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- Bäck, Emma, et al.
(författare)
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Attributional biases about the origins of preferences in a group-decision situation.
- 2007
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Attributional bias between groups has been shown to exist when group-boundaries are composed of attitudes that are self-defining (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). We wanted to see if attributional bias between groups would exist when the attitude issue separating the groups was not self-defining. Further, we wanted to see whether a decision of the issue would affect attributional bias. This was done in an experiment where participants, high-school students, read about a hypothetical situation where a decision was to be made. The decision would affect the school’s students, but was not considered self-defining. The participants stated their preferred outcome of the decision. Outcome was manipulated to be either concordant or discordant with participants´ preferences. Further, decision-making form varied so that in one condition, participants were informed that in-group authorities (student representatives) had made the final decision, and in the other condition, the decision was made by out-group authorities (the principal and teachers). Results showed that attributional bias was present when attitude issue was not self-defining. When outcome supported preferred alternative, attributional bias was stronger. Being part of the winning side, that is the high-status group, provides self-validation and increases self-esteem (Tyler, 1994 ). This interpretation is supported by further analysis showing that high self-esteem was related to more attributional bias. Attributional bias was stronger when the decision was made by in-group authorities as compared to out-group authorities. When in-group members make a decision, attributional bias may increase as a function of in-group identification, which provides information about self-worth (Smith & Tyler, 1997).
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- Bäck, Emma, et al.
(författare)
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Defending or challenging the status quo : Effects of position on biased perceptions of opponents
- 2009
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Ingår i: Proceedings of 21st Annual Convention of the Association for Psychological Science, San Francisco, 2009. ; , s. 215-215
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- People want to maintain status quo. Most prior research concern groups with real status differences. Pro/con status quo position may itself carry status information. Three studies explored the effects of pro/con status quo position on biased perceptions of others. Challengers were more biased, regardless of real status differences. Supporting summary The default ideological position is status quo maintaining (Skitka et al. 2002). Most prior research concerns groups with real status differences, such as majority/minority status (Jost et. al., 2004). In general, people tend to ascribe more favourable reasons for the attitude position of those who agree vs. disagree with oneself (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002, Reeder et al., 2004), but perceptions of others may vary as a function of power position, such that the powerful are more biased than the powerless (Guinote et al, 2002). It has been argued that defenders of the status quo perceive a greater sense of power than challengers (De Dreu et al, 2008), and thus defenders should be more biased than challengers. However, as challengers are opposing the default position, they may experience threat, which has been shown to increase biases (Stephan et. al., 2002) and a need to justify own position. Thus, it seems possible that pro/con status quo position may carry status information separate from real intergroup status differences. In three studies, we explored how defenders and challengers of the status quo perceive those who agreed and disagreed with their position, trying to separate the effects of pro/con status quo position from status position (e. g. majority/minority). In Study 1, participants stated own preferred alternative on a controversial issue (whether wearing religious symbols should be prohibited in schools or not) and rated the origins of preferences of those who agreed and disagreed. Challengers of the status quo were more biased than defenders, such that they ascribed more favourable origins of preferences of those who agreed as opposed to disagreed with them than did defenders. In reality, though, challengers were in minority. Hence, in Study 2, majority/minority status of pro/con status quo position was manipulated, such that participants were informed about the majority/minority status of their own preference position in one of several randomly assigned attitude issues (e.g., gay couples’ right to child adoption, prohibition of religious symbols in schools). Results showed that majority/minority information did not affect biases, but pro/con status quo position did, such that challengers were again more biased than defenders. Again, in reality, challengers were in fact in minority. Thus, in a final study, challengers were in reality in majority (on the issue of whether teachers’ should be allowed to confiscate students’ disturbing cell phones during class hours). Again, challengers were more biased even though they in reality were in majority. To conclude, it seems that real status differences are not needed for biased perceptions of others, but rather perceived status differences implied by pro/con status quo position is decisive. This is an important finding as it implies that people who want to change the current situation may feel threatened and hence refrain from expressing their attitudes, although their opinion may actually be shared by a majority. This could have deteriorating effects for an evolving society, where people feel powerless over their situation. Future research should examine what characteristics may be prevalent among those who actually express their challenging opinions.
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- Bäck, Emma, et al.
(författare)
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Status Quo Change: Bias Differences Between Pro and Con Positions
- 2009
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Ingår i: XIth annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Tampa, February 5-7, 2009.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The default ideological position is status quo maintaining (Skitka et. al., 2002), and people typically perceive more self-interest in arguements undermining rather than maintaining the status quo (O’Brien & Crandall, 2005). However, it is not known how people pro status quo change perceive those disagree rather than agree with themselves. In three studies the current research explored how individuals pro and con a status quo change on a controversial issue (e. g., gay couples’ right to child adoption, prohibition of religious symbols in schools) perceived the externality and rationality of preferences among those who agreed and disagreed with their own preference (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). In all three studies, individuals pro- as compared to con a status quo change showed more bias, that is more perceived externality and less rationality behind preferences of those disagreeing rather than agreeing with themselves. Individuals pro status quo change were more biased when a decision on the target issue was made that concorded rather than discorded with their own preference, whereas those against a change showed more bias with a discordant decision outcome. Because status quo is default position, people who challenge it take a risk, possibly inducing threat feelings which should increase biases (Stephan et. al., 2002). A concordant decision outcome in this situation may have a validating function, boosting self-enhancement and increase biases (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
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- Bäck, Emma, et al.
