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Träfflista för sökning "WFRF:(Qin Ping) srt2:(2005-2009)"

Sökning: WFRF:(Qin Ping) > (2005-2009)

  • Resultat 1-7 av 7
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1.
  • Ablikim, M., et al. (författare)
  • Measurements of (XcJ)-> K+K-K+K- decays
  • 2006
  • Ingår i: Physics Letters B. - : Elsevier BV. - 0370-2693 .- 1873-2445. ; 642:3, s. 197-202
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Using 14M psi(2S) events taken with the BESII detector, chi(cJ) -> 2(K+K-) decays are studied. For the four-kaon final state, the branching fractions are B(chi(c0,1,2) ->.2(K+K-)) = (3.48 +/- 0.23 +/- 0.47) x 10(-3), (0.70 +/- 0.13 +/- 0.10) x 10(-3), and (2.17 +/- 0.20 +/- 0.31) x 10(-3). For the phi K+K- final state, the branching fractions, which are measured for the first time, are B(chi(c0,1,2) -> phi K+K-) = (1.03 +/- 0.22 +/- 0.15) x 10(-3), (0.46 +/- 0.16 +/- 0.06) x 10(-3), and (1.67 +/- 0.26 +/- 0.24) x 10(-4). For the phi phi final state, B(chi(c0,2) -> phi phi) = (0.94 +/- 0.21 +/- 0.13) x 10(-3) and (1.70 +/- 0.30 +/- 0.25) x 10(-3).
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2.
  • Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al. (författare)
  • Household decision making and the influence of spouses’ income, education, and communist party membership: A field experiment in rural China
  • 2009
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • We study household decision making in a high-stakes experiment with a random sample of households in rural China. Spouses have to choose between risky lotteries, first separately and then jointly. We find that spouses’ individual risk preferences are more similar the richer the household and the higher the wife’s relative income contribution. A couple’s joint decision is typically determined by the husband, but women who contribute relatively more to the household income, women in high-income households, women with more education than their husbands, and women with communist party membership have a stronger influence on the joint decision.
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3.
  • Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al. (författare)
  • It is better to be the head of a chicken than the tail of a phoenix: a study of concern for relative standing in rural China
  • 2008
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • This paper examines the concern for relative standing among rural households in China. We use a survey-experimental method to measure to what extent poor Chinese farmers care about their relative income and find that the respondents care to a high degree. Compared to previous studies in developed countries, the concern for relative standing seems to be equally strong among rural households in China. This should be seen in the light of the rapid change China has undergone, with high growth, increased inequality, and the highest urban-rural income ratio in the world. Thus, the rural population, which is lagging behind, is suffering not only from the low absolute income but also from low relative income.
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4.
  • Dong, Jin Song, et al. (författare)
  • Timed Automata Patterns
  • 2008
  • Ingår i: IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering. - 0098-5589 .- 1939-3520. ; 34:6, s. 844-859
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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5.
  • Qin, Ping, 1976 (författare)
  • Risk, Relative Standing and Property Rights: Rural Household Decision-Making in China
  • 2009
  • Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • Paper 1 examines the concern for relative standing among rural households in China. We used a survey-experimental method to measure to what extent poor Chinese farmers care about their relative income and found that the respondents cared to a high degree. Compared to previous studies in developed countries, the concern for relative standing seems to be equally strong among rural households in China. This should be seen in the light of the rapid change China has undergone, with high growth, increased inequality, and the highest urban-rural income ratio in the world. Thus, the rural population, which is lagging behind, is suffering not only from the low absolute income but also from low relative income. Paper 2 studies risky decision-making in a high-stakes experiment with couples in rural China. In the experiment, spouses chose between risky lotteries, first separately and then jointly. We are particularly interested in the (socio-demographic) factors determining (i) the similarity of spouses’ individual decisions and (ii) women’s influence on couples’ joint decisions. We find that spouses in richer households have more similar individual risk preferences. The couple’s joint decision is largely influenced by the husband, but women with higher income, more years of education, and communist party membership have a significantly stronger influence on the joint decision. Paper 3 investigates farmers’ preferences for various property rights attributes of a forestland contract. We find that farmers are highly concerned with what types of rights a contract provides. Reducing perceived risks of contract termination and introducing a priority right in renewal of an old contract significantly increase farmers’ marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a forest contract. An extended waiting time for rights to harvest the forest reduces a farmer’s perceived value of a contract. We also investigate whether accounting for the fact that farmers ignore one or more attributes when answering stated preference questions affects the MWTP, and find it to be systematically lower in the model where we consider that respondents ignore attributes. Paper 4 assesses the impact of tenure types, property rights, and harvest quota regulation on farmer investment behavior in Chinese collective forests. We investigate the issue using household survey data from Fujian province. The results indicate that investment incentives increase due to the tenure reform. In the reform property rights are gradually established, and confirmed to the individual farmers via a contract. However, some issues remain. Farmers still perceive some tenure arrangements to be more uncertain, which discourage them to undertake plot investments. The harvest quota regulation, introduced for stock conservation purposes, acts as a disincentive in forestry management and development. These evidences imply that there could be even further improvement in investment incentives, if some of these constraints were relaxed through a policy reform.
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  • Resultat 1-7 av 7

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