| 1. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Social Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting
- 1996
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper analyzes the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in a public finance context. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger population fraction adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. It is shown that this may give rise to multiple equilibria and to non-linearities that do not arise from economic incentives alone. In the model, individuals also vote on taxes and transfers. Hence, the social norm influences both their economic and political behavior. We show that monotone and continuous changes in external factors may result in non-monotone, and even discontinuous, changes in the political equilibrium.
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| 2. |
- Nyberg, Sten, 1962-, et al.
(författare)
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Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State
- 1999
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Ingår i: Quarterly Journal of Economics. - : Oxford University Press. - 0033-5533 .- 1531-4650. ; 114:1, s. 1-35
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper analyzes the interplay between social norms and economic incentives in the context of work decisions in the modern welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population share adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. Individuals face two choices: one economic, whether to work or live off public transfers; and one political, how large the transfer should be. The size of the transfer and the intensity of the social norm are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
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| 3. |
- Weibull, Jörgen
(författare)
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Evolutionary Game Theory
- 1995
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This book provides a self-contained, concise, introduction to evolutionary game theory, focusing on conceptual and logical connections between evolutionary and noncooperative game theory. The text assumes a mathematical and game-theoretic background at about the master level in economics, biology or mathematics. The book considers single-population evolutionary models of pairwise interactions represented as a symmetric two-player games, discussas a few static concepts centered around the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy; a particular dynamic model of evolutionary selection in continuous time, the so-called replicator dynamics; and models of other selection dynamics, including dynamic models of social evolution. The book develops both static and dynamic models of multipopulation interactions represented as n-player games. An appendix provides a concise introduction to the theory of ordinary differential equations. Weibull is professor emeritus in Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics . Bibliography; index.
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| 4. |
- Weibull, Jörgen
(författare)
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The Mass-Action Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium
- 1995
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Nash's "mass action" interpretation of his equilibrium concept for on-cooperative games, boundedly rational players are repeatedly and randomly drawn from large populations to play the game, one population for each player position. The players are assumed to base their strategy choice on the strategies' observed "relative advantage". This note formally examines this interpretation in terms of a few classes of population dynamics based on imitative and innovative adaption, and innovative adaption with memory, respectively. Extending some results in evolutionary game theory, connections between long-run aggregate behaviour and Nash equilibrium are established.
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