internalism.
|
|
| 5. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-, et al.
(författare)
-
Recent Work on Motivational Internalism
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Analysis. - 0003-2638 .- 1467-8284. ; 72:1, s. 124-137
-
Forskningsöversikt (refereegranskat)abstract
- Reviews recent work on motivational internalism
|
|
| 6. |
- Eriksson, John, 1973, et al.
(författare)
-
Non-Cognitivism and the Classification Account of Moral Uncertainty
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 94:4, s. 719-735
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has been objected to moral non-cognitivism that it cannot account for fundamental moral uncertainty. A person is derivatively uncertain about whether an act is, say, morally wrong, when her certainty is at bottom due to uncertainty about whether the act has certain non-moral, descriptive, properties, which she takes to be wrong-making. She is fundamentally morally uncertain when her uncertainty directly concerns whether the properties of the act are wrong-making. In this paper we advance a new reply to the objection to non-cognitivism, immune to the problems afflicting earlier replies. First, we argue that fundamental moral uncertainty is best understood as classificatory uncertainty, since (i) the psychological factors behind fundamental moral uncertainty are analogous to the factors behind fundamental uncertainty regarding descriptive, non-moral, matters, and (ii) fundamental descriptive uncertainty is naturally understood as classificatory uncertainty. We call this the classification account of moral uncertainty. Second, we argue that it is congenial with non-cognitivism, given certain plausible assumptions about the psychology of moral judgment formation.
|
|
| 7. |
- Francén Olinder, Ragnar, 1977
(författare)
-
Some Varieties of Metaethical Relativism
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Philosophy Compass. - : Wiley. - 1747-9991. ; 11:10, s. 529-540
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This opinionated survey article discusses a relativist view in metaethics that we can call Appraiser-standard Relativism. According to this view, the truth value of moral judgments varies depending on the moral standard (the norms or values, etc.) of the appraiser – that is, someone who makes or assesses the judgments. On this view, when two persons judge that, say, lying is always morally wrong; one of the judgments might be true and the other false. The paper presents various forms of this view, contrasts it against other forms of moral relativism, and shortly describes the main arguments for it. It considers the two most pressing objections – from disagreement and from counterintuitivity – and discusses how different forms of Appraiser-standard Relativism are affected by, or can be seen as responses to, these objections. Lastly, it discusses whether Appraiser-standard Relativism rules out moral realism, the view that there are objective moral truths. © 2016 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
|
|
| 8. |
- Olinder, Ragnar Francen
(författare)
-
Rescuing Doxastic Normativism
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Theoria. - : Wiley. - 0040-5825 .- 1755-2567. ; 78:4, s. 293-308
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by a truth-norm. It has been objected that this view fails since there are true propositions such that if you believed them they would not be true, and thus the obligation to believe true propositions cannot hold for these. I argue that the solution for doxastic normativists is to find a norm that draws the right distinction between those true propositions we are obliged to believe (ordinary non-tricky propositions) and those we are not (tricky propositions). I develop a norm which I argue does exactly this, and further argue that it can be used to salvage the idea that belief is constitutively normative.
|
|
| 9. |
- Olinder, Ragnar Francén
(författare)
-
Svavarsdottir's Burden
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 40:3, s. 577-589
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is sometimes observed that the debate between internalists and externalists about moral motivation seems to have reached a deadlock. There are those who do, and those who don't, recognize the intuitive possibility of amoralists: i.e. people having moral opinions without being motivated to act accordingly. This makes Sigrun Svavarsdttir's methodological objection to internalism especially interesting, since it promises to break the deadlock through building a case against internalism (construed as a conceptual thesis), not on such intuitions, but on a methodological principle for empirical investigations. According to the objection, internalists incur the burden of argument, since they have to exclude certain explanations of the (verbal and non-verbal) behavior of apparent amoralists, while externalists don't. In this paper I argue that the objection fails: the principle for empirical investigations is plausible, but Svavarsdttir's application of it to internalism is not. Once we clearly distinguish between the conceptual and the empirical aspects of the internalist and externalist explanations of apparent amoralists, we see that these views incur an equal burden of explanation. I end the paper with a positive suggestion to the effect that there is a third alternative, a view that involves accepting neither internalism nor externalism, which does not incur an explanatory burden of the relevant sort.
|
|
