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| 2. |
- Le Coq, Chloé, et al.
(författare)
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Does opponents' experience matter? Experimental evidence from a quantity precommitment game
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681. ; 84:1, s. 265-277
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper investigates why subjects in laboratory experiments on quantity precommitment games consistently choose capacities above the Cournot level – the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We argue that this puzzling regularity may be attributed to players’ perceptions of their opponents’ skill or level of rationality. We first show theoretically that it is the case by modelling a two-stage game of capacity investment and pricing with bounded rational players. We then design an experiment in which we use the level of experience as a proxy for the level of rationality and match subjects with different levels of experience. We find significant differences in behavior depending on opponents’ experience; moreover, players facing inexperienced players tend to choose higher capacities than they would otherwise.
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| 3. |
- Le Coq, Chloé, et al.
(författare)
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EU-Russia: Gas relationship at a crossroads
- 2014
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Ingår i: Russian Energy and Security up to 2030. - : Routledge. - 9781315858920 - 9780415639644 ; , s. 41-60
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 4. |
- Le Coq, Chloé, et al.
(författare)
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Price caps and fluctuating demands in electricity markets: Experimental evidence of competitive bidding
- 2012
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Ingår i: 9th International Conference on the European Energy Market, EEM 12. - 9781467308328
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment designed to test how competitive behavior is sensitive to price cap and demand level in a uniform price auction. Several features of the electricity markets inspire the experimental design. Two treatments with different price caps are considered and demand is high in certain periods, and low in others. In addition the market is characterized by excess capacity regardless of the demand level and competitive outcome is predicted. Although attempts to collude do take place, these fail to increase market prices in any substantial way. Despite this, inefficiencies do occur as the attempts at colluding imply that marginal costs fail to equalize across firms. This allocative inefficiencies appear to be more severe, both when the demand is high and when the price cap is high.
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| 5. |
- Le Coq, Chloé, et al.
(författare)
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The length of contracts and collusion
- 2010
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Ingår i: International Journal of Industrial Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-7187. ; 28:1, s. 21-29
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many commodities (including energy, agricultural products and metals) are sold both on spot markets and through long-term contracts which commit the parties to exchange the commodity in each of a number of spot market periods. This paper shows how the length of contracts affects the possibility of collusion in a repeated price-setting game. Contracts can both help and hinder collusion, because they reduce the size of the spot market, cutting both the immediate gain from defection and the punishment for deviation. Firms can always sustain some collusive price above marginal cost if they sell the right number of contracts, of any duration, whatever their discount factor. As the duration of contracts increases, however, collusion becomes harder to sustain.
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- Paltseva, Elena, et al.
(författare)
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Assessing gas transit risks: Russia vs. the EU
- 2012
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Ingår i: Energy Policy. - : Elsevier. - 0301-4215. ; 42, s. 642-650
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper proposes a Transit Risk Index (TRI) designed to assess the riskiness of pipeline gas imports and to study the effect of introducing new gas routes. TRI controls for gas dependency, transit route diversification, political risks of transit, pipeline rupture probability, and the balance of power between supplying and consuming countries along the transit route. Evaluating TRI for the EU-Russia gas trade, we show that the introduction of the Nord Stream pipeline would further widen already large disparities in gas risk exposure across the EU Member States. The gas risk exposure of the Member States served by Nord Stream would decline. In contrast, EU countries not connected to Nord Stream, but sharing other Russian gas transit routes with the Nord Stream countries, would face greater gas risk exposure. We discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of the common energy policy in the EU.
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