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- Cassel, Anders, et al.
(författare)
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On Perception Safety Requirements and Multi Sensor Systems for Automated Driving Systems
- 2020
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Ingår i: SAE technical paper series. - 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA, United States : SAE International. - 0148-7191. ; 2020-April:April
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- One major challenge in designing SAE level 3-5 Automated Driving Systems (ADS) is to define requirements for the perception system that would enable argumentation for safe operation. The safety requirements on the perception system can only be fulfilled through redundancy in the sensor hardware. It is, however, a challenge to specify the redundancy that is required in the sensor system. Safe operation for an ADS is significantly more difficult compared to advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS). The safety argumentation for ADAS typically argues that in case of a failure in the sensor array a fail-silent behavior is acceptable because the human driver can take control of the vehicle back. This argumentation however is not possible when developing level 4 or higher automation. This paper investigates prerequisites for applying a systematic methodology for analyzing redundancy in a multi-sensor system and the relation to a conceptual ADS functional architecture. This analysis must address the complexity that comes with partially overlapping sensor data from different sensors and considers variations in performance and characteristics due to changes in the environmental conditions. The paper introduces the term incomplete redundancy and presents a systematic methodology for analyzing redundancy. The aim is to provide arguments for how several sensors in a system, when appropriately combined, meet an assigned safety requirement on a higher level. Each sensor will then be assigned a certain responsibility and contributes with a sub-set of information. A set of questions of importance to address as a foundation for such a methodology are defined and discussed. The definitions of redundancy and independence between sensors are discussed as well as contract-based functional safety to adapt to different environmental and operating conditions.
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- Warg, Fredrik, et al.
(författare)
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Managing Continuous Assurance of Complex Dependable Systems : Report from a workshop held at the Scandinavian Conference on System and Software Safety (SCSSS) 2022.
- 2022
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The SALIENCE4CAV project has done work on enabling continuous assurance, which aims to ensure safety is maintained throughout the entire lifecycle of a product, system, or service. One key technique is the use of safety contracts and modular assurance cases for systematically managing safety responsibilities and requirements across different stakeholders. This report summarizes outcomes from a workshop where discussions were held around this work. The participants were predominantly working in domains with high dependability requirements, such as automotive. Knowledge, tools, and organizational issues are seen as some key obstacles, but interest is high, and the community realizes the need for enabling continuous assurance.
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| 6. |
- Damschen, Marvin, et al.
(författare)
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Development and onboard assessment of drone for assistance in firefighting resource management and rescue operations
- 2022
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This report provides comprehensive information for deciding whether to pursue the deployment of adrone system for increasing safety on ship. The assessments of technical and legal feasibility as wellas usefulness of a drone system for surveying the open decks of a ro-ro ship are presented. The usecases of fire patrol, fire resource management and search & rescue operations are targeted. Aprototype drone system is detailed that is built on open standards and open-source software for highextensibility and reproducibility. Technical feasibility is assessed positively overall using a purpose-designed drone-control software, in-field tests and a demonstration onboard of DFDS PetuniaSeaways. The needs for further development, analysis and long-term tests are described. The legalfeasibility assessment gives an overview of applicable maritime and airspace regulations within theEU. It concludes that the drone system should be seen complementary to existing fire safety systemsand that operational authorization is best applied for in collaboration with a ship owner. Usefulnessis assessed using responses from maritime experts to an online questionnaire on the targeted usecases. Results are positive with two major challenges identified: achieving a reasonable selling priceand obtaining the ship operators’ and crews’ trust in the system. Finally, a SWOT analysis gives aconcise summary of the performed assessments and can be used as input to the strategic businessplanning for a potential drone system provider.
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| 7. |
- Gyllenhammar, Magnus, 1992-, et al.
(författare)
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Towards an Operational Design Domain That Supports the Safety Argumentation of an Automated Driving System
- 2020
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Ingår i: Proceeding of the 10th European Congress on Embedded Real Time Software and Systems. - Toulouse.
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- One of the biggest challenges for self-driving road vehicles is how to argue that their safety cases are complete. The operational design domain (ODD) of the automated driving system (ADS) can be used to restrict where the ADS is valid and thus confine the scope of the safety case as well as the verification. To complete the safety case there is a need to ensure that the ADS will not exit its ODD. We present four generic strategies to ensure this. Use cases (UCs) provide a convenient way providing such a strategy for a collection of operating conditions (OCs) and further ensures that the ODD allows for operation within the real world. A framework to categorise the OCs of a UC is presented and it is suggested that the ODD is written with this structure in mind to facilitate mapping towards potential UCs. The ODD defines the functional boundary of the system and modelling it with this structure makes it modular and generalisable across different potential UCs. Further, using the ODD to connect the ADS to the UC enables the continuous delivery of the ADS feature. Two examples of dimensions of the ODD are given and a strategy to avoid an ODD exit is proposed in the respective case.
