| 1. |
- Banerjee, Abhijit, et al.
(författare)
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Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games
- 2000
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Ingår i: Games and economic behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 32:1, s. 1-24
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games and specifically characterizes the set of neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk 2×2 coordination games. With a finite message set, this set is finite. As the number of messages goes to infinity, the set expands toward a countable limit. The Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium payoff is its unique cluster point. By contrast, the corresponding limit set of strategically stable outcomes is dense in the interval spanned by the Nash equilibrium payoffs of the underlying game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C70.
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| 2. |
- Benaim, Michel, et al.
(författare)
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Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- 2003
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Ingår i: Econometrica. - : Wiley-Blackwell. - 1468-0262 .- 0012-9682. ; 71:3, s. 873-903
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when finite populations recurrently play finite games. The processes are Markov chains, and the approximation is defined in continuous time as a system of ordinary differential equations of the type studied in evolutionary game theory. We establish precise connections between the long-run behavior of the discrete stochastic process, for large populations, and its deterministic flow approximation. In particular, we provide probabilistic bounds on exit times from and visitation rates to neighborhoods of attractors to the deterministic flow. We sharpen these results in the special case of ergodic processes. Copyright Econometric Society, 2002.
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| 3. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics
- 2003
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Ingår i: Journal of the European Economic Association. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1542-4766 .- 1542-4774. ; 1:2-3, s. 533-542
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare‐state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.
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| 4. |
- Matros, Alexander, et al.
(författare)
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Bertrand competition with forward-looking consumers
- 2001
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In the standard model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every time period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods, and if they have some foresight. Consumers who observe price undercutting may (correctly) anticipate a subsequent price war, and may therefore postpone purchases. This effect may drastically reduce the profits to a deviation from collusive pricing. Hence, consumers' intertemporal substitution possibilities and foresight may facilitate collusion against them. However, such a richer model of the demand side complicates the analysis, since the interaction between the firms no longer constitutes a repeated game - and hence falls outside the domain of the usual Folk theorems. We formally analyze collusive pricing in such a setting, and identify cases both when collusion is facilitated and when it is made more difficult when consumers have perfect foresight. We also consider cases of imperfect foresight.
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| 5. |
- Mattsson, Lars-Göran, et al.
(författare)
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Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality
- 2002
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 41:1, s. 61-78
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We derive a family of probabilistic choice models, including the multinomial logit model, from a microecononic model in which the decision maker has to make some effort in order to implement any desired outcome. The disutility of this effort enters the decision maker's goal function in an additively separable way. A particular disutility function, yielding the multinomial logit as a special case, is characterized axiamatically. The present approach naturally leads to a normalization of the achieved utility with respect to the number of alternatives. The approach also applies to continuum choice sets in Euclidean spaces, and provides a microeconomic foundation for logit-type quantal-response models in game theory.
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| 6. |
- Weibull, Jörgen
(författare)
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Testing game theory
- 2004
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Ingår i: Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour. - : Palgrave Macmillan.
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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