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- Kågeson, Per
(författare)
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Applying the principle of common but differentiated responsibility to the mitigation of greenhouse gases from international shipping
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The report discusses options for reconciling the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) with IMO’s principle of equal treatment of ships when creating a markedbased measure for curbing CO2 emissions from international shipping. Global application with revenues used for compensating the developing countries (no net incidence) is the most obvious option. Another possibility is to provide a grace period for emissions from ships on route to non-Annex I countries by restricting the application of a market-based measure to emissions caused by ships on journey to ports in the rich countries. The geographical coverage of such a scheme could gradually widen as non-Annex I countries become more economically advanced. Among the issues that need to be clarified are the exact grounds for compensation. The basic choice is between distinct categories (Annex I or non-Annex I) and parametric values such as CO2/capita and GDP/capita. Another main issue is the duration of the compensation rules. Some non-Annex I countries have already passed the least developed Annex I countries in terms of GDP per capita and/or emissions per capita. It may be a good idea to establish an expert group, as proposed by China and India, to look into the details of how to apply CBDR to the reduction of emissions from international shipping, including the longer term implications.
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- Kågeson, Per
(författare)
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Dieselization in Sweden
- 2013
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Ingår i: Energy Policy. - : Elsevier BV. - 0301-4215 .- 1873-6777. ; 54, s. 42-46
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In Sweden the market share of diesel cars grew from below 10 per cent in 2005 to 62 per cent in 2011 despite a closing gap between pump prices on diesel oil and gasoline, and diesel cars being less favored than ethanol and biogas cars in terms of tax cuts and other subsidies offered to "environment cars". The most important factor behind the dieselization was probably the market entrance of a number of low-consuming models. Towards the end of the period a growing number of diesel models were able to meet the 120 g CO2 threshold applicable to "environment cars" that cannot use ethanol or biogas. This helped such models increase their share of the diesel car market from zero to 41 per cent. Dieselization appears to have had only a minor effect on annual distances driven. The higher average annual mileage of diesel cars is probably to a large extent a result of a self-selection bias. However, the Swedish diesel car fleet is young, and the direct rebound effect stemming from a lower variable driving cost may show up more clearly as the fleet gets older based on the assumption that second owners are more fuel price sensitive than first owners.
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- Kågeson, Per
(författare)
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Fuel Taxation, Regulations and Selective Incentives : Striking the Balance
- 2012
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Ingår i: Cars and Carbon. - Dordrecht : Springer. ; , s. 127-151
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This chapter discusses to what extent fuel taxes may need to be complemented by other government-induced measures for achieving a cost-effective reduction of carbon emissions from cars. The conclusion is that market failures and the need to prepare for longer-term climate objectives make it essential to regulate the specific fuel consumption of new cars. The current European regulation, being full of derogations and other loopholes, makes support from national incentive schemes important. However, for efficiency, and in order to prevent excessive taxation, common guidelines are needed. They should prescribe that all incentives must comply with certain basic principles, the three most important being technical neutrality and equal treatment of all cars; continuous incentive (rather than a number of CO2 thresholds); and that the size of fees and bonuses should not depart substantially from the marginal abatement cost in other sectors. However, selective incentives to emerging technologies by definition cannot be technologically neutral. Such incentives, thus, should only be allowed if the member state can show that there are good reasons to expect that the learning curve and economies of scale will make production cost decline considerably. This requirement will prevent them from subsidizing mature technologies and minimize the risk for lock-in effects and the distortion of competition.
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- Kågeson, Per
(författare)
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Options for Europe when acting alone on CO2 emissions from shipping
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper was prepared as a contribution to the Working Group on Ships of the European Union's European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) and presented on 22–23 June 2011 at the second meeting of the group. It discusses various options that may be considered by the EU when contemplating, in the absence of any progress in the International Maritime Organzation (IMO), to act unilaterally on market-based measures for curbing CO2 emissions from international shipping. Focus is, in particular, on the pros and cons of introducing a hybrid scheme where emissions from domestic shipping and other small vessels (below a certain size threshold) are addressed by up-stream allocation of liability, i.e. with the fuel suppliers, while a down-stream allocation of responsibility would apply to large ships and to journeys departing from ports outside of the EU. For the latter, the ship owner would be directly responsible for submission on emission allowances or, alternatively, for paying a CO2 charge or levy.
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