| 1. |
- Berndt, Sonja I., et al.
(författare)
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Genome-wide meta-analysis identifies 11 new loci for anthropometric traits and provides insights into genetic architecture
- 2013
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Ingår i: Nature Genetics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1061-4036 .- 1546-1718. ; 45:5, s. 501-U69
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Approaches exploiting trait distribution extremes may be used to identify loci associated with common traits, but it is unknown whether these loci are generalizable to the broader population. In a genome-wide search for loci associated with the upper versus the lower 5th percentiles of body mass index, height and waist-to-hip ratio, as well as clinical classes of obesity, including up to 263,407 individuals of European ancestry, we identified 4 new loci (IGFBP4, H6PD, RSRC1 and PPP2R2A) influencing height detected in the distribution tails and 7 new loci (HNF4G, RPTOR, GNAT2, MRPS33P4, ADCY9, HS6ST3 and ZZZ3) for clinical classes of obesity. Further, we find a large overlap in genetic structure and the distribution of variants between traits based on extremes and the general population and little etiological heterogeneity between obesity subgroups.
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| 2. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-
(författare)
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A Note in Defence of Ratificationism
- 2011
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Ingår i: Erkenntnis. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0165-0106 .- 1572-8420. ; 75:1, s. 147-150
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theorygives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, ThePsychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Eganargues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. Thispaper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations.Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decisiontheory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory.
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| 3. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-
(författare)
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An extended framework for preference relations
- 2011
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Ingår i: Economics and Philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0266-2671 .- 1474-0028. ; 27:2, s. 101-108
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The swap framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first.
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| 4. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-
(författare)
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An extended framework for preference relations–corrected version
- 2011
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Ingår i: Economics and Philosophy. - 0266-2671 .- 1474-0028. ; 27:3, s. 360-367
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is regretted that the originally published paper (doi:10.1017/S0266267111000010, published online 22 June 2011) was not the author's final amended version. We apologise for this oversight and reproduce the entire corrected paper here in print and online, with revised notation. In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The swap framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first.
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| 5. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-, et al.
(författare)
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Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument
- 2010
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Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly. - Oxford : Blackwell Publishing. - 0031-8094 .- 1467-9213. ; 60:241, s. 754-763
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The small-improvement argument is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, viz the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required either to prefer one of the alternatives to the other or to be indifferent between them. We argue that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. As a result, the reasons do not provide support for believing the conjunction of the premises. Without support for the conjunction of the premises, the small-improvement argument for incomparability fails.
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| 6. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-
(författare)
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Freedom of choice and expected compromise
- 2010
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 35:1, s. 65-79
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed, which is able to take into account the values of the possible options.
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| 7. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-, et al.
(författare)
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In Defense of My Favourite Theory
- 2014
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - : Wiley. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 95:2, s. 159-174
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non‐arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the arguments that have been levelled against My Favourite Theory and offer some arguments against intertheoretic comparisons of value.
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| 8. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-
(författare)
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Preference and Choice
- 2011
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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