(författare)
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The role of issue importance in biased biases regarding the origins of preferences
- 2008
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Ingår i: Annual Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Albuquerque, 2008.
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Konferensbidrag (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Important issues seem to elicit attributional biases regarding origins of attitudes, such that people holding the same attitude as oneself (ingroup) is seen as more rational and less externally influenced than people holding an opposing attitude (outgroup) (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). The current research examines the role of issue importance for such biases in three studies. In Study 1, students read about pros and cons of prohibiting religious symbols in Swedish schools. They stated their preferred alternative, issue importance, and rated origins of preferences for the ingroup and outgroup. Issue importance was related to biases. This relation was tested in two follow-up studies where high school students read about a hypothetical decision situation where their school was to decide whether to prohibit religious symbols or not. In both studies, participants stated preferred decision alternative and issue importance. Decision outcome was manipulated to concord or discord with participants’ preferences. In Study 2, decision-making form varied so the decision was made by the student council, school authorities or by voting. In Study 3, the student council of participants’ own and an adjacent school were going to make the decision together. School size and composition principle of the student council varied. Results showed that biases varied with target group and issue importance in both studies. In Study 2, biases also varied with decision-making form and outcome, although this was not replicated in Study 3. Importance seems to be decisive for biases, and decision-making form and outcome may under some circumstances influence biases.
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- Diesen, Christian, et al.
(författare)
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Likhet inför lagen
- 2005
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Principen om likhet inför lagen är djupt rotad i Sverige, både i det allmänna medvetandet och i lagstiftningens grundprinciper. Men hur fungerar det i praktiken? Är det acceptabelt att tillämpningen skiljer sig mellan stad och land, att domarens kön spelar roll eller att faktorer som kön, klass och etnicitet får avgörande betydelse för rättsprocessens utgång? Slutsatserna i Likhet inför lagen bygger på tusentals faktiska domar och är den första större studien som belyser den pågående strukturella diskrimineringen inom rättsväsendet. I inledningskapitlet presenterar jur. dr Claes Lernestedt en historisk och rättsfilosofisk översikt av principen om likhet inför lagen. Sedan följer en genomgång av kriminologisk forskning om institutionell diskriminering av personer med utländsk bakgrund sammanställd av fil. dr Tove Pettersson. Professor Christian Diesen redogör för tidigare opublicerade forskningsrapporter som visar på såväl negativ särbehandling av invandrare, barn, kvinnor, handikappade och homosexuella som positiv särbehandling av direktörer, poliser och advokater. Fil. dr Torun Lindholm presenterar avslutningsvis internationella och egna socialpsykologiska rön när det gäller fördomar och omedveten diskriminering.
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- Hedberg, Per-Henrik, et al.
(författare)
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Investigating correct and incorrect statements of eyewitness testimony using semantic spaces
- 2009
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Ingår i: 21st Annual Convention of the Association for Psychological Science, San Francisco, 2009. ; , s. 81-81
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Studies have shown that descriptions of real and suggested or fabricated eyewitness memory may differ in ways that could be explained by differences in the formation and cognitive representations of these memories. However, the characteristics of an eyewitness’ description are likely to depend not only on the cognitive features of memory, but also on the witness’ social motivation to display meta-cognitive states to the investigator. For example, when a response to a question is delayed, this delay is open to several interpretations. It may mean that the respondent a) have difficulty understanding the question b) is retrieving the information c) is formulating her response d) is withdrawing from the interaction. To prevent misunderstanding, respondents need to account for their delays, uncertainties, and failures in answering. Linguistic research shows that when responding to general knowledge questions, people do this by using several markers (Brennan & Williams, 1995; Krahmer & Swerts, 2005; Smith & Clark, 1993). Respondents often use fillers like “uh” and “um” to indicate some trouble with processing. The fillers both signal the delay and offer a brief account for it. Lack of confidence can either be implied by rising intonation, or by hedges as “I think”, “I guess”, etc. Respondents can also account for delays with self-talk and explicit commentary. Both fillers and self-talk are showing the questioner that despite the delay, one is still actively trying to retrieve an answer. Both are ways to let the questioner in on how the retrieval is progressing, and show that the respondent is not uncooperative, ignorant, poor in judgment etc. Listeners have been shown to use these cues to make adequate assessments of the certainty or uncertainty of the speaker (Brennan & Williams, 1995; Krahmer & Swerts, 2005; 2006). This constitutes the Interactive view on question answering (Smith & Clark, 1993). The current research investigated whether similar communicative cues discriminated eyewitnesses’ accurate and inaccurate responses to questions about a crime event. Furthermore, we examined the extent to which groups differing in experience with judging eyewitness memory use these cues to estimate witness accuracy. Witnesses were videotaped while being interviewed about their memory of a simulated crime scenario. Responses to cued recall questions that provided correct or incorrect information about a specific detail were protocoled and scored with respect to linguistic and paralinguistic uncertainty cues (delays, fillers non-words/words, hedges, number of words). Results confirmed a higher frequency of “uncertainty” cues in witnesses’ incorrect as compared to correct responses. This finding points to the importance of taking the interactive component of the question-answering situation into account when analysing eyewitness memory. The eyewitness statements were presented to police detectives, chief judges, and lay-persons in written or in videotaped format. While all groups had difficulty determining accuracy, experienced police detectives, but not judges, had a better discrimination accuracy than lay-persons. Both professionals and lay-persons showed better discrimination when presented with statements in written than in videotaped format. This suggests that the visual format conveys information that interferes with the detection of valid accuracy cues.
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