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- Andersson, Anna-Karin, 1978-
(författare)
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Libertarianism and Potential Agents : A Libertarian View of the Moral Rights of Foetuses and Children
- 2007
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This essay advances a libertarian theory of moral rights, which responds effectively to some serious objections that have been raised against libertarianism. I show how libertarianism can explain children’s rights to certain physical integrity and aid. I defend strong moral rights of human, pre-natal organisms, infants and children against all agents to certain non-interference with their physical integrity. I also argue that parents’ moral obligation to aid their offspring follows from a moral principle that prohibits agents to actively harm rights-bearers. Since this is the core principle of all versions of libertarianism, we gain simplicity and coherence. In chapter two, I explain my theory’s similarities and differences to a libertarian theory of moral rights advanced by Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I explain the structure and coherence of negative moral rights as advanced by Nozick. Then, I discuss what these negative rights are rights to, and the criteria for being a rights-bearer. In chapter three, I formulate a clear distinction between active and passive behaviour, and discuss the moral importance of foreseeing consequences of one’s active interventions. In chapter four, I claim that some pre-natal human organisms, human infants, and children, are rights-bearers. I formulate a morally relevant characterization of potentiality, and argue that possession of such potentiality is sufficient to have negative rights against all agents. In chapter five, I discuss whether potential moral subjects, in addition, have positive moral rights against all agents to means sufficient to develop into actual moral subjects. I argue that this suggestion brings some difficulties when applied to rights-conflicts. In chapter six, I argue that potential moral subjects’ rights to means necessary to develop into actual moral subjects can be defended in terms of merely negative rights. By adopting the view advanced in this chapter, we get a simple, coherent theory. It avoids the difficulties in the view advanced in chapter five, while keeping its intuitively plausible features. In chapter seven, I discuss whether the entitlement theory is contradictory and morally repugnant. I argue that my version of the entitlement theory is not.
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Den svårfångade relativismen: en uppslagsbok
- 2008
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Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Finns det absoluta sanningar? Många svarar nej. Sanning är alltid relativ till något annat, säger man – en individ, en kultur, ett paradigm eller något annat. Och relativism handlar inte bara om sanning, liknande uppfattningar finns beträffande kunskap, rationalitet, moral. Men även om relativistiska åsikter är vanliga så är frågor om relativism mycket omstridda. De flesta filosofer genom tiderna har förnekat att radikala former av relativism är hållbara, och hävdat att relativismen är motsägelsefull eller självupphävande. Andra menar att detta inte alls stämmer. Ibland ses relativismen som en radikal utmaning mot den rådande ordningen, ibland ses den som ett lättköpt försvar för vilket traditionellt förtruck som helst. Diskussionen om relativism rymmer många djupa och intrikata frågor kring sanning, kunskap och moral, men även en hel del förvirring och missförstånd. Den svårfångade relativismen har formen av en uppslagsbok men kan också läsas rakt igenom. I 54 korta artiklar, och en längre inledande översikt, presenterar 18 svenska filosofer nyckelbegrepp och nyckelpersoner i relativismdebatten. Artiklarna kräver inga särskilda förkunskaper, men väjer inte heller för komplicerade resonemang.
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- Grill, Kalle
(författare)
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Anti-paternalism
- 2006
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Licentiatavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This is a thesis about anti-paternalism – the liberal doctrine that we may not interfere with a person’s liberty for her own good. Empirical circumstances and moral values may certainly give us reason to avoid benevolent interference. Anti-paternalism as a normative doctrine should, however, be rejected. Essay I concerns the definitions of paternalism and anti-paternalism. It is argued that only a definition of paternalism in terms of compound reason-actions can accommodate its special moral properties. Definitions in terms of actions, common in the literature, cannot. It is argued, furthermore, that in specifying the reason-actions in further detail, the notion of what is self-regarding, as opposed to other-regarding, is irrelevant, contrary to received opinion. Essay II starts out with the definition of paternalism defended in essay I and claims that however this very general definition is specified, anti-paternalism is unreasonable and should be rejected. Anti-paternalism is the position that certain reasons – referring one way or the other to the good of a person, give no valid normative support to certain actions – some kind of interferences with the same person. Since the reasons in question are normally quite legitimate and important reasons for action, a convincing argument for anti-paternalism must explain why they are invalid in cases of interference. A closer look at the reasons and actions in question provides no basis for such an explanation. Essay III considers a concrete case of benevolent interference – the withholding of information concerning uncertain threats to public health in the public’s best interest. Such a policy has been suggested in relation to the European Commission’s proposed new system for the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH). Information about uncertain threats to health from chemicals would allegedly spread anxiety and depression and thus do more harm than good. The avoidance of negative health effects is accepted as a legitimate and good reason for withholding of information, thus respecting the conclusion of essay II, that anti-paternalism should be rejected. Other reasons, however, tip the balance in favour of making the information available. These reasons include the net effects on knowledge, psychological effects, effects on private decisions and effects on political decisions.
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| 7. |
- Tamburrini, Claudio, et al.
(författare)
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Transcending human limitations
- 2007
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Ingår i: Sport, Ethics and Philosopy: Special Issue - The ethics of Sports Medicine. - 1751-1321. ; 1:2, s. 113-118
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 10. |
- Tännsjö, Torbjörn, 1946-
(författare)
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Döden är förhandlingsbar
- 2009
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Bok (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Resonerar kring det "förhandlingsutrymme" som finns då människor dör inom sjukvården. De kan erbjudas smärtlindring som på skyndar döden, de kan få livsuppehållande behandling avbruten, de kan få sova in i döden, för att nämna tre omdiskuterade möjligheter. Det är emellertid inte reglerat när man få denna typ av hjälp att dö och det är också oklart vem som bestämmer. I boken argumenterar författaren för tydligare riktlinjer.
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