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- Henriksson, Jens, et al.
(författare)
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Out-of-Distribution Detection as Support for Autonomous Driving Safety Lifecycle
- 2023
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Ingår i: <em>Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatic. )</em>Volume 13975 LNCS, Pages 233 - 242. - : Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. - 9783031297854 ; , s. 233-242
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- The automotive industry is moving towards increased automation, where features such as automated driving systems typically include machine learning (ML), e.g. in the perception system. [Question/Problem] Ensuring safety for systems partly relying on ML is challenging. Different approaches and frameworks have been proposed, typically where the developer must define quantitative and/or qualitative acceptance criteria, and ensure the criteria are fulfilled using different methods to improve e.g., design, robustness and error detection. However, there is still a knowledge gap between quality methods and metrics employed in the ML domain and how such methods can contribute to satisfying the vehicle level safety requirements. In this paper, we argue the need for connecting available ML quality methods and metrics to the safety lifecycle and explicitly show their contribution to safety. In particular, we analyse Out-of-Distribution (OoD) detection, e.g., the frequency of novelty detection, and show its potential for multiple safety-related purposes. I.e., as (a) an acceptance criterion contributing to the decision if the software fulfills the safety requirements and hence is ready-for-release, (b) in operational design domain selection and expansion by including novelty samples into the training/development loop, and (c) as a run-time measure, e.g., if there is a sequence of novel samples, the vehicle should consider reaching a minimal risk condition. [Contribution] This paper describes the possibility to use OoD detection as a safety measure, and the potential contributions in different stages of the safety lifecycle. © 2023, The Author(s)
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- Skoglund, Martin, et al.
(författare)
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Enhancing Safety Assessment of Automated Driving Systems with Key Enabling Technology Assessment Templates
- 2023
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Ingår i: Vehicles. - 2624-8921. ; 5:4, s. 1818-1843
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The emergence of Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) has transformed the landscape of safety assessment. ADSs, capable of controlling a vehicle without human intervention, represent a significant shift from traditional driver-centric approaches to vehicle safety. While traditional safety assessments rely on the assumption of a human driver in control, ADSs require a different approach that acknowledges the machine as the primary driver. Before market introduction, it is necessary to confirm the vehicle safety claimed by the manufacturer. The complexity of the systems necessitates a new comprehensive safety assessment that examines and validates the hazard identification and safety-by-design concepts and ensures that the ADS meets the relevant safety requirements throughout the vehicle lifecycle. The presented work aims to enhance the effectiveness of the assessment performed by a homologation service provider by using assessment templates based on refined requirement attributes that link to the operational design domain (ODD) and the use of Key Enabling Technologies (KETs), such as communication, positioning, and cybersecurity, in the implementation of ADSs. The refined requirement attributes can serve as safety-performance indicators to assist the evaluation of the design soundness of the ODD. The contributions of this paper are: (1) outlining a method for deriving assessment templates for use in future ADS assessments; (2) demonstrating the method by analysing three KETs with respect to such assessment templates; and (3) demonstrating the use of assessment templates on a use case, an unmanned (remotely assisted) truck in a limited ODD. By employing assessment templates tailored to the technology reliance of the identified use case, the evaluation process gained clarity through assessable attributes, assessment criteria, and functional scenarios linked to the ODD and KETs.
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- Skoglund, Martin, et al.
(författare)
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Technical and functional requirements for V2X communication, positioning and cyber-security in the HEADSTART project
- 2021
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Connected and AutomatedD riving (CAD) features rely on s e v er al key technologies to function safelyat the vehicle and compone nt level. HEADSTART (Harm onised European Solutions fo r TestingAutomated Road Transport) is a research project fund ed by the European Union tha t aims to definetesting and validation pro c e d ur e s for CAD features with a focus on three K ey Enabling Technologi es(KETs): Vehicle to eve rything (V2X) communication, Positioning and Cyber security. This paperpresent s the technical and functional requ i rements for these three KETs including w h a t is n e eded forthese technol ogies to work corre ctly (at vehicle and c omponent level) and what is needed to verify andvali d ate them in proving ground and simulation environment. The final aim is to satisfy t h e safetyrequirements to protect the veh i c l e i ts e lf and the other road users.
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