| 1. |
- Kulyk, Oksana, et al.
(author)
-
Coercion-resistant Proxy Voting
- 2016
-
In: ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection. - Cham : Springer. - 9783319336299 ; , s. 3-16
-
Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In general, most elections follow the principle of equality, or as it came to be known, the principle of "one man - one vote". However, this principle might pose difficulties for voters, who are not well informed regarding the particular matter that is voted on. In order to address this issue, a new form of voting has been proposed, namely proxy voting. In proxy voting, each voter has the possibility to delegate her voting right to another voter, so called proxy, that she considers a trusted expert on the matter. In this paper we propose an end-to-end verifiable Internet voting scheme, which to the best of our knowledge is the first scheme to address voter coercion in the proxy voting setting.
|
|
| 2. |
- Kulyk, Oksana, et al.
(author)
-
Introducing Proxy Voting to Helios
- 2016
-
In: Proceedings of 2016 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, (Ares 2016). - : IEEE. - 9781509009909 ; , s. 98-106
-
Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Proxy voting is a form of voting, where the voters can either vote on an issue directly, or delegate their voting right to a proxy. This proxy might for instance be a trusted expert on the particular issue. In this work, we extend the widely studied end-to-end verifiable Helios Internet voting system towards the proxy voting approach. Therefore, we introduce a new type of credentials, so-called delegation credentials. The main purpose of these credentials is to ensure that the proxy has been authorised by an eligible voter to cast a delegated vote. If voters, after delegating, change their mind and want to vote directly, cancelling a delegation is possible throughout the entire voting phase. We show that the proposed extension preserves the security requirements of the original Helios system for the votes that are cast directly, as well as security requirements tailored toward proxy voting.
|
|
| 3. |
|
|
