| 1. |
- Brinck, Ingar, et al.
(författare)
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Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents
- 1999
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Ingår i: Synthese. - 0039-7857. ; 118:1, s. 89-104
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have fullblown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-representations that are independent of the context.
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| 2. |
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| 4. |
- Gärdenfors, Peter
(författare)
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Cued and Detached Representations in Animal Cognition
- 1995
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper analyzes the function of certain aspects of cognition, like planning, deceiving, self-awareness, and communication. I distinguish between two kinds of representations of information. A cued representation stands for something that is present in the current situation. Detached representations stand for objects or events that are neither present in the situation nor triggered by some recent situation. The inner environment of an animal is defined as the collection of all detached representations. The fundamental difference between signals and symbols is that the reference of a symbol is a detached representation, while a signal refers to a cued representation. Detached representations make planning possible. I distinguish between immediate planning, where plans are made for present needs, and anticipatory planning, where future needs are predicted. The evolution of self-consciousness is outlined as a series of steps. The first is when other agents are seen as having an inner environment of their own. This is when deception becomes possible. A further step is when the agent realizes that the other agents' representations of the external world includes a representation of the inner environment of the agent itself. Then the agent can become self-conscious since it can form representations of its own representations.
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| 5. |
- Gärdenfors, Peter
(författare)
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Human Communication: What Happens?
- 1995
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The development of information technology opens up new venues of human communication. So far, most research has been devoted to the technological side of communication. By analysing the metaphors that are used to talk about communication, the differences between technological and human communication can be targeted. What is needed in order to understand human communication is more knowledge about the contents of what is communicated, not only the coding. Cognitive semantics offers a promising way to analyse how linguistic information is connected with perception and memory. But we should also consider what cognitive processes are involved in dialogues between people in order to further develop the forms of human communication with and via computers
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| 6. |
- Gärdenfors, Peter
(författare)
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Language and the Evolution of Cognition
- 1995
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The main purpose of this article is to discuss the kinds of mental representations that are required for language to evolve. Firstly, I distinguish between cued and detached representations. A cued representation stands for something that is present in the current external situation of the representing organism, while a detached representation may stand for objects or events that are neither present in the current situation nor triggered by some recent situation. The inner environment of an agent is deÞned as the collection of all detached representations of the agent. The fundamental difference between signal and a symbol is that the reference of a symbol is a detached representation, while a signal refers to a cued representation. Icons also refer to detached representations, but unlike symbols, the choice of representation is not arbitrary, since an icon in some aspects resembles the thing it represents
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| 7. |
- Gärdenfors, Peter
(författare)
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Meanings as Conceptual Structures
- 1995
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Cognitive semantics relates linguistic expressions to conceptual structures. The purpose of this paper is to present a framework for such a cognitive structure. As a preparation, Putnam's argument against intensional semantics as a theory of meaning is presented. Some of the main tenets of cognitive semantics as it has developed during the last years are outlined. The notion of a conceptual space is proposed as a central tool for representing semantic information. It is outlined how conceptual spaces can be used as a basis for a formal cognitive semantics.The model is then applied to some problems in lexical semantics, such as the effect of varying contrast classes
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| 8. |
- Gärdenfors, Peter
(författare)
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När tanken lyfter
- 1996
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper discusses the evolutionary function of certain advanced aspects of cognition, like planning, self-awareness, and free will. The inner environment of an agent consists of all representations which the agent can actively "think about". A distinction is made between immediate planning, where plans are made for present needs, and anticipatory planning, where future needs are predicted. Humans seem to be the only animals capable of anticipatory planning, which puts us in a particular predicament. The evolution of self-consciousness is outlined as a series of steps. The first is when other agents are seen as having an inner environment of their own. This is when deception becomes possible. A further step is when the agent realizes that the other agents' representations of the external world includes a representation of the inner environment of the agent itself. The agent can then become self-conscious since it can form representations of its own representations. Free will can be seen as the capacity to represent one's own will, which then makes it possible to "choose" the will one wants. The evollutionary perspective on free will is compared to some ideas found in Kirkegaard and Dostoyevsky
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