| 1. |
- Farm, Ante, et al.
(författare)
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Noncooperative Flexible Pricing in a Homogenous Market
- 1986
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A market is studied in which prices are set by the sellers, and where equilibrium is established through pure price adjustment. It is assumed that the sellers can observe each others' prices, and that each of them is free to instantly and costlessly change his price. In this setting it is shown that, when the number of competitors is large, a "cartel price", above the (Walrasian) competitive price, is an equilibrium - in fact the unique equilibrium price on the Pareto frontier.
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| 2. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Balanced-Budget Redistribution as Political Equilibrium
- 1985
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper considers balanced-budget redistribution between socioeconomic groups of individuals as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties. Equilibrium is unique in the present model, and a sufficient condition for existence is given, requiring that there be sufficient "stochastic heterogeneity" with respect to party preferences in the electorate. The validity of Hotelling's "principle of minimum differentiation", as well as of "Director's law", is examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs and voters' possibilities of "exit" adn "voice" in the election process. The policy strategy of expected-plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the parobability of gaining a plurality. Incomes are fixed and known, so lump-sum taxation is feasible. However, constraints on tax/transfer differentitation between individuals are permitted in the analysis.
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| 3. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Debt-Financed Transfers, Public Consumption and Public Investment in an Open Economy
- 1985
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper compares the welfare implications for two consecutive generations of debt-financed public spending of three different types - tansfer payments, public consumption and public (infrastructure) investment. The analysis is performed by means of an overlapping generations model with the consumption of a publicly provided good in the utility function of the consumer and the stock of public productive capital in the private sector's production function. The standard overlapping generations model is extended also to include work in the second period of the individual's life and asset holdings in his/her preference function. It is shown how the utility effects on different generations depend not only on the type of spending but also on the implications of the spending for future tax (transfer) payments, as well as on the initial levels of public consumption and public capital.
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| 4. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Political Equilibrium in Representative Democracy
- 1989
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- It is shown in this paper that the Median Voter Theorem lacks robustness in the sense that if voters have (even the slightest) preferences for the competing candidates, beside preferences for their current policy proposals, then no policy in the neighbourhood of the median voter's preferred policy constitutes an equilibrium (in pure strategies). This suggests that this classical theorem does not apply to representative democracy. Indeed, if voters do have candidate preferences, and these are strong enough, the policy-motivated candidates will, in general, adopt differing policy positions in equilibrium, and, under certain qualifications, the equilibrium outcome will be (close ti) a particular utilitarian optimum. More specifically, in a discretized model the policy outcome will lie between the preferred policy of the most popular candidate and this utilitarian optimum.
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| 5. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Strategic Interaction with Altruism : The Economics of Fait Accompli
- 1987
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The present paper analyzes the strategic and intertemporal insteraction between two well-informed economic agents, who have more or less "altruistic" preferences vis-à-vis each others. The agents may be two individuals, a social bureau and a client, or two units in an organization, etc. It is shown that the presence of altruism in such situations easily leads to socially inefficient outcomes, in which one economic agent "free-rides" on the other's altruism. In the paper, a formal definition of free-riding is suggested, and necessary and sufficient conditions are given for it to occur in subgame perfect equilibrium. We also discuss how such free-riding might be mitigated by social security systems.
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| 6. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Welfare Effects of Alternative Forms of Public Spending
- 1986
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper analyzes welfare effects, in a second-best world, of public spending of three different types: transfer payments, public consumption and public investment. It is shown how these effects depend not only on the type of spending but also on the initial level of spending, as well as on anticipated consequences for future taxes and transfer payments. The analysis is performed in an overlapping generations model with (i) individuals who in each period endogenously allocate their time between (taxed) market work and (tax free) home production, (ii) a publicly provided good ("public consumption") that enters as a secondfactor in home production, and (iii) productivity-enhancing public investment in the private (market) production sector. The consequences for the current account of the balance of payments of the different spending alternatives are also studied.
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| 7. |
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, et al.
(författare)
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An Upper Bound on Optimal Income Taxes
- 1986
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - 0047-2727. ; 30, s. 165-181
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, et al.
(författare)
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Efficient Income Taxation in Steady State
- 1985
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- With the Pareto principle as the sole normative criterion, simple necessary conditions for efficient tax rates on labour and capital incomes are established in an overlapping-generations model. The individuals in the economy have differing earning abilities and their labour supply is elastic. The analysis focuses on inragenerational aspects and is restricted to linear taxation in steady states of a closed economy. Both "global" results on the range of efficient tax rates, and "local" counterparts are given, the latter in the form of upper bounds that depend on the (uncompensated) elasticities of aggregate labour supply and private savings. The Golden Rule is shown to apply in this context.
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