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- Thunholm, Peter, 1959-, et al.
(författare)
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Evaluating the effectiveness of an armoured brigade staff
- 2014
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Ingår i: Assessing command and control effectiveness. - London : Ashgate. - 9781472436948 ; , s. 141-160
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The purpose with this chapter is to present a study of the effectiveness of an Armoured Brigade Headquarters (HQ) in some specific respects. Important issues were (1) how is the HQ Staff dimensioned in relation to its tasks, (2) how does the three staff processes work (Planning, Execution and Coordination / Decision) and (3) how well does the HQ’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and Battle Rhythm function in the light of the HQ’s organization and work processes? The study was designed as a survey study and was based on the following four instruments: (1) Military Command Team Effectiveness Instrument (CTEF 2.0; Essence, Vogelaar, Baranski, Berggren, Van Buskirk, Goodwin & Myller, 2008); (2) Measurement of workload according to the Borg scale (Borg, 1998); (3) Subjective assessments of quality of the Brigade HQ’s orders and reports, and (4) verification that the Brigade HQ followed it’s Standard Operating Procedure. Fifty-four staff members of an Armoured Brigade HQ volunteered as participants. In the study, the HQ was challenged with a peace support / peace keeping operation exercise.The overall result regarding the CTEF and quality measurements on orders and reports indicate that the HQ worked well during the entire exercise and that the SOP and Battle Rhythm worked rather well. However, through the CTEF, four problem areas were identified. These areas regarded (1) the level of uncertainty in the mission, (2) the high complexity of the task, (3) the perceived instability of the objectives that were supposed to be attained in the mission environment, and (4) a high level of workload in some staff sections. Three of these areas are not under the control of the Brigade HQ (high level of uncertainty, high task complexity and unstable objectives of the operation). However, the fourth area, workload, could be influenced. Some staff sections seem to be undermanned in the current organization and that problem needs to be handled, by increasing some staff sections or by moving some duties to other sections.
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Grundvattendagarna 2013
- 2013
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Proceedings (redaktörskap) (refereegranskat)abstract
- Den här rapporten innehåller en sammanställning av abstracts som ligger till underlag för de presentationer som presenterades på konferensen Grundvattendagarna i Lund den 16–17 oktober 2013. Konferensen anordnades av SGU i samarbete med Geologiska institutionen på Lunds uni-versitet och Länsstyrelsen Skåne. Ett av konferensens syften var att få till en bred uppslutning från olika organisationer, myndigheter, konsulter, universitet, etc., och att skapa goda förutsättningar för att överföra kunskap och knyta kontakter för framtida samarbeten. Totalt har inte mindre än 59 olika bidrag kommit in och omfattningen på innehållet är verkligen stort. Det har varit en ära att få anordna konferensen och vi är tacksamma för det stora intresse som ni visat.
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- Thunholm, Peter, 1959-, et al.
(författare)
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Tactical Thinking as Problem Solving : a paradigm for development of tactical thinking ability?
- 2012
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Ingår i:
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The classic definition of tactics proposed by Clausewitz (1976, p. 128) was that “tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement”. Clausewitz in a similar way of thinking defined strategy as “the use of engagements for the object of the war”. Clausewitz´s definition of tactics is still basically in use in several doctrines around the world although often a bit more developed. So, for example, in the Swedish Doctrine for Ground Operations (2005, p 36) tactics is defined as “the ability to use military forces in conducting battle or in support of battle”. The definitions of tactics are often implicitly (e.g. Clausewitz, 1832/1976) or explicitly (Swedish Armed Forces, 2005) focused on the ability of someone to use military units in order to win an engagement. This someone is a military officer. Studying military tactics is one of the main subjects for officers in military academies, yet, what constitutes tactical thinking ability and how it can be studied and trained has not been under much scientific attention. One way to view tactical thinking ability is to frame it as problem solving activity. This has been done partly by the US Army (2005, 2010). The advantage with this is that problem solving research offers several different avenues to how tactical thinking ability can be studied. First, it offers a general classification of types of problems that could be applied to the typical military tactical problem. We propose that a proper understanding of the general military tactical problem facing a military officer is key to understanding how tactical thinking ability can be developed. We also propose that tactical problems generally are dynamic problems, and “formally correct” solutions to dynamic problems cannot be identified in advance. Another advantage using a problem solving research perspective is that it also offers a set of different theoretical frameworks for studying officers solving tactical problems.In this paper we present a new approach, at the Swedish National Defence College, to study and develop tactical thinking ability in military officers. We start by classifying a generic tactical problem facing a tactical commander. Secondly, we survey different possible problem solving theories or paradigms that could be applied in order to study, and later also develop, the ability of officers to think tactics. Finally we discuss how a research program for studying and developing tactical thinking ability with a problem solving research approach could be designed.
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- Waldenström, Christofer, 1972-
(författare)
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Supporting Dynamic Decision Making in Naval Search and Evasion Tasks
- 2011
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis investigates a decision aid to support tasks where there is an initial sighting of an object and then the decision maker has to guide some vehicles, either to reestablish contact with the lost object or to stay clear of it. As such, the tasks are analogous to naval search and evasion tasks. The decision aid helps a user to keep track of where enemy units can be by visualizing constraints on the units’ movement. Six studies are included. The first investigates how commanders judge the threat in a tactical situation and what they do to control that threat. The results point to that analysis of the enemy is a difficult task and has the potential to be improved by a support system. The second study investigates how commanders analyze the enemy. The results suggest that the uncertainties regarding the location and behavior of the enemy are central problems for the commander. It further describes a strategy that the participants use to cope with those problems, and the strategy is used as basis for the proposed decision aid. The remaining studies are experiments in which the support system is evaluated. A search task and an evasion task are used, and participants with and without experience from the tasks participate. The results suggest that the decision aid increased performance in both tasks and that both university students and navy officers gained from using it. Further, when using the visualization novice participants performed on the same level as the experienced. It was easy to learn how to use the visualization, and transfer to a situation without it depended on the complexity of its outline. The findings have practical application for designers of command and control support systems as they indirectly suggest that people have problems in inferring the whereabouts of contacts of which they only have fragmentary information. Thus, including the proposed decision aid in the design of such systems may have positive impact on overall system performance.